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The Failure of
The International
Community to
Implement RtoP:
The Darfur Crisis
VICTORIA L. SITCAWICH
Acronym Glossary
AL…………………………… The Arab League
AMIS……..… African Union Mission in Sudan
AU……………………......... The African Union
AUPSC………........... African Union Peace and
Security Council
CPA……… Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DPA…………………. Darfur Peace Agreement
DPKO……… Department for Peacekeeping
Operations
GoS…………………. Government of Sudan
ICC……………… International Criminal Court
ICISS………… International Commission on
Intervention and State Sovereignty
IDP……………….. Internally Displaced Person
IGO…………...International Governmental
Organization
JEM………….. Justice and Equality Movement
RtoP……………...Responsibility to Protect
SLM/A…Sudan Liberation Movement/Army
UN………………………… The United Nations
UNAMID…………United Nations-African
Union Mission in Darfur
UNGA…… United Nations General Assembly
UNSC……….. United Nations Security Council
US………………………… The United States

4

Abstract
Who is responsible for protecting the rights
of global populations, and how should such
protection be implemented? This paper
illustrates the ineffectiveness of the doctrine,
Responsibility to Protect (RtoP), in terms of
practice and implementation in the global
community. Focusing on the Darfur conflict
that emerged in 2003, this paper presents
qualitative and quantitative data that provide
evidence of the international community’s
failure to successfully intervene and
promote a sustainable conflict resolution.
The emergence of RtoP and its defining
points are first examined in this paper,
followed by the failures of RtoP as they
relate to international organizations and
external states involved in resolving the
Darfur conflict. RtoP’s failures can be
attributed to its ambiguous foundation, lack
of legal standing, and its controversial
nature. Consequently, Darfur continues to
experience mass atrocities today.
Introduction

Following the end of the Cold War,
intrastate conflicts have increased, triggering
necessary debates regarding suitable
response methods to such crises. A central
theme to these debates is humanitarian
intervention, its legality, and its
implementation. In 2001, the Canadian
International Commission on Intervention
and State Sovereignty (ICISS) announced its
creation of the doctrine, The Responsibility
to Protect (RtoP), which was later endorsed
by 150 Heads of State and Government in
the text of the 2005 World Summit Outcome
(“2005 World Summit” 2005). The doctrine
has served as an international norm that
unites human rights with state sovereignty,
and provides a foundation for when human
intervention should be deemed appropriate.
However, RtoP has not been successful in
facilitating effective change when
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confronting intrastate conflict. The Darfur
crisis provides evidence of RtoP’s failure, as
Darfur’s population continues to suffer from
mass atrocities, and the international
community remains in disagreement over
how to implement such an ambiguous
international concept. In theory, RtoP serves
to protect individual human rights, which
has the potential to shift the current
international order. However, RtoP lacks a
clear legal status and, therefore, fails to be
effectively implemented, as exemplified in
the Darfur conflict that erupted in 2003.
The Emergence of RtoP

5

Throughout the 1990s, international
intervention greatly increased as a result of
escalating intrastate humanitarian crises,
including the Rwandan genocide in 1994
and the mass killings in Srebrenica in 1995
(Orford 2013, 98). However, problems
regarding the legitimacy, authority, and
credibility of such international operations
quickly formed, making it clear that existing
legal and political concepts could not serve
to address such issues (Orford 2013, 98).
For example, it remained unclear which
local actors to recognize as collaborators
when making pragmatic decisions about
who could effectively demonstrate control in
a region, or justly claim to represent the
people (Orford 2013, 99). Furthermore, both
the successes and failures of UN operations
in the 1990s called into question the
legitimacy of international authority (Orford
2013, 99).
Recognizing the controversial
concept of international intervention,
Francis Deng proposed a solution labeled,
“sovereignty as responsibility,” specifically
in regards to conflict management in Africa
(Bellamy 2013, 26). This idea marks the
starting point for RtoP, as it argues for
sovereign states to protect their populations
from human rights violations (Hall 2010, 2).

As argued by Deng, “We are clearly
witnessing what is probably an irresistible
shift in public attitudes toward the belief that
the defense of the oppressed in the name of
morality should prevail over frontiers and
legal documents” (Hall 2010, 2). However,
Deng’s work did not come without
criticisms, specifically from China during a
1993 discussion on IDPs in the UN’s
Human Rights Commission (Bellamy 2013,
26). China voiced its opposition of
interference in the internal affairs of states
based on ‘self-interested’ concepts of human
rights and ideologies held by ‘a few
countries’ (Bellamy 2013, 26).
China’s argument stated:
The practices of distorting human rights
standards, exerting political pressure
through abuse of monitoring
mechanisms, applying selectivity and
double-standards have led to the
violation of principles and purposes of
the UN Charter, and the impairing of the
sovereignty and dignity of many
developing countries. Thus the beautiful
term human rights has been tarnished
(Bellamy 2013, 26)

According to China, ‘sovereignty as
responsibility’ posed a threat to legitimizing
the interference of the strong in the affairs of
the postcolonial, weaker countries (Bellamy
2013, 26-27). China views humanitarian
intervention as having ties to imperialism,
which calls into question the ability of
powerful states to remove self-interests from
their agendas when acting as humanitarian
interveners (Orford 2013, 100). In
opposition to China’s view, Kofi Annan
stressed the horridness of not providing
humanitarian aid on the basis that it directly
conflicts with state sovereignty (Grono
2006, 622).
In response to this debate, the
Canadian government announced at the
General Assembly in 2000 its establishment
of the ICISS, which sought to eliminate the
apparent tension between sovereignty and
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humanitarian intervention through its 2001
report, The Responsibility to Protect (Orford
2013, 101). Per the ICISS, state sovereignty
calls for the responsibility of a state to
protect its own population and the rights of
its people (Grono 2006, 623). If a state is
unable to do so, then the international
community has the right to intervene on the
grounds of a responsibility to protect
individuals’ sovereignty (Grono 2006, 623).
With that said, the international community
and the states themselves should always first
attempt to prevent the outbreak of any
violations to human rights (Hall 2010, 10).
The report even mentions the necessity of
dedicating a greater commitment and more
resources to prevention options (Hall 2010,
10). RtoP was unanimously adopted by the
states that participated in the 2005 World
Summit, which served as the Summit’s
greatest accomplishment (Grono 2006, 622).
RtoP’s mandate is outlined in sections 138
and 139 of the 2005 World Summit
Outcome, which state:
138. Each individual State has the
responsibility to protect its populations
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing and crimes against humanity.
This responsibility entails the prevention
of such crimes…
139. The international community,
through the United Nations, also has the
responsibility to protect to use
appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian
and other peaceful means, in accordance
with Chapters VI and VIII of the
Charter, to help to protect populations
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing and crimes against humanity
(“Implementing RtoP” 2009, 4)

6

According to UN Secretary-General Ban Kimoon, there exists a three-pillar RtoP
implementation strategy, which includes
“(1) The protection responsibilities of the
State, (2) International assistance and
capacity building, and (3) Timely and
decisive response” (“Implementing RtoP”
2009, 2). Ki-moon claims that the provisions

presented in paragraphs 138 and 139 exist
within well-established principles of
international law, which permits this
implementation strategy to exist
(“Implementing RtoP” 2009, 5). Under
conventional and customary law, states are
obligated to prevent and punish “genocide,
war crimes, and crimes against humanity”
(“Implementing RtoP” 2009, 5). Ethnic
cleansing is not technically a crime under
international law, but acts of ethnic
cleansing may fall under one of the other
three crimes (“Implementing RtoP” 2009,
5). It should be stressed that actions under
paragraphs 138 and 139 of the Summit
Outcome are to be undertaken only in
conformity with the requirements, purposes
and principles of the UN Charter
(“Implementing RtoP” 2009, 5). In that
regard, RtoP does not change, but instead
reinforces, the legal obligations of Member
States to refrain from the use of force except
in compliance with the Charter
(“Implementing RtoP” 2009, 5).
Background on the Darfur Conflict
Located in Sudan’s western region,
Darfur has experienced decades of
oppression, drought, and numerous
overlapping conflicts (Refer to Figure 1 for
a visual of Darfur’s geographical location)
(De Waal 2007, 1039). The civil war in
Darfur that is made up of large-scale attacks
by the GoS and its proxies, as well as rebel
groups, serves as a model situation in which
RtoP can and should be implemented (De
Waal 2007, 1039). With a lack of political
will from Sudan’s government to resolve
conflict, the international community, as
stated in RtoP, has the responsibility to offer
its protection to the people of Darfur.
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Figure 1: Political Map of Darfur in Sudan

“Origins: Current Events in Historical Perspectives.” 2017.
Ohio State University.

7

In April of 2003, war in the Darfur
region was officially declared, as rebel
groups attacked the airport in El Fashir, the
capital of North Darfur (“Chaos by Design”
2007, 27). In response to the attacks, the
GoS recruited and armed their primarily
Arab forces, known as the Janjaweed militia,
to commit atrocities against civilian
populations (“Chaos by Design” 2007, 27).
Specifically, the Fur, Zaghawa, and Masalit
ethnic groups were attacked, as they are the
same groups that make up most the rebel
Sudan Liberation Movement/Army
(SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality
Movement (JEM) (“Chaos by Design” 2007,
27). By mid-2004, it is estimated that
hundreds of villages had been burned and
looted, thousands of civilians had been
killed, over a million civilians had been
displaced (“Chaos by Design” 2007, 27).
Tensions in the Darfur region have
existed for decades. After being an
independent Muslim sultanate until 1916,
Darfur became a neglected adjunct to Sudan
for a brief 40-year colonial period (De Waal
2007, 1039). The following 40 years of

independent rule did not make progress in
terms of developments, as Darfurians
remained desperately poor (De Waal 2007,
1039). In the 1980s, the Darfur region had
very little political stability due to the
conflict in southern Sudan (“Chaos by
Design” 2007, 28). Additionally, climate
change and famine played factors in the
tensions that grew among Darfurians. The
Sudanese government began to provide
Arab militia with weapons to fight off
southern Sudanese rebels. At the same time,
the civil war in neighboring Chad spilled
over into Darfur. The GoS took no action as
militia drawn from Darfur’s Arab tribes
armed themselves with the support of their
Chadian comrades and tried to seize land
from their Fur and Masalit neighbors (De
Waal 2007, 1039).
Throughout the 1990s, parts of
Darfur erupted into conflict due to a
combination of clashes among tribes over
land, grazing, and water resources.
Khartoum addressed local conflicts by
distributing arms to one side to overpower
the other. Generally, the GoS favored the
Arabs through this policy (De Waal 2007,
1039). The Sudanese police force was not
proactive due to a lack of funding and
resources, as well as a lack of political will.
It was during this decade that certain nonArab communities, more specifically the
Fur, Zaghawa, and Masalit, began to
announce the government’s biased treatment
of Darfur’s communities, based upon race
and politics (“Chaos by Design” 2007, 28).
In 2003, the GoS increased tensions
in the region by recruiting thousands of poor
men, most of whom identified as Arabs
(“Chaos by Design” 2007, 29). These men
had suffered through desertification and
water shortages, which made the recruiting
process easy for the GoS. They joined the
Janjaweed militia, and committed numerous
atrocities, mainly targeting non-Arab
communities. This ethnic cleansing
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campaign continues today due to “the
climate of fear, along with the land
occupations and almost total lack of
accountability for war-related crimes”
(“Chaos by Design” 2007, 29). The effects
of the Darfur conflict have been significant,
as indicated in Figure 2. Approximately four
million civilians have been affected by the
conflict, and roughly two million civilians
have been internally displaced as of 2008
(Foerstel, 2008, 260).
Figure 2: Number of Darfurians Displaced by Crisis

Foerstel, Karen. 2008. “Crisis in Darfur.” CQ Global
Researcher 2 (9): 243-270.

Fighting continues among the GoS
and rebel groups today, with an estimated
300,000 fatalities in 2012 (“Enough Project”
2014). The Darfur conflict has been
categorized as genocide, which sets the
crisis up as a test case for RtoP (Okeke
2010, 67). There must exist a deep
understanding of the political and economic
context in which the Darfur crisis has been
shaped and sustained in order to determine
the way in which RtoP should be applied
(Okeke 2010, 77). Even with the approval of
RtoP among 150 Heads of State and
Government, there is still yet to be an
effective solution in terms of forming a
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conflict resolution and sustaining peace in
Darfur.
Literature Review: Theoretical Views on
International Intervention
Does the international community
have the right, or perhaps the duty, to
intervene in the internal affairs of states?
Such has been debated by international
relations scholars for decades, and continues
to spark polarizing opinions in the academic
and political courts. Cases have been made
for this question based on theoretical
applications, including the pluralist
perspective, cosmopolitan school of thought,
and the realist critique. Although strong
arguments have been made based on each
theory, the realist critique continues to
dominate international relations, as it best
captures real world politics.
One who embraces the pluralist
perspective believes in the idea of an
international community of sovereign states,
in which the right to intervene in the affairs
of other states is not permitted (Ramsbotham
et al. 2011, 396). Instead, the pluralist
perspective promotes conflict settlement
through peaceful means, such as diplomacy,
mediation, and negotiation (396). Although
this theory suggests a moral approach to
international crisis, it is not the reality in
which the world functions today. As argued
by realist thinkers, Kegley and Wittkopf,
there is an incentive for UN members to
assist in the peacekeeping missions that
benefit their own self-interests (Mandoyi et
al. 2013, 2). Furthermore, Nel claims that
states only act morally when it is beneficial
to their self-interests, and refrain from such
morality when it does not assist their selfbenefitting agendas (Mandoyi et al. 2013,
2). The points made by realist thinkers in
regards to states favoring national interests
and security over moral concerns has been
illustrated throughout history. For example,
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China continues to support the Sudanese
government, despite atrocities it has
committed since 2003, in order to secure its
stake in Sudan’s oil supply (Mandoyi 2013,
2-3).
Unlike the pluralist view of the
international community of sovereign states,
the cosmopolitan perspective is the idea of a
world community (Ramsbotham et al. 2011,
396). This perspective focuses on a nonviolent transformation through reformed
structures of global governance
(Ramsbotham et al. 2011, 396-397). It tends
to stray from non-intervention norms, which
directly opposes the pluralist resistance of
outside domination (Ramsbotham et al.
2011, 398). The cosmopolitan belief in
transformative conflict resolution, which
strives to ensure that genuine human needs
are satisfied, is looked upon by the pluralist
theory as directly opposing state sovereignty
(Ramsbotham et al. 2011, 398). Such an idea
is combated by the realist perspective, which
argues that mediation, negotiation, and
humanitarian aid can have an unintentional
effect of extending the conflict, with civilian
populations suffering most (Ramsbotham et
al. 2011, 400). Such is evident in the case of
Darfur, as the non-violent intervention of
international organizations like the African
Union has indeed prolonged the conflict,
resulting in the continued atrocities against
civilians (Mandoyi et al. 2013, 8).
The realist perspective critiques the
cosmopolitan view by labeling it as
‘idealistic’ (Ramsbotham et al. 2011, 399).
David Shearer argues that there are
limitations to strategies that rely exclusively
on negotiation and the ability of parties to
reach a consensus (Shearer 1997, 845). He
claims that military force can serve as a
means to conflict resolution, despite its
controversial nature (Shearer 1997, 845). On
the other hand, Richard Falk’s idea of
“humane governance” embodies the
cosmopolitan perspective, as it focuses on a

non-violent transformation of conflict, and is
“informed by one of the most fully formed
and morally powerful globalist conceptions
available today” (Shaw 1996, 183).
However, the steps taken to implement a
non-violent conflict transformation remain
somewhat vague, and extremely difficult to
successfully apply.
According to the realist perspective,
conflict resolution is incapable of solving
the impact of “globalization on the
weakening of vulnerable states, the
provision of cheap weaponry suitable for
‘asymmetric war,’ and the generation of
shadow economies that make ‘new wars’
self-perpetuating and profitable”
(Ramsbotham et al. 2011, 399). Therefore, it
is widely accepted among realist thinkers
that conflict resolution, which disregards
non-intervention norms, should be avoided.
David Chandler even goes so far as to claim
that regardless of the reason for neglecting
non-intervention norms, whether it is for
humanitarianism, democracy, or conflict
resolution, it is simply not tolerable
(Ramsbotham et al. 2011, 398).
The ongoing debate among
international relations scholars, as well as
political actors, in regards to international
intervention reflects the complexity of the
issue. Although the cosmopolitan
perspective focuses on the important need of
catering to individual human rights, it does
not provide a realistic means of doing so, as
states are naturally selfish, and constantly
seeking self-preservation. Therefore, it
cannot be assumed that states will be able to
join together to intervene in the affairs of
another state on the basis of moral purposes.
The realist perspective provides a much
more applicable depiction of current world
affairs, including states’ motives for
international intervention.
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Opposing Viewpoints on Humanitarian
Intervention: State Sovereignty Vs.
Human Rights
RtoP is founded on the belief that
sovereign states have a responsibility to
protect their populations from “genocide,
war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes
against humanity” (Grono 2006, 623). If a
state is unable to provide protection, then the
responsibility falls on the international
community to intervene and provide
protection to a population. The report also
stresses that the international community not
only holds the responsibility to react to
situations in which human rights are
violated, but it must also work to prevent
such violations, and to rebuild a stabilized
state (Grono 2006, 623). With a current
international order based on the sovereignty
of states, RtoP has produced a great deal of
controversy, hindering its universal
acceptance and implementation. One of the
underlying issues of RtoP is the continuous
debate over state sovereignty and human
rights.
The origins of human security are
credited to the actions of the United Nations
in the twentieth century (Hall 2010, 4).
During a time of growing emphasis on
human rights to the international
community, and the idea that states could
not be trusted to ensure the safety of their
own populations, the UN introduced human
rights as a factor when dealing with
international peace and security. It is
important to note that the UN focused on
individual human rights, rather than on
states’ rights. Human security was officially
defined in the 1994 Human Development
Report released by the United Nations
Development Program as an idea, which
“equates security with people rather than
with territories, with development rather
than with arms” (Hall 2010, 4). Such a new
concept has called for the redefining of state

10

sovereignty and the introduction to
individual sovereignty (Hall 2010, 5).
This concept has stimulated much
debate, as those who believe in traditional
sovereignty argue that intervention
conducted by the international community is
a violation of state sovereignty, and poses a
threat to international order in the long term
(Ayoob 2006, 225). In the traditional sense
(according to Chapter VI of the UN
Charter), peacekeepers are only supposed to
act in self-defense and with the consent of
the host government (Williams 2010, 12).
Advocates of traditional sovereignty argue
that nations enjoy a fundamental right to
self-determination (Bellamy 2013, 15). In
other words, all sovereign states should be
free to determine their own cultures and
systems of governance (Bellamy 2013, 15).
To secure this freedom, non-intervention is
necessary, as it protects the weak states from
the strong states (Bellamy 16). In doing so,
the potential return of colonialism is
prevented (Bellamy 2013, 16).
A traditional sovereignty supporter
believes that “A relaxed attitude to
intervention would create disorder, as states
would wage war to protect and export their
own cultural and political preferences”
(Bellamy 2013, 17). The relaxation of nonintervention could ultimately lead to the
legitimation of colonialism (Bellamy 2013,
17). This position is held by most states,
which severely inhibits RtoP from evolving
and spreading (Bellamy 2013, 18). As a
counterargument to favoring human rights
over state sovereignty, Ayoob states that
“Even if human rights are thought to be
inalienable…rights still must be identified –
that is, constructed – by human beings and
codified in legal systems” (2006, 226).
Currently, only the UNSC can legally
authorize intervention and, therefore, acting
otherwise would undermine the rule of law
and the fundamental human right to selfdetermination (Bellamy 2013, 17). It is of
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the utmost importance that states abide by
the legal rules of the current international
order, which supports the notion of nonintervention (Bellamy 2013, 17).
Mamdani states, “Many believe that
we are in throes of a systematic transition in
international relations” (2009, 273). He is
referring to the undeniable shift that has
taken place since the end of the Cold War, in
which the international humanitarian order
promises to ensure that a human rights
standard is held by all sovereign states
(Mamdani 2009, 273). However, as argued
by Mamdani, this humanitarian order does
not acknowledge citizenship. Instead, it
turns citizens into “passive beneficiaries” of
an external “responsibility to protect”
(Mamdani 2009, 275). Citizens are no
longer “bearers of rights,” which eliminates
their citizenship and forces them to rely
upon the help of external forces (Mamdani
2009, 275). This creates an unchanging
international order in which “fragile” states
remain weak, while core nations continue to
dominate, using RtoP as a vehicle to do so.
Those who opt for change in the
current international order, however,
strongly challenge the perspective of
traditional sovereignty. Williams argues that
state sovereignty and human rights are not
opposing concepts, but rather are associated
with one another (2010, 12). The principle
of RtoP is formed on this basis.
Nonintervention is not a result of
sovereignty, as it is merely a rule created by
sovereigns to govern their relations with one
another (Bellamy 2013, 14). This rule,
however, can be changed and still permit the
existence of sovereign states. What is then
proposed is ‘sovereignty as responsibility’,
which is based on two foundations: First, the
recognition that individuals have inalienable
human rights that are “natural, equal, and
universal” (Bellamy 2013, 19). These rights
were formed before politics and, therefore,
are not secondary to the rights of sovereigns

11

(Bellamy 2013, 19). Second, governments
maintain the responsibility to protect their
populations, but the international
community has the right and duty to
intervene if the rights of a population are
being abused (Bellamy 2013, 19). Such
concepts have served as the basis for RtoP,
which gained unanimous support among
states at the 2005 World Summit.
Despite its praise at the World
Summit, RtoP has since been reconsidered
among policymakers. As stated by the
president of the International Crisis Group,
“There has since 2005 been some
backsliding from this highpoint. One doesn’t
have to spend too much time in UN
corridors…before hearing expressions of
regret, or even denial, that so far-reaching a
doctrine could possibly have been agreed to
by national leaders” (Mamdani 2009, 275276). Such a powerful statement indicates a
significant disconnection between current
international policies and the goals set by
RtoP. Thus, RtoP remains a controversial
doctrine that requires further development in
order to gain stronger support.
International Organizations in Darfur:
Failure to Bring Conflict Resolution and
Peace
International organizations and the
international community of sovereign states
initially failed Darfur by not taking action to
dissolve tension between the rebel groups
and the GoS, which resulted in the start of
mass atrocities in 2003. Looked upon as a
test case for RtoP, the Darfur conflict
illustrates the international community’s
failure to prevent mass atrocities and diffuse
a highly tense situation before it became a
conflict. Not only were no prevention
measures taken, but international
organizations, such as the African Union
(AU) and the UN, proved to be indecisive
and timid when acting as peacekeepers in
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Darfur. In 2009, the Secretary General of the
UN published the three pillars that should be
used to implement RtoP: The protection
responsibility of the State, international
assistance and capacity-building, and timely
and decisive response (“Implementing
RtoP” 2009). Such implementation methods
have not been effectively executed in
Darfur, as the AU continues to lack the
proper funds and resources, and the
decisions of the UNSC are influenced by
states with opposing views.
The African Union
The AU was created in 2002, and is
considered to be an improvement over the
performance of its predecessor institution,
the Organization of African Unity (OAU), in
terms of human rights and peacekeeping
initiatives (Keith 2007, 153). However, such
improvements are not evident in the Darfur
region, as mass human rights violations
continue to occur daily, and peace is yet to
be attained (Keith 2007, 153). The AU’s
failure to protect human rights can be
attributed to its limited resources and lack of
political will (Keith 2007, 153). Regardless
of the unanimous acceptance of RtoP as an
international norm during the 2005 World
Summit, the AU has not effectively
established its presence in Darfur, nor has it
guided a conflict resolution through RtoP’s
provisions.
The Darfur crisis, which began in
2003, greatly tested the ability of the AU to
uphold its Constitutive Act (Keith 2007,
154). The charter emphasizes a commitment
to human rights, and provides the AU with
the authority to back up that commitment
with action. As stated in Article 4(h) of the
Constitutive Act, the AU has the right “to
intervene in a Member State pursuant to a
decision of the Assembly in respect of grave
circumstances, namely: war crimes,
genocide and crimes against humanity”
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(“Constitutive Act” 2000, 7). The AU was
forced to act as both peacemaker and
peacekeeper in Darfur, as no other
organization wanted to take on the
challenge, and pressure from outside forces,
including the US and several European
countries, began to surface (Flint 2008,
173).
The Constitutive Act strongly
indicates that the AU, not the UNSC, may
undertake primary responsibility when
confronted with humanitarian emergencies
(Bellamy 2013, 79). As the primary
international organization responding to the
Darfur crisis, the AU insisted that RtoP
should not be used to undermine the
sovereignty of states (Bellamy 2013, 80).
Additionally, the AU argues that the use of
force must comply with Article 51 of the
UN Charter, which claims self-defense as a
necessary means of using force, and Article
4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act (Bellamy
2013, 80). Such demands sought to limit
UNSC activism, and ultimately deemed the
provisions of RtoP as insignificant (Bellamy
2013, 80). RtoP enables the international
community to intervene in the internal
affairs of a state, with or without the consent
of that state, when that state is unwilling or
unable to protect its population. Instead of
using RtoP to act quickly and efficiently, the
AU demanded consent from the GoS. The
AU’s actions indicate that the debate
between state sovereignty and human rights
is still very much apparent in today’s
international order.
The AU has been the lead
international actor in Darfur since mid-2004,
beginning as a small monitoring mission
(Grono 2006, 625). This mission, endorsed
by the UNSC, monitored a humanitarian
ceasefire agreement, known as the
N’Djamena Agreement, between the rebels
and Khartoum (Keith 2007, 154). The
agreement was signed on April 8, 2004 by
the GoS, the SLM/A, and the JEM, and is
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responsible for creating the African Union
Mission in Sudan (AMIS), a team of
military observers protected by an armed
force. The agreement also called for the GoS
to neutralize the Janjaweed militia forces
and to provide humanitarian assistance, with
the help of the rebel factions (“Humanitarian
Ceasefire…” 2014).
Despite its good intentions, the
N’Djamena Agreement was a flawed
document for several reasons. First, the
agreement contained no maps, which
professional military officials from both
sides claimed beforehand would be
problematic (Flint 2008, 174). They argued
that no ceasefire could be monitored if the
peacemakers could not locate the
belligerents (Flint 2008, 174). Second, the
US and the UK wanted Khartoum, Chad,
and the AU to quickly fix the Darfur crisis,
as it threatened to undo the progress made in
the North-South Sudan talks (Flint 2008,
174-175). However, the ceasefire agreement
was not respected by any of the opposing
parties, and the AU monitors did not have
the power to enforce the agreement (Flint
2008, 175). Third, and perhaps the most
serious flaw, the N’Djamena Agreement
existed in two versions (Flint 2008, 175).
After both the GoS and the rebel factions
signed the agreement, the GoS delegation
demanded that it be revised to include a
provision of the location of the armed
forces’ sites (“Humanitarian Ceasefire…”
2014). Such a demand would not have been
agreed upon by the SLM/A, as doing so
would have put their men at risk of the
government’s air force and army (Flint
2008, 175). Nevertheless, the AU
representative added the provision by hand
to Article 6, and the Chadian mediator
decided to support the amended version
without the approval of the SLM/A
(“Humanitarian Ceasefire…” 2014). As a
result, the SLM/A deemed the final
agreement to be invalid, inhibiting its
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implementation (“Humanitarian
Ceasefire…” 2014).
The AU’s failure to bring peace to
Darfur is a result of several factors,
including the mutual mistrust between the
GoS and the rebel movements (Mandoyi
2013, 7). A lack of trust diminishes
confidence among the opposing parties, and
limits their willingness to negotiate and
compromise (Mandoyi 2013, 7).
Additionally, the incompetence of the
mediators hindered the Darfur peace process
from the very beginning (Mandoyi 2013, 7).
As is evident from the N’Djamena
Agreement, Chad did not have mediation
experience and lacked impartiality, as
Chadian President Derby clearly favored the
GoS throughout the ceasefire process
(Mandoyi 2013, 7). President Derby’s firm
stance against the rebels damaged his
credibility as a neutral mediator, and
ultimately led to the demand of international
observers by the rebel factions (Mandoyi
2013, 7). Even after the AU took the lead in
the negotiation process, little progress was
made, as the AU also proved to be a weak
mediator (Mandoyi 2013, 8).
The N’Djamena Agreement did not
successfully produce a ceasefire, but it did
provide the establishment of AMIS, through
which 120 military observers were
dispatched to monitor the ceasefire and 350
troops were sent to protect them (Flint 2008,
174). The AU Council did not consider an
armed humanitarian intervention, even
though such was possible under the
Constitutive Act (Flint 2008, 174). Instead,
the Council focused on traditional ceasefire
monitoring, and the troops were not
mandated to protect civilians (Flint
2008,174). The AU’s mandate has been
termed an “observer mission,” as it was
limited from taking action and proactively
protecting citizens in Darfur (Grono 2006,
626). Such limitations coincide with the lack
of funds and support that the AU received
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from the international community (Grono
2006, 626). With a very restrictive mandate
and little international support, the AU was
unable to implement RtoP in Darfur,
resulting in little progress made by the
organization.
Although AMIS was underfunded
and understaffed, it received credit for
making small improvements in Darfur
(Keith 2007, 154). The UNSC even gave
recognition to AMIS in Resolution 1706 for
“reducing large-scale organized violence”
(Keith 2007, 154). However, contributions
made by AMIS have been generally
regarded as inadequate, largely because of
its small size and lack of financial and
military resources (Keith 2007, 154). A
small number of Africa’s wealthier states
have suffered with the burden of paying for
the AU’s peacekeeping budgets,
accompanied by limited foreign funding
(Keith 2007, 155). From the start of its
mission in Sudan, the AU has lacked a
sufficient number of soldiers, which has
limited its ability to use the proper amount
of force needed to contain the conflict
(Keith 2007, 155). Furthermore, domestic
political factors have inhibited AMIS from
its potential to be an effective force.
Wealthy African nations contributing funds
to the AU’s peacekeeping missions are
limited to “what their people will tolerate
and what their other priorities will
accommodate” (Keith 2007, 155). Thus, the
AU received inadequate funding since the
beginning of its presence in Darfur.
In 2004, the AU assisted in
monitoring the Abuja Peace Talks, which
began among the two main rebel groups, the
SLM/A and the JEM, as well as the GoS.
These talks eventually led to the signing of
the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in 2006
(Lanz 2008, 78). During the Abuja Peace
Talks, the AU played a major role in
facilitating a political agreement through
means of mediation and infrastructure.
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However, the Abuja Talks dealt only with
security and humanitarian issues, instead of
addressing political and economic issues, the
root causes of the conflict (Mandoyi 2013,
8). The lack of addressing such foundational
issues, along with a misguided mediation
strategy involving “deadline diplomacy,”
lead to the collapse of the Abuja Talks
(Mandoyi 2013, 8).
There are several reasons why the
DPA failed to bring about a peaceful
resolution to this conflict. To begin, the
DPA was constructed by external mediators
and, therefore, was essentially not owned by
the Sudanese people (Lanz 2008, 78). This
has proven to be a universal problem in
attempts at conflict resolution by regional
and international organizations. Parties must
accept the agreement as something that they
contributed to, and are a part of, for such an
agreement to be successful. Limiting the
participation of all opposing parties severely
inhibited their ability to negotiate with one
another, and form a sustainable resolution.
Another negative impact that the AU
brought upon the resolution process was its
usage of “deadline diplomacy” (Lanz 2008,
78). The AU hurried through negotiations by
setting unrealistic deadlines in an attempt to
stop the mass killings in Darfur as quickly as
possible. For this reason, as well as pressure
from the international community, the AU
forced along the negotiation process, which
was ultimately deemed counterproductive
(Lanz 2008, 78). The set deadlines were
supposed to put pressure on the parties and
exhibit the seriousness of the international
community. However, when deadlines were
not met, there were no negative
repercussions (Nathan 2007, 498). As stated
in July of 2006 by a senior Sudanese
government official, “The United Nations
has threatened us so many times, we no
longer take it seriously” (Nathan 2007, 498).
Such a statement illustrates the
ineffectiveness of the deadlines as a means
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of pressuring the parties, and instead
suggests a lack of seriousness from the
international community (Nathan 2007,
498).
Even if the level of destruction is
severe, it is vital that mediators remain
patient when facilitating a negotiation
process. An attempt to force a quick
agreement in civil wars, such as the AU’s
usage of deadline diplomacy in Darfur, is a
set-up for failure. Mediators had limited the
timeframe of the negotiations by setting
deadlines, so that the opposing parties were
not allotted enough time to solve their
differences, and to fully discuss and
understand the DPA before signing it
(Mandoyi 2013, 8). Five days prior to the
April 30 deadline, the mediation team
presented the DPA to the parties on a “takeit-or-leave-it basis” (Nathan 2007, 498). The
parties were given less than a week to
understand and support an 86-page Englishlanguage document intended to accomplish
a ceasefire and address the causes of a civil
war (Nathan 2007, 498). Not only was the
DPA forced upon the parties, but many
rebels had difficulty understanding the
complicated document, as most rebel
negotiators spoke Arabic (Nathan 2007,
498). The Arabic version of the DPA was
not presented until April 28 and contained
many mistranslations. Most the rebels felt as
though they were not given enough time to
study the DPA and, therefore, rejected it
altogether (Nathan 2007, 498).
Pressure from the international
community reached its peak during the
process of the DPA signing. Despite its
reservations, the GoS stated its readiness to
endorse the DPA (Nathan 2007, 499).
External leaders and officials, including US
Deputy Secretary of State, Robert Zoellick,
offered the rebels guarantees regarding the
implementation of the DPA and threatened
them with collective and individual
sanctions (Nathan 2007, 499). The rebel
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leader of the SLA, Minni Minnawi, was put
under significant pressure and eventually
signed the DPA, along with the GoS, on
May 5 (Nathan 2007, 499). Months
following the DPA signing, both the GoS
and Minnawi breached their obligation to
refrain from killing civilians and obstructing
humanitarian relief efforts (Nathan 2007,
500). Additionally, the DPA did not include
the JEM, led by Abdel Wahid, which made
such an agreement very unlikely to succeed.
Without the inclusion of all opposing
parties, the DPA did not provide a concrete
foundation for conflict resolution in Darfur.
Tragically, the DPA did not achieve
peace and in some ways made the conflict
even worse. Neither party obeyed its
commitments, and the GoS continued to
bomb villages and terrorize IDP camps
(Flint 2008, 178). As insecurity grew around
IDP camps due to Janjaweed activity and
rebel threats after the DPA was signed,
AMIS officers began to rely on the
government representatives in their observer
bases for intelligence and force protection
(Flint 2008, 178). Between May and August
of 2006, the DPA destroyed what remained
of the AU’s impartiality and troops’ security
(Flint 2008, 179). Attacks against AMIS
escalated, leaving more than 40
peacekeepers dead by the time their mandate
ended on December 31, 2007 (Flint 2008,
179).
Throughout history, overstretched
and poorly funded peacekeeping missions
have struggled to keep peace in a place
where peace does not exist (Cooper 2009,
204). To measure the success of
peacekeeping, four criteria are taken into
consideration: 1) completion of the mandate,
2) facilitation of the conflict resolution, 3)
containment of the conflict, and 4) the
limitation of casualties (Mandoyi 2013, 8).
None of these criteria have been met in
Darfur. The AU’s mandate has not been
fulfilled, and civilian casualties, as well as
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IDPs, have continued to increase (Mandoyi
2013, 8). Moreover, the ways in which the
AU facilitated conflict resolution in Darfur
have prolonged the conflict, rather than
terminating it. The actions implemented by
the AU call into question the effect, or lack
thereof, that RtoP has in regards to
international intervention. There remains
great debate over how responsibilities
should be divided among the UN, regional
organizations, and third states under the
principle of RtoP (Hoffman 2012, 18).
Furthermore, the principle itself remains
ambiguous in regards to its scope and the
contents of its legal core (Hoffman 2012,
19). It is also vague in terms of its moral and
political implications (Hoffman 2012, 19).
For the RtoP principle to be truly helpful in
undertaking global humanitarian crisis, more
transparency on its standards and practical
implications is needed (Hoffman 2012, 19).
The United Nations
Over the period of 2004 to 2007, the
international community sought to achieve
several objectives for Darfur that included
refining security and humanitarian access,
supporting the CPA, developing a negotiated
peace, deploying a UN force, and punishing
those standing in the way of these goals (De
Waal 2007, 1041). The complexity of these
goals hindered the formation of a clear and
coherent strategy, and few objectives were
consistently monitored. For example, the
UNSC’s Resolution 1556 of July 30, 2004
demanded the disarmament of the Janjaweed
within 30 days, but failed to define
‘disarmament’ and ‘Janjaweed’ (De Waal
2007, 1041). As a result, the UNSC failed to
monitor the implementation of its demand,
and did not pose consequences on Khartoum
for failing to act (De Waal 2007, 1041). In
August, the UNSC demanded that security
from the GoS be provided to IDP camps, but
once again, the UNSC failed to take any
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follow-up actions when the GoS stalled in
addressing the demand (De Waal 2007,
1041). With an internally dysfunctional
regime answering to a perplexed and
inconsistent international community, it is
no surprise that little progress was made in
facilitating a peaceful resolution (De Waal
2007, 1043).
Edwards attributes such failures of
international organizations, like the UN, to
“the lack of universal membership, slow
response time, and insufficient capability or
resolve” (2010, 4). With this being the case,
RtoP can in no way improve collective
intervention without the appropriate
foundation to do so. The international
community under the UN struggled to act in
a timely manner in response to the Darfur
crisis, which is largely due to the differing
opinions of the major permanent states that
make up the SC. Furthermore, without equal
representation from all participating UN
member states, the underlying motives of
the states involved in the decision-making of
international organizations must be called
into question.
In the summer of 2005, the US
government voiced its support for replacing
AMIS with a UN peacekeeping force, as it
believed the UN had superior resources and
personnel capable of handling such a
complex humanitarian crisis as Darfur
proved to be (De Waal 2007, 1042). If the
AU, UN, and GoS agreed rapidly to this
proposal, it could have been timely and
effective. Instead, the secretariats and SC
members of the AU and UN were hesitant,
and Khartoum was opposed (De Waal 2007,
1042). Over the next two years, the US spent
the majority of its diplomatic resources and
political capital in the attempt to persuade
the AU, UN, and GoS to accept this policy
(De Waal 2007, 1042). Despite Khartoum’s
continuing opposition, the UNSC adopted
Resolution 1706 on August 31, 2006, which
called for Sudan’s consent to a UN force.
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This resolution implied that if consent was
not given, such a force might be dispatched
without it (De Waal 2007, 1042). In this
case, the UN’s use of collective security was
not enforced, as Sudanese President Omar al
Bashir rejected Resolution 1706 without any
repercussions (De Waal 2007, 1042). A
compromise proposal for a ‘hybrid’ AU-UN
force was suggested by the US and China,
and adopted by the UNSC on November 16.
After another eight months of disputing, the
SC finally obtained Sudan’s consent to the
hybrid AU-UN force, the United NationsAfrican Union Mission in Darfur
(UNAMID), which was mandated in
Resolution 1769 on July 31, 2007 (De Waal
2007, 1042).
Throughout 2004-2006, prior to the
official deployment of UNAMID, the debate
on the international military presence in
Darfur caused the international community’s
response to be slow and inefficient (De
Waal 2007, 1044). A major area of debate
included whether the troops should be under
the AU or the UN command. Additionally,
the numbers of troops and their capabilities
were called into question. The international
community generally agreed that the AMIS
force was too small and poorly equipped
(De Waal 2007, 1044). If AMIS or any UN
successor organization was to be responsible
for protecting IDP camps and humanitarian
supply routes, monitoring patrols over large
areas of Darfur, or administering a ceasefire,
it would have to be larger in size and better
equipped with more logistics and
communications (De Waal 2007, 1044).
Another area of debate rested on the
mandate itself that would be created and
implemented by the international force. All
states agreed that the mandate of ceasefire
monitoring that resulted from the
N’Djamena agreement was inadequate (De
Waal 2007, 1044). Questions regarding the
mandate gave rise to whether the force
should operate under Chapter VI or VII of
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the UN Charter, as well as how the force
would be financed (De Waal 2007, 1044).
The AU had no way of obtaining ample
financial contributions from its member
states to support AMIS because African
countries did not have the ability to pay (De
Waal 2007, 1044). Therefore, AMIS was
funded by optional contributions from
Europeans and North American
governments. A UN force authorized by the
UNSC, however, would be financed through
required contributions by UN member
states, deeming it more dependable (De
Waal 2007, 1044).
The deployment of a UN force
produced many debates, yet very little
attention was given to the notion of
operations and strategic goals of such a
force (De Waal 2007, 1045). The continuing
debate on RtoP parallels this emphasis, as
RtoP debates have focused on when and
whether to intervene, not how to do so and
with what goal in mind (De Waal 2007,
1045). Flawed and impractical expectations
of what UN troops would do in Darfur,
which were intensified by many Darfur
activists in the US, fueled fears and hopes in
Sudan (De Waal 2007, 1045). The GoS
feared the possibility of a UN force
mandated under Chapter VII of the UN
Charter, which would impose peace
enforcement in Darfur, rather than just
peacekeeping (De Waal 2007, 1045). Those
fears were stimulated partly by the potential
threat that a UN operation might pose, such
as executing arrest warrants on behalf of the
International Criminal Court (ICC)
(Aboagye 2007). At no point were sufficient
time, resources, or political leadership
committed to the duty of “properly
analyzing the security challenges on the
ground in Darfur, obtaining a common
understanding of the basic tasks by all
players (government, movements, other
armed groups and militia, AU and UN), and
orchestrating the different military, civilian
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and political instruments available” (De
Waal 2007, 1048). Hence, planning the
peace support operation in Darfur through
UNAMID proved to be deficient (De Waal
2007, 1049).
Because of a poor strategy on behalf
of the AU-UN force, as well as inadequate
funds and resources, humanitarian workers
have been exposed to kidnapping, robbery,
and harassment by government and rebel
forces (Reinold 2013, 75). Delays in
achieving full deployment of UNAMID
were caused by two factors, including
obstruction strategies used by the GoS,
which Khartoum also used to weaken
AMIS, and by the international community’s
slowness in providing the essential
personnel and resources for UNAMID to
function efficiently (Reinold 2013, 76). As
illustrated in Figure 3, the funds and
resources supplied to UNAMID as of 2008
had been far from adequate. At the time, not
even a single military aircraft had been
donated to UNAMID (Foerstel 2008, 247).
This depicts the international community’s
confusion on which states should be
responsible for supplying funds and
resources to international organizations in
times of humanitarian crisis.
Figure 3: UNAMID Resources and Funds (June 2008)

Foerstel, Karen. 2008. “Crisis in Darfur.” CQ Global
Researcher 2 (9): 247
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The Views and Actions of External States
in Response to the Darfur Crisis
The international community of
sovereign states has succeeded in providing
some life-saving humanitarian aid to Darfur,
but its initial response was a failure (Reinold
2013, 76). In addition to China and Russia’s
opposition to international intervention in
Darfur without the consent of its
government, Western states must also be
criticized for not raising the costs of
noncompliance for Khartoum (Reinold
2013, 77). Reinold argues that the
international community’s implementation
of a consent-based strategy in Darfur
remains the most fundamental issue that
resulted in failure to provide adequate
humanitarian assistance (2013, 77).
Although the concept of RtoP suggests that
the international community has a duty to
intervene even against the consent of the
host government, states have not been
willing to act without the consent of the GoS
(Reinold 2013, 77).
The United States
Since the end of the Cold War, the
US is less motivated to become involved in
distant African conflicts (Francis 1998, 8).
This is the result of donor weariness, deaths
of Westerners in Somalia, and the feeling
that ethnic conflicts are oftentimes endless
(Francis 1998, 8). However, the US
government has done more than most other
governments to help Darfurian citizens, yet
its efforts are mainly “responsive only to
pressure” (Reinold 2013, 77). A significant
factor in shaping the US response to the
crisis in Darfur was the public outrage at the
atrocities reported by the US media (Reinold
2013, 78). The US has repeatedly called for
tougher measures to force Khartoum to stop
using the Janjaweed and it has provided aid
to the people of Darfur (Reinold 2013, 77).
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Actions taken by the US in response
to the Darfur conflict, though greater than
other nations, remain limited. Many of the
decisions made by the US can be attributed
to various factors, including the War on
Terror (Reinold 2013, 81). Involvement in
Afghanistan and Iraq left the US with little
“troops, political capital, or attention for
Darfur” (Reinold 2013, 81). Additionally,
the Bush administration devoted significant
efforts to settle the war in the South of
Sudan by helping to finalize the CPA
(Reinold 2013, 81). Thus, the US did not
dedicate the necessary amounts of funds and
resources in Darfur. Cooper accuses the US
of focusing on crisis management in the
middle or late states of a conflict: “Western
governments have invested hundreds of
billions of dollars in the capability to fight
and win wars, but little money or time in
developing the skill, knowledge, and
practical tools necessary to prevent deadly
conflict.” (Cooper 2009, 205). While State
Department documents now claim that the
US has a commitment to preventing and
resolving conflict, rhetoric does not match
reality (Cooper 2009, 205). Governments at
the 2005 World Summit agreed that
prevention should be a priority focus of
international efforts to protect populations
because, in theory, prevention stops
conflicts (Cooper 2009, 205). However,
conflicts that seem preventable continue to
emerge (Cooper 2009, 205).
China
During the 1990s, China acted on its
interest in Africa for new sources of oil and
other key resources (Traub 2010). In 1996,
China had bought a 40 percent stake in
Sudan’s leading oil company, while Western
oil companies were pulling out of Sudan due
to its state sponsor of terrorism (Traub
2010). China later helped Sudan develop the
country’s major oil refinery. By 2004, Sudan
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was supplying 10 percent of China’s
imported oil, while China was helping the
GoS build a pipeline to the Red Sea and was
supposedly Sudan’s most important source
of weaponry (Traub 2010). It was
understood that China’s trade relations with
Khartoum included protection that China
was able to offer as a permanent member of
the UNSC (Traub 2010). By threatening to
use its veto on the UNSC, China has
provided protection to Khartoum from
sanctions, and has thinned out every
resolution on Darfur in order to protect its
interests in Sudan (Mandoyi 2013, 2-3).
China’s position on action in Darfur,
however, cannot be entirely reduced to its
trade policy. China has long been one of the
main supporters of the principle of absolute
sovereignty (Traub 2010).
In 2004, several states, including
Sudan, recognized that it had a
responsibility to protect its population, and
the majority agreed that the situation in
Darfur was a legitimate matter of
international concern (Glanville 2013, 199).
Some states, most notably China and Russia,
disagreed with coercive interference in
Darfur on the grounds that “the main
responsibility still lies with the Sudanese
authorities” (Glanville 2013, 199). By 2006,
it was unquestionable that the GoS had
failed in its responsibility to protect civilians
in Darfur under the terms of the 2005 World
Summit agreement (Glanville 2013, 199).
On August 31, the SC adopted Resolution
1706, which “invited” the consent of the
GoS to the deployment of more than 20,000
UN peacekeepers in Darfur (Glanville 2013,
199). It was widely accepted among member
states that consent from Sudan would be
needed before UN forces could be deployed
(Glanville 2013, 199). Even though the
resolution called for Sudanese consent,
China, Russia, and Qatar still refrained from
the vote on principle (Glanville 2013, 199).
China was upset that the phrase “with the
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consent of the Government of National
Unity” was not included in the text of the
resolution, since this was “a fixed and
standardized phrase utilized by the Council
when deploying United Nations missions”
(Glanville 2013, 199-200). China and Russia
repeatedly insisted that RtoP did not
overrule the necessity for sovereign consent
and that international assistance should only
ever be provided with “full respect for the
will of the state concerned” (Glanville 2013,
200).
Defining the “International Community”
According to the RtoP doctrine, it is
the responsibility of the “international
community” to protect individuals against
abusive state sovereigns. However, there is
no clear understanding of who exactly the
“international community” is. Mamdani
argues that the international community is
composed of the UNSC, whose permanent
members are the great powers (Mamdani
2009, 274). If such is true, then an argument
can be formed to claim that these great
powers cannot possibly make decisions
based solely on humanitarian intervention,
as they are bound to consider their own
political, economic, militaristic, and
diplomatic gains. However, it remains true
that only a few countries, including these
great powers, have an abundance of assets
needed to implement intervention mandates
(Evans et al., 2002).
In the case of Darfur, the response of
the international community, including
international organizations, was chaotic.
Due to a lack of political will and
ambiguous guidelines set by RtoP, the
international community found itself in
debates over who exactly should be
responsible for intervening in Darfur. Thus,
the international community wasted valuable
time in responding, while mass atrocities
continued to take place. As Hoffman points
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out, it is one thing to argue that all states
must act in case of mass atrocities, but this
does not answer the question as to which
state or organization is to act (2012, 19).
Conclusion
There is a developing consensus in
today’s world around the idea that state
sovereignty must coincide with RtoP, and
that individual human rights are of the
utmost importance. Despite acceptance of
RtoP in principle, its implementation
continues to be nonexistent. This is
attributed to its presence as only an
international norm, and not an international
law. As stated by UN Secretary General Ban
Ki-moon, RtoP is “one of the more powerful
but less understood ideas of our times”
(Hoffman 2012, 19). For the RtoP principle
to assist in undertaking humanitarian crises
in the world, more transparency on the
principle, its foundations and practical
implications is needed (Hoffman 2012, 19).
Due to its little impact so far, RtoP is being
supported in principle by states, such as
Sudan, despite it being a target for RtoPtype action (Hoffman 2012, 48).
The conflict in Darfur illustrates the
current confusion that exists in the
international community in regards to RtoP.
For example, it is still unclear as to who
specifically is responsible for responding to
intrastate conflicts, like that of Darfur, and
to what extent. This has resulted in slow
humanitarian action taken by the AU, the
UN, and external sovereign states.
Furthermore, there remains debate over how
responsibilities are to be shared within the
international community. In the case of
Darfur, confusion over responsibilities
shared between the AU and the UN resulted
in a poor strategic implementation of a
peace agreement and a conflict resolution
(De Waal 2007, 1049). It is essential that
RtoP be more clearly defined for the
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international community to properly execute
it. Such requires that RtoP become more
than just an international norm, and that it
addresses specifically those responsible for
providing protection to affected populations
of “genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing,
and crimes against humanity”
(“Implementing RtoP” 2009, 4). Otherwise,
RtoP will remain an ineffective doctrine
with no clear universal understanding, and
intrastate conflicts like the one in Darfur
will continue to flourish.

UNAMID.” 2007. Human Rights Watch,
September 2007. New York. 19(15): 1-75.
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Bilharzia in
Sub-Saharan
Africa: A Biosocial
Disease
LIA I. GOROGIANIS
Abstract
This essay examines bilharzia in SubSaharan Africa as a bio-social disease. It
studies two distinct cases in Uganda and
Nigeria to demonstrate how cases differ in
different regions but are still connected by
their socioeconomic causes. The paper
challenges readers to relinquish the
stereotype that Africa is a disease-ridden
continent and that the West consists of white
saviors. After reading this essay, the
audience will be better equipped in
examining socioeconomic factors and the
role they play in disease. They, too, will
recognize that socioeconomic conditions call
for different methods of treatment. Simple
doses of medication are not enough, but
community-based education groups, will
significantly help treat this distinctly
localized disease.
Introduction

Take a moment to remember the last time
you washed your clothes, your car, or
simply waded in a refreshing pool of water
to cool off on a hot day. Did the risk of
catching a debilitating disease ever cross
your mind? Most likely not. Unfortunately,
those living near bodies of freshwater SubSaharan Africa risk contracting bilharzia on
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a daily basis through their occupational and
domestic activities. Globally, Africans carry
93% of the disease, and in some
communities, as many as 50% of the
population suffers (“Schistosomiasis and
HIV"; Adenowo et al. 2015:198).
But what is bilharzia? Is it “just
another African disease,” or does it require
attention, the relinquishing of stereotypes, to
foster a better understanding of health on a
social level? People contract bilharzia via
snails that harbor parasitic worms in fresh
bodies of water. Whether swimming,
bathing, working, or performing chores in
water, Sub-Saharan Africans know that
bilharzia exists, but they cannot simply
abandon their livelihood in the hopes of not
being infected. In learning about the
disease’s social constraints, novices might
wonder, “How do health professionals
currently treat bilharzia?” and “What
improvements can they make in the future?”
“How can people see bilharzia as a social,
behavior-induced condition, and not just a
medical one?” Research shows that if health
professionals and mass treatment
campaigns, such as those of the World
Health Organization, can establish a new
humanitarian framework that embraces the
social, localized aspects of bilharzia in SubSaharan Africa through community-based
education programs, the field will be better
equipped to respond to health crises and thus
view bilharzia not as “just another African
disease” but instead as a widespread, yet
distinctly localized, disease caused by
constrained socioeconomic behaviors;
bilharzia-ridden communities, too, by
learning to embrace their biosocial identity,
can advocate for effective health policies
and adequate sanitation.
This work steers clear of persuading
Western saviors to rescue the oh-sodeprived and so-called afflicted “diseased
heart of Africa.” Unlike a one-note tale, this
work does not persuade readers to donate a
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dollar a day to “save the Africans.” As Jane
Livingston, author of “Pregnant Children
and Half-Dead Adults: Modern Living and
the Quickening Life Cycle in Botswana”
says, “There will be no hyenas or elephants,
or even any big, red African sunsets”; shift
attention away from preconceived notions
about Africa, and instead, see disease, and
bilharzia in this case, as a problem neither
strictly Western nor African but as human,
unfolding due to socioeconomic and
regional conditions (Improvising Medicine
2012:x). Step outside of familiar contexts,
and call into question “basic assumptions
about illness…and medicine that American
patients, their clinicians, and family
members often take for granted” to truly
contemplate what it means to be seriously ill
in a context of socioeconomically
constrained, disease-causing behaviors
(Improvising Medicine 2012:21-22).
With that in mind, let
socioeconomics be bilharzia’s backdrop. If
Africans contract bilharzia via fresh water,
the health field must examine the ways in
which different areas depend on water.
Bilharzia sprouts from behavior, and
behaviors vary throughout Africa, just as
economies do. Bilharzia’s mode of exposure
in, say, Uganda differs with that of Nigeria.
If health professionals understand bilharzia’s
contributing factors, they can treat the
disease effectively. Livingston reminds us
to not neglect health’s ethnographic
features:
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…Though we know much about how
the medical and public health
professions and their institutions and
technologies have responded to
epidemiologic transitions, we know less
about how local people have
experienced and interpreted such
changes as they occur in terms of
broader historical
trends…Epidemiologic and
demographic transitions have not been
uniform across historical or geographic
contexts, and....local actors respond to

disease [and] health…in culturally and
ecologically specific ways. (“Pregnant
Children” 2003:134)

As Livingston shows, doctors have learned
about how to medically respond to endemic
diseases, but they have neglected the social
aspects—studying the people affected, their
conditions, and the way they respond to the
disease. Rather than localized treatment,
doctors often seek out one-size-fits-all
methods. But one cannot separate the person
from the disease because people, across
cultures, respond differently to the same
diseases. Health and social circumstances go
hand in hand, and poor social circumstances
induce bilharzia.
Scientifically known as
Schistosomiasis or “schisto,” bilharzia
formulates when infected adults and
children urinate or defecate in fresh water,
releasing eggs. These eggs hatch and
penetrate snails’ tissue, multiplying within
the tissue. Using the snail as a host, the
parasite eventually emerges back into the
water where it survives for approximately 48
hours. The parasite develops into a form that
penetrates human skin. Once inside the
body, female and male parasites can live,
mate, and multiply up to seven years. The
female releases thousands of eggs, some of
which pass through the urethra (urinary
schistosomiasis), some of which pass
through the intestines (intestinal
schistosomiasis), and some of which harbor
in the body’s tissue and veins, causing fever,
inflammation, and chills (Montgomery
2015; “Schistosomiasis” 2014). When
released through bodily functions, the eggs
cause bleeding and pain, leaving sufferers
vulnerable to HIV/AIDS, anemia, impaired
cognitive ability, and organ disease and
dysfunction (“Schistosomiasis” 2014).
With Bilharzia stemming from SubSaharan Africa’s lack of safe, fresh water
and lack of adequate sanitation, the diseases
kills around 534,000 Africans every year
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(Adenowo et al. 2015:196). Those most at
risk spend a considerable amount of time in
the water and typically have a low
socioeconomic status along with poor
educational access (Bustinduy et al.
2014:640). Naturally, Africans know
bilharzia exists, but they simply cannot
reverse their mode of life when their
economic status depends on lakes and other
bodies of water. With 76% of Sub-Saharan
Africans living close to open bodies of
water, they cannot entirely avoid using the
water, especially when “the majority of the
sub-Saharan population survives on between
US $1.25–$2.00 per day” (Adenowo et al.
2015:201). The combined effect of being
poor and having no other sources of
livelihood forces the use of contaminated
water. A vicious cycle exists between
bilharzia and poverty.
Poverty pressures individuals into
using contaminated water for activities both
domestic and work-related, but when
individuals contract bilharzia, they cannot
fully engage in their livelihood, meaning
that poverty persists. Poverty ultimately
limits access to clean water and for
combatting disease, so whether or not
Africans work in the water, perform chores,
or simply wade in it to cool off, contracting
bilharzia coexists with daily life. To avoid
making generalizations about Sub-Saharan
Africa’s causes of infection and to better
understand the disease on a social level,
consider two case studies on Nigeria and
Uganda—both countries in Sub-Saharan
Africa that suffer from bilharzia but also
countries that suffer for distinct reasons.
This aids in the understanding of bilharzia’s
biosocial linkages.
Uganda’s booming fish industry
accounts for 6% of the country’s total GDP;
it employs over 1.2 million people including
fisherman, distributors, handlers, smokers,
driers, and more, which means that workers
risk contracting bilharzia on a daily basis
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(Keizire 2006:ii). In fact, four million
Ugandans have the disease now, and 17
million people risk infection. Those residing
in Uganda’s fishing villages have the highest
risk for contracting bilharzia, especially
during the dry season when water levels
decrease, forming small pools, essentially
disease breeding grounds where fisherman
will stand for extended period of time to
catch fish in the deeper water (OdongoAginya and Doehring 2008:241). Small,
shallow pools both facilitate the breeding of
host snails and increase the potential contact
between humans and parasites. Every day,
on the shores of Busabala, Uganda, for
example, around 800 people frequent the
shore’s fish market. The site offers one
toilet, meaning that people must resort to the
waters for relief. Although communities
strive to increase the number of lakeside
latrines, it remains an economic challenge
(Montgomery 2015).
When the average fisherman lives
below the poverty line, only making 100,000
UShs, roughly $30 USD, per month,
avoiding contact with water remains
difficult (Odongkara et al. 2006:09).
Ugandan livelihood depends on risking
contracting bilharzia due to constrained
socioeconomic behavior. Because of
transport issues and the lack of funding and
of sales agents in remote areas, Ugandans
cannot afford the proper amount of fishing
gear, and often use worn out canoes or fish
barefoot in the water. Theresa Maoung’a, a
fish handler near Lake Victoria says, “I go
and sell at the market for some little profit to
sustain my life…People around here stay for
long hours in the water. Schisto is rampant
in the community because people do not use
clean water…You see, this leads to poverty
because when you are sick, you are unable
to do your normal activities”
(“Schistosomiasis in Lake Victoria” 2014).
When poverty persists, bilharzia does, as
well. Researchers performed a study of 446
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Ugandans in the Musoli village along Lake
Victoria. Of 217 females and 229 males,
with an average age of about 26 years old,
73.4% of the individuals, most of them
farmers, fishermen, and students, had
bilharzia and still went to Lake Victoria
more than 5 days a week. Poverty and low
income does not limit daily activities; in
fact, poverty perpetuates bilharzia
(Tukahebwa et al. 2013:03). Ugandans see
bilharzia in coexistence with daily life at this
point; their livelihood depends on infected
water.
Nigeria suffers at much higher
numbers; 29 million people, the highest
number in Africa, live with bilharzia, and
101 million people risk infection (Dawaki et
al. 2015:02). Similar to Uganda and other
Sub-Saharan countries, many Nigerian
communities lack access to safe water.
However, Nigerian bilharzia has distinctly
local features: in 1993, the World Health
Organization “noted that the prevalence and
intensity of the disease have increased in
areas undergoing water resource
development, especially irrigation. After the
Sahel drought of 1973, following the
Federal Government’s policy of large-scale
irrigation and water conservation, several
reservoirs were built” (Mafiana, Ekpo, Ojo
2003:78). In 1984, commissioners built the
Oyan Reservoir, a multi-purpose dam for
fish breeding, water supply, and irrigation.
Nonetheless, the reservoir serves only as a
water supply to water treatment plants in
Lagos and Abeokuta due to poor use. With
no nearby mechanized farms, irrigation
hardly occurs. Creation of the reservoir
forced over 1,000 people to relocate to
Abule-titun, Ibaro, and Imalo-odo, three
villages near the reservoir’s bank. This
displacement and ultimate confinement
triggered a huge outbreak of bilharzia
among the three communities just within
four years; bilharzia developed in 71.8% of
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adults and children (Mafiana, Ekpo, Ojo
2003:78-81).
Researchers met with afflicted
community members to understand water
contact practices and knowledge of the
disease. Women mentioned their knowledge
of bilharzia’s causes: “We get it from
bathing, drinking and washing clothes with
dam water,” and preschool-age children
contract it by accompanying their mothers to
wash, bathe, and fish, they revealed
(Mafiana, Ekpo, Ojo 2003:81). One mother
said, “I bathe my child in the water
[reservoir] as there is no other source of
water” (Mafiana, Ekpo, Ojo 2003:80). Even
after acknowledging bilharzia’s
accompanying pain and the limits it places
on daily life, these communities, overall, did
not consider bilharzia a serious disease
because, as one village leader said, “the
reservoir is our only source of income”
(Mafiana, Ekpo, Ojo 2003:81). When water
plays such a prominent role in economic and
domestic life, the afflicted have no other
choice but to use it. Poverty limits options
for safe action; people will continue to take
necessary measures to sustain themselves,
even if it means slowly compromising their
health in the process.
Currently, in mass treatment
campaigns, doctors use just one medication
called Praziquantel to treat bilharzia. It costs
roughly $.25 USD per adult treatment, and
one to two doses in a single day kills worms
effectively, typically around 85-90%. A
single 600mg pill costs about $.08 USD, but
no pediatric version exists for preschool-age
children, who suffer at a 71.8% rate in the
Nigerian case study and typically suffer at
the highest rates throughout Africa.
Praziquantel also requires a strong immune
system in order to work, and because
bilharzia puts people at risk for contracting
HIV/AIDS, it treats these people less
effectively (“Schistosomiasis and HIV”). To
an American, Praziquantel may appear
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cheap, but “realistically, most sub-Saharan
African countries cannot afford the
estimated 1.2 billion tablets of Praziquantel
required to treat 400 million individuals per
annum for five years at a total cost of USD
$100 million” (Adenowo et al. 2015:202).
Bilharzia reduction therefore requires
foreign funding; the World Health
Organization (WHO) plans to reduce
morbidity by 2020 and proposes an entire
elimination through medication by 2025.
With the target populations as adults and
school-age children, “periodic treatment of
at-risk populations will cure subtle
morbidity and prevent infected individuals
from developing severe, late-stage morbidity
due to schistosomiasis” ("Strategy: Control
and Preventive Chemotherapy"). But is this
enough, and is this truly possible without
social intervention? Praziquantel is no cureall pill; in fact, it does not protect against
reinfection. The WHO keeps track of the
most at-risk areas, but do they speak with
communities? Do they examine behavior?
Their plan mentions nothing improving the
disease’s socioeconomic causes; it fails to
see health through a biosocial lens and
instead sees medication as a solution.
Bilharzia requires biosocial
awareness and treatment; while pills may
cure diseases, they do not cure constrained
behaviors and economies, and as the above
case studies demonstrate, behaviors vary in
different areas. Pills know diseases, but they
do not know people. A qualitative
approach—talking to those suffering and
examining their conditions—is more
effective than a quantitative approach that
simply analyzes statistics and delivers
medicine, because it responds to the
challenges of the people, not the disease.
Perhaps the WHO would consider altering
their strategy to something more
community- and education-based if they
knew that in a study in Northern Nigeria
where 63.8% of people knew about bilharzia
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and its causes, only 36.2% of people fully
understood preventative measures.
Moreover, only 34.7% of them sought
treatment at a hospital or clinic (Dawaki et
al. 2015:01). A mere 6.1% of study
participants (23 out of 376 people)
considered avoiding contaminated water to
be a factor in preventing bilharzia (Dawaki
et al. 2015:10).
With that said, pill distribution and
local awareness do not guarantee a
significant, clear-cut reduction in bilharzia;
people will continue using the water for
domestic and occupational needs because
they do not see avoiding water as a
preventative measure. Even after pill
treatment, locals will remain in contact with
the water and risk reinfection. Even if the
WHO was able to fund Praziquantel
treatment for the affected regions, there
remains a plethora of other parasites and
infectious diseases to which these same
populations are vulnerable. Treating one
disease through a pill will not prevent other
infections. Thus, the benefits of educating
both the affected communities and
communities at risk can generate benefits
well beyond combatting this disease, and
others, in a way that treatment via pill is
incapable of doing. This is not to say that the
WHO is not an organization without merit;
it does, in fact, gather enormous amounts of
statistics on disease-specific population
health and disseminates this information
globally via its website. However, their
strategy for bilharzia lacks the social aspect
of health; it requires community-based,
participatory education programs that treat
the people, not the disease. If sub-Saharan
Africans cannot avoid the water, they must
know how to take proper precautions before
using it. On top of Praziquantel treatments,
the WHO should provide mothers in Nigeria
and occupational fishermen in Uganda with
protective gloves and shoes for domestic
work. Education programs in both areas
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would inform communities on preventative
measures: seeking out hospitals and clinics
rather than local chemists, boiling water
before drinking or bathing, and restraining
children when possible from bathing or
swimming in contaminated water (Mafiana,
Ekpo, Ojo 2003:81). Throughout SubSaharan Africa, people must be encouraged
to adhere to and maintain these personal
hygiene and sanitary practices to reduce
bilharzia. A reduction in bilharzia requires
more than medication; a biosocial response
that recognizes socioeconomically specific
behavior, though, will reduce bilharzia.
Continuing this further, consider that
“health is a state of complete physical,
mental and social well-being and not merely
the absence of disease or infirmity” (Ene
2009:08). Social and physical wellbeing can
be neither obtained nor maintained without a
contribution of the social environment. In
order to treat health biosocially, health
professionals and treatment campaigns need
to combine the role that people play in
health with the way science describes people
and disease to generate an identity among a
community of people. Social identities
eventually generate change: “The way in
which people imagine
themselves…structures their rapport with
the social world around them and helps to
construct…social…networks” (Nguyen
2005:265). If health professionals educate
communities, the people will identify with
other educated, diseased individuals; they
can rise up as a community, as a social
network to enact community mobilization
and to make positive changes in costeffective health policies.
Unquestionably, completely
avoiding contaminated water will be
difficult when poverty persists. Education
will not eliminate poverty, but it will
alleviate the disease-causing risks in
constrained behavior. Through a newfound
identity, bilharzia-infected communities can
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advocate for clean water and sanitation over
time; many authorities in Sub-Saharan
Africa do not make clean water accessibility
a priority; therefore, through collaboration
and communication, bilharzia-ridden
communities can push for better health care
while raising social awareness of their
condition to construct a productive, positive
role for themselves. They will, in turn, allow
for more extensive, efficient global health
care measures, attracting attention from the
global health community who will see
Africa not as a disease-ridden continent, but
instead, as a web of locally intricate
countries unfortunately plagued by
socioeconomic disease-causing conditions.
Each country’s story differs from the
next, from Uganda’s fish-dependent
economy to Nigeria’s failed dam and
contaminated reservoir. At the end of the
day, public health faces a complex
challenge. Now, more than ever, the field
needs to take note of social interaction to
mandate efficient social services, such as
identity-forming, community-based
education groups that can advocate for better
health policies. This will better provide for
Sub-Saharan African communities suffering
from bilharzia and ultimately dispose of the
disease-ridden image that the global health
community has of individuals in SubSaharan Africa
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Acronym Glossary
AEP………Agri-Environmental Program
ANC………. Areas of Natural Constraints
BSR…………………Baltic State Region
CAP………. Common Agricultural Policy
EU………………………European Union
GDP……………Gross Domestic Product
GHG……………………. Greenhouse gas
LFA…………………Less Favored Areas
SFS……………… Small Farmers Scheme
WTO…………World Trade Organization
Abstract
The Common Agricultural Policy has
traditionally been a way to guarantee food
security through subsidies between
European Union nations. Recent CAP
reforms require additional policies to
enforce environmental sustainability,
decrease pollution, promote better nutrition,
and encourage young and small farmers. On
the supranational EU level, the reformed
CAP has positively impacted sustainability
and improvement of the environment.
Critics argue the CAP still perpetuates
inequality, both between nations and
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between large and small farmers, and waters
down environmental policy. Still, the CAP is
an improvement to past policies and has
made positive changes, both towards the
environment and public good.
Introduction

Before the European Union (EU) even
existed as an entity, the Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP) was designed as
an approach in 1962 to unite western
European countries to form a defense
against food insecurity and to promote
integration. Through subsidies and support,
the CAP was able to fortify farmers during
tough economic periods to prevent food
shortages and bankruptcy in the agricultural
sector. The CAP has recently undergone
substantial reform as a part of Europe’s
2020 plan, partially through a process called
“greening” (Dragoi and Balgar 2015, 57).
The most important addition to the CAP is
the Rural Development Plan, which
supplements farm subsidies with
environmental and sustainability incentives.
The European Union’s implementation and
recent reform of the Common Agricultural
Policy has transformed the way farms are
subsidized and supported. In doing so, the
CAP on the supranational EU level has been
able to make positive strides in
environmental sustainability, pollution
reduction, and increase in organic food
production. CAP reforms have the ability to
make positive changes in the nutrition and
environmental safety of EU citizens’ lives,
and could go even further to provide
incentives and programs. The CAP is an
example of a new kind of subsidy used for
positive gains for society as a whole, and not
just the farmer. However, these subsidies are
still not ideal. Though food security and
production is still the primary focus of the
CAP, significant achievements have been
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made in making rural development and
sustainability an essential ambition.
The CAP has been met with criticism
from multiple sectors. Like most subsidy
programs worldwide, the CAP leaves small
farmers and poorer EU countries behind,
leaving large farmers to reap most of the
benefits (Lacy 2015). Activists from the
agricultural sector argue the reformed CAP
compels farmers to meet difficult
environmental standards that will hinder
productivity. On the other side,
environmentalists contend that the CAP
does not go far enough to protect Europe
from increasing climate change and
pollution.
Today, the challenge of the CAP is
to strike a balance between rural
development and renewable energy, and to
maintain food security and production
(Bolognini 2015, 194). The modern CAP
has found a way to encourage farmers onto
pathways of rural development, while
maintaining motivation to continue farm
production.
Literature Review
Literature surrounding the EU CAP
continues to address the concept of
economic patriotism and interventionism, in
both positive and negative lights. This is
because in Europe, there is a constant
tension between neo-liberal market
integration and national economic policies.
The European Union is a unique case,
because it balances national interests with
supranational interests in regards to the
economy and policy-making. The EU strikes
a balance between interventionism with neoliberal elements (Clift 2013, 104).
Economic patriotism is defined by
Clift as “economic choices which seek to
discriminate in favor of particular social
groups, firms, or sectors understood by
decision-makers as “insiders” because of
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their territorial status” (2013, 103). The
theory is related to, and encompasses
elements of neo-mercantilism, economic
nationalism, and protectionism. Under
economic patriotism, state aid is analyzed as
an economic intervention that attempts to
advance economic self-interest of groups
and actors defined according to their
territorial status (Clift 2013, 101). It implies
that interests of the homeland are more
important than the interests of the individual
(Clift 2013, 104). Within the EU, this is seen
through the redistributive properties of the
CAP. Through taxes, the CAP redistributes
money from the individual, and puts it into
the hands of farmers and agriculture through
the two pillar subsidy system (Cong 2012,
10). The agricultural sector is unique in the
EU because European agricultural is about
more than just producing a commodity. It
also has a cultural value. Farmers are trusted
to provide high-quality products, whose
geographical origin determines part of their
value (Grant 2010, 422). Europeans take
pride in where their food comes from, as
observed by the author’s time spent in the
South of France. Protectionists, including
some Europeans, believe that farmers
shouldn’t have to be sacrificed based on
their competitors around the world (Grant
2010, 422). Subsidizing farmers also
contributes to guaranteed food security,
which is an issue that has brought up
recently during the Economic Crisis of 2008
(Grant 2010, 433).The farming sector
contributes to broader national interests and
goals, providing the link to economic
patriotism (Grant 2010, 421).
Grant states that agricultural
exceptionalism affirms that the agricultural
sector is unique to other sectors because it is
difficult to maintain an equilibrium between
supply and demand. It cannot be treated like
other sectors within the economy, because it
does not behave in the same supply-demand
fashion (2010, 422). Because of this, it is
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hard to regulate with traditional neo-liberal
policies. Nevertheless, some neo-liberals,
such as the United Kingdom Independence
Party, think the CAP should be abolished
because it stands in the way of the free
market and uses too many consumer tax
dollars to subsidize already relatively
wealthy farmers (Clift 2012, 104, Vernet
and Wysocki 2015). Neo-liberals would
favor innovative risk-based or insurancerelated instruments to stabilize the market,
not direct intervention. However, many
don’t realize that economic patriotism and
neo-liberalism are not mutually exclusive.
Neo-liberal economic policies can be
designed to favor specific industries, as can
economic patriotism, therefore the two can
be compatible (Clift 2012, 104).
According to Clift, economic
patriotism is not the same as economic
nationalism, because it is agnostic to the
shape, size, and nature of the “patrie1”,
which may be demonstrated through
supranational patriotism. This makes
economic patriotism more regional rather
than national (2012, 105). This
supranational EU has been the cause of
dispute while formulating policy for the
CAP. The European Union is made up of 28
member states that are diverse in
socioeconomic development and in their
natural environment (Brodzinska 2015,
157). National differences impede a
harmonious or harmonized European policy
response or strategy (Clift 2012, 106).
Interregional cooperation across the EU is
necessary for the CAP to work to its best
ability (Dragoi and Balgar 2013a, 40).
Member States like France and Ireland have
favored the continuation of subsidies and
protection. In contrast, nations like Sweden
and the UK prefer a more market-oriented,
commercial agricultural policy, dealing

mainly with the preservation of public goods
(Grant 2010, 421). The European
Commission must reach consensus for CAP
policy through compromise in their mixed
economy.
Grant argues that today the CAP tries
to accommodate both protectionist and neoliberal points of view (2010, 423). The CAP
is transitioning from more protectionist
interventionist policies towards policies with
more flexibility and are more marketoriented (Grant 2010, 433). For example,
modern reforms no longer force the farmer
to overproduce to receive a subsidy, but
allows them to respond to the market
signals. Farmers are paid in payments
unrelated to their production, and instead
receive direct payments based on factors like
farm size and environmental sustainability
(Grant 2010, 422). The CAP is now
considered interventionist in alternative
ways. The response to sustainability is also
interventionist, but interventionist in terms
of consumption, such as penalizing negative
externalities and rewarding positive ones
(Grant 2010, 427). In addition, member
states can now be more flexible with how
they distribute CAP funds. This helps strike
a balance within individual Member states,
who find themselves using both neo-liberal
and protectionist elements to advance the
economic interests of particular territorially
defined groups, which are sometimes
national and sometimes European (Clift
2012, 115).
Background: What is the CAP?
The CAP was first introduced in
1962 to establish a market for free trade of
agricultural goods between European
nations, even before the formation of the
European Union. After two World Wars,

1

Patrie is a French term, referring to a homeland, and also
on a larger scale, to heritage in general, learned from the
author’s time studying abroad in France.
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agriculture had been impaired and food
shortages were common (Yamaç and Acar
2009, 424). By breaking down trade
barriers, European nations were able to
eliminate food shortages and establish a
bond between them to help ensure peace.
The CAP provides security that exporting
countries will have a market and income for
their product (Dragoi and Balgar 2013a, 34).
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, new
incentives were put in place to modernize
farming, provide farmers with education,
and assist farmers in arduous environments.
These incentives were in the form of
artificial price support of agricultural
goods.The CAP went through a series of
reforms in the 1990s and 2000s (European
Union Commission, 2015). Figure 1
displays a timeline of the reforms from the
early years through the most recent reform
for the 2020 agenda, with the main priorities
of the CAP indicated with arrows.
Figure 1

Source: European Union Commission 2013a

In 1992, the MacSharry reforms
redirected payments so farmers were paid
directly through subsidies, and price support
in the market was decreased (European
Union Commission, 2015). Today, price
support is only used in times of crisis or
national disasters (European Union
Commission, 2013b). Through subsidies,
farms were able to grow and increase
production because farmers could afford
things like better machinery and more labor
(Yamaç and Acar 2009, 428). The 1992
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reforms maintained a safety net for
producers by providing income support.
During the economic crisis of 2008, the
CAP still supported farmers through the
direct payment system and was able to avoid
a total catastrophe (Dragoi and Balgar
2013a, 39). This also began a wave of agrienvironmental programs and rural
development strategies (European
Commission 2013, 2). Today, according to
the European Commission Reform Report,
the CAP has three main objectives: “viable
food production, sustainable management of
natural resources and climate action, and
balanced territorial development“ (European
Commission 2013, 2). The CAP is also
unique, because in 2013, for the first time
the European Parliament also had a part in
drafting the reform. This is unique because
the European Commission is usually the
only branch of the EU to draft legislation,
making this reform more widely agreed
upon by Member States of the EU
(Bolognini 2015, 202). The agri-food sector
accounts for 14.2 percent of the total EU
manufacturing output, so frequent reforms
allow the industry to remain relevant and
successful to the changing global economy
(Yamaç and Acar 2009, 424).
The modern day two-pillar system
was introduced to the CAP as part of
Agenda 2000 in 1999. Pillar 1 of the CAP is
dedicated to market-related expenditure, and
Pillar 2 focuses on rural development. Each
pillar has its own separate budget and
objectives, but the 2013 reform establishes
more connections between the two pillars.
The CAP accounts for almost half the EU’s
legislation (Cong 2012, 1).The CAP is the
lion’s share of the EU budget, representing
37.8 percent, or 408.31 billion euros, of the
entire EU budget ceiling for the 2014-2020
period. Based on the CAP budget, it is clear
that food production and security remain the
primary focus, because Pillar 1 receives
significantly more funding. For the 2014-
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2020 period, Pillar 1 receives 312.74 billion
euros, while Pillar 2 receives 95.58 billion
euros in funding (European Commission
2013, 3). The EU has also decided to reform
policies that are too specific and too heavily
support farmer’s incomes. For example, the
CAP has decided to phase out milk quotas,
which were production based, with complete
elimination by 2015 (BBC 2013). Today,
The CAP fills 3 roles: a political one
because it unifies EU member states, an
economic one because it stabilizes
agriculture markets, and a redistributional
one because of the interstate budget flow for
revenue payments because of shared EU
budget costs (Bednarikova and Jilkova, 29).
Decoupling farm income from
investment behavior was introduced in 2003,
and was strengthened under the 2013
reform. In the CAP, decoupling refers to the
payments to farmers for how much land they
have, not the quantity of goods they
produce. Decoupling resource-use from
economic growth is now essential to
sustainability (Carson et al. 2013, 5). Under
decoupling, also known as the Single Farm
Payment Scheme (SPS), previous payments
have been turned into entitlements.
Therefore, farmers can claim the
entitlements they possess by demonstrating
that their eligible land is being operated and
meets requirements of the Good Agriculture
and Environmental conditions (Viaggi et al.
2010, 188). Cong states that the 2003 SPS
reform may have been the most radical CAP
reform to date, before the 2013 reform
(2012, 2). The direct payment system
guarantees a minimum income for farmers,
regardless of the profit they make selling
their products. Reform was needed due to a
significant decrease in agricultural income
in 2009 (Dragoi and Balgar 2013a, 37-38).
Payments are no longer attached to the
production of specific crops, which
decreases incentive for cultivation and
investment because of the possibility of
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receiving payments without crop cultivation
(Viaggi et al. 2010, 189). From 2015 on,
farmers will have to follow three factors that
promote environmental sustainability to
receive full CAP funding: cross-compliance,
greening, and rural development (European
Commission 2013, 6). The expected results
of decoupling are a change in crop mix,
increased investment potential due to
relaxed budget constraints, and increase in
farm income due to flexibility in guaranteed
payments (Viaggi et al. 2010, 189).
Targeted Actions
The 2013 CAP reform creates a more
holistic approach to agriculture, using the
two pillar system in a complementary way.
To make the two pillars of the CAP more
cohesive, the Commission has established
“targeted actions,” which will receive
attention and funding through programs of
both Pillar 1 and Pillar 2. The targeted
actions for the 2014-2020 plan are the
environment, young farmers, areas with
natural constraints, small farmers, and
producer cooperation (European
Commission 2013, 9). Farmers must first
meet the Basic Payment criteria (cross
compliance standards) before being eligible
for any other payments like the green direct
payment, young farmer payments, or
payments for farmers with land constraints
(Dragoi and Balgar 2015, 59-60). The new
financial framework leaves funds available
for organic farming, young farmers’
payments, and funding farming in
disadvantaged areas (Dragoi and Balgar
2015, 57).
According to the European
Commission, Basic Payments will be
awarded to young farmers under age 40. In
addition to measures made through the Pillar
2 rural development programs, young
farmers will be topped up 25 percent for the
first five years of installation. Start-up grants
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up to 70,000 euros and training and advisory
services may also be given to young
farmers. This program will be funded by 2
percent of the national CAP envelope, and is
mandatory for all Member States to adopt
(European Commission 2013b). In the EU,
for every 1 farmer under age 35, there are 9
farmers over age 55. At present 4.5 million
farmers in Europe (30 percent) are over 65,
and only 6 percent are under 35 (European
Union Commission 2013c). This reflects
how unattractive farming has become for the
younger generation.This also creates the
possibility of future land abandonment
(Carson et al. 2013, 48). By requiring
Member States to provide incentives to
young farmers, the CAP is ensuring longterm food security and establishing
agricultural providers for the next
generation. One study in Italy also found
older farmers are becoming mentors for
younger farmers. Young farmers are
returning back to family farms and to the
countryside as a consequence in economic
crises in other sectors (Galluzzo 2015, 28).
This provides further evidence to support
young farmers in the EU.
Unlike the young farmers initiative,
incentives in the CAP for small farmers are
not mandatory for all Member States. In this
regard, member states are given flexibility.
Those States that choose to adopt the Small
Farmers Scheme pay farmers an annual
fixed payment between 500 and 1500 euros,
regardless of the actual farm size. Small
farms may also be given up to 15,000 euros
in start-up aid (European Commission
2013b). There is no formal EU definition of
what qualifies as a small farm, that is up the
the Member State. Member States may
benefit from this policy, such as Hungary,
which found subsidies for SFS has lower
administrative costs than other optional
policies (Potori, Kovacs, and Vasary 2013,
123). This part of the CAP is highly
beneficial to small farmers, who in the past
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were excluded from CAP legislation. Before
the 2013 CAP reform, small farmers either
sold or leased their quotas to larger farms
because they could not compete with the
large industrial farmers. Farmers with the
highest yielding land and who were
competitive in the market, received the
highest payments per hectare before the
Small Farmers Scheme (Cong 2012, 2).
Because subsidies were coupled with
production of specific crops, the small farms
could not receive the subsidies or produce
enough to support themselves (Yamaç and
Acar 2009, 229).
There are also optional target area
programs in place for Areas with Natural
Constraints (ANCs) and Less Favored Areas
(LFAs). Member states may use up to 5
percent of their national CAP envelope for
additional payments for ANCs and LFAs.
These payments would be part of Pillar 1,
and do not affect the Pillar 2 payments under
Rural Development (European Union
Commission 2013b). This increases the area
of available farmland and encourages
innovation in farmers located in difficult
areas. One study in Italy found by increasing
funding to farmers who live in ANCs and
LFAs, or are affected by weather changes, it
decreases the chance of out-migration from
the countryside, both within and outside of
the country (Galluzzo 2015, 20).
Pollution and Sustainability
The industrial food model in the past
50 years has led to environmental
degradation and climate change that has led
to multiple natural disasters (Yamaç and
Acar 2009, 433). In the past, subsidies have
increased use of fossil fuels and petroleum
fuels because they rely heavily on output
and production rates (Lacy 2015). Water,
land, and forests may have been irreversibly
damaged. Arable land in the EU is
declining, as well as its population growth
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(Carson et al. 2013, 33). Old methods of
farming were more chemically dependent
and were increasingly damaging to the
environment (Yamaç and Acar 2009, 433).
Excessive use of products that use fossil
fuels like fertilizers, pesticides, and plastics
have affected the natural equilibrium of
ecosystems and increased the level of
greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the
environment (Dragoi and Balgar 2013b, 96).
Agriculture is responsible for 9.6 percent of
EU GHG emissions, including 75 percent of
the EU’s nitrous oxide emissions from
fertilizer applications and 49 percent of the
EU’s methane emissions (EEB 2011, 4).
Farming that can be viable long term is
dependent on a well-balanced and
functioning ecosystem (Carson et al. 2013,
1). Agriculture is the first victim of climate
change and weather disasters caused by
climate change. Because of this, it is
important to support farmers who adopt
green technology (Dragoi and Balgar 2013b,
96). Agri-environmental programs (AEPs)
are designed to reduce agriculturally
produced pollution and have been
mandatory for EU member states since the
CAP was reformed in 1992. AEPs also
address the need to reduce agricultural
overproduction, which contribute to soil
pollution and erosion. (Laukkanen and
Nauges 2014, 458).
Farmers were given examples of
several methods and incentives through the
CAP to decrease pollution. Farmers in the
countryside are becoming one of the main
drivers in the process of environmental
protection by producing positive
externalities (Galluzzo 2015, 19).
According the to European Commission, for
the mandatory greening policies, farmers
must participate in maintaining a permanent
grassland, crop diversification, and must
maintain an “ecological focus area”
(European Union Commission 2013b). In
terms of crop diversification, a farmer must
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farm at least two crops if his farm exceeds
ten hectares, and three crops if his or her
farm exceeds thirty hectares. The main crop
may occupy up to 75 percent of the farmed
land, with 25 percent left for additional
crops (European Union Commission 2013b).
Farmers are required to farm multiple crops
to prevent mono-cropping and soil
degradation. Crop rotation is one measure
taken to reduce greenhouse gases and
improve biodiversity. The “ecological focus
area” must take up 5 percent of the farmers
land and be set aside in a manner to
“encourage biodiversity” (Dragoi and Balgar
2015, 58). This applies to farms larger than
15 hectares, and will increase to 7 percent of
the farmed area in 2017 (European Union
Commission 2013b).
It is necessary to address the
importance of biodiversity to agriculture,
because heavy agricultural production is
causing ecosystems to become depleted.
When there is a loss of biodiversity, a
generation of crops can go extinct, with no
way to get them back. This is a loss not just
for the environment, but for agriculture as
well (Brodzinska 2015, 157). Seven species
of arable plants are considered extinct in
Britain and a further 54 are threatened (EEB
2011, 2). It is estimated that by 2050 there
will be a loss of 11 percent of the natural
areas which existed in 2000 (Madau, Furesi,
and Pulina 2014, 498). Other elements of
biodiversity particularly at risk are
pollinators and birds. The European
grassland butterfly indicator shows a decline
of some 70 percent since 1990, and farmland
bird populations across the EU declined by
49 percent between 1980 and 2008 (EEB
2011, 2). Incentives are given in the CAP to
preserving 7 percent of land as “focus areas”
to permanently lay fallow to help reduce
carbon dioxide emissions and promote
biodiversity (Dragoi and Balgar 2015, 57).
These grassland policies have been
successful because the poorest regions are
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often grassland regions, therefore best way
to encourage social objectives to maintain
grasslands is the grassland subsidy. Land
use targeted through public policy is a
strong driver of patterns of regional welfare
(Mouysset 2014, 19).
Regarding maximum biodiversity
performance, Mouysset observed that a tax
on crops leads at best to medium objectives
(up to 17 percent) while subsidies on
grasslands are capable of achieving the
highest performances (30 percent or more if
the budgetary constraint is relaxed)
(Mouysset 2014,18) . This supports the
argument that subsidies are a successful
method used to preserve biodiversity.
Mouysset goes so far to argue that in
contrast to what is commonly accepted,
reducing first pillar subsidies would be the
most relevant strategy to cost-effectively
manage biodiversity and greening the CAP
with medium ecological objectives.
Increasing second pillar funds would
positively affect biodiversity. Improving
biodiversity would improve the quality of
the overall environment, showing that the
CAP is able to make positive strides in
environmental protection. (Mouysset 2014,
22).
Another method used to combat
climate change while promoting the natural
landscape is agroforestry, which uses the
cultivation of trees in agriculture.
Agroforestry involves multi-cropping which
is dispersed in small areas generating
positive externalities. According to
Galluzzo, it’s a central factor in rural areas
at risk of marginalization in order to reach a
higher level of ecological sustainability. The
increase in trees reduces emissions of
greenhouse gases, and increases gas
sequestration. Agroforestry also alleviates
poverty in some rural areas, by bringing
more arboreous crops to the region. The
CAP agroforestry policies protected the
countryside and forest environments, while
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cultivating arboreous crops, such as
“chestnut, walnuts, hazelnuts, scattered in
small portions of Italian farms, producing
intangible public goods in terms of positive
externalities and niche products as truffle,
mushrooms and forest fruits” (Galluzzo
2015, 21-23). There is evidence in progress
in agroforestry, but not on the large scale. A
study in Italy showed much of agroforestry
actions have been conducted in lowlands
and upland rural territories in Italy, affecting
only a small percentage of farmers. This is
also important to highlight, because one of
the most important effects of agroforestation
was to reduce the desertification in
Mediterranean areas. The European Union
and global food market relies heavily on
Mediterranean areas for food supply, so
there is possibility of food insecurity if
desertification is not reduced (Galluzzo
2015, 23). Agroforestation is also important
to improve the quality of land that has been
exploited post-industrialization (Galluzzo
2015, 21). According to the European
Commission, forestry has been addressed in
the reform, by receiving, “strengthened and
streamlined support through grants and
annual payments”, but this action is vague
and could use further action (European
Union Commission 2013b). Galluzzo’s
study underlines that a large proportion of
agroforested areas are mostly located and
scattered in lowland areas rather than in
upland territories agroforested areas.
Therefore, these lowland areas need
financial support in order to ensure a
persistent development in the countryside
and to reduce the out-migration from rural
territories (Galluzzo 2015, 26).
Water and Soil
It is estimated by the EU that
agriculture uses 44 percent of Europe’s total
water supply (Madau, Furesi, and Pulina
2014, 496). Agriculture contributes 50-80
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percent of the total nitrogen load to
freshwater in Europe for multiple reasons.
Pesticides have been found in groundwater
in all EU countries that have been tested,
supporting the case for a decrease in
pesticide use. (Carson et al. 2013, 53-54)
Pesticides are also known to be found in
drinking water. In 2008, 17 percent of the
population of Eure-et- Loir, France received
drinking water with pesticides above legal
thresholds. French national data shows that,
in 2008, 5 million people received, at least
one time per year, drinking water which did
not comply with the regulation on pesticides
(EEB 2011, 19). Therefore, pesticides can
be damaging to humans as well as the
environment. Farm runoff of manure also
contributes to nitrate pollutants in water
(Dragoi and Balgar 2015, 57).
Water pollution is a problem in all
EU Member States, especially in nations
around the Baltic Sea Region (BSR), such as
Finland. The Baltic Sea contains seven of
the world’s ten largest marine dead zones,
where the sea’s oxygen has been depleted by
algae blooms caused by the build up of
nutrients, which is suffocating the sea (EEB
2011, 22). Finland needs to drastically
reduce water pollution in order to improve
overall quality of both its freshwater sources
and the Baltic Sea (Laukkanen and Nauges
2014, 474). Applying artificial fertilizers,
draining, and “modern forms of grass
conservation” can lead to soil erosion, loss
of organic matter, increase water runoff, and
increase greenhouse gases. This means a
balanced, more natural approach to farming
is needed (Carson et al. 2013, 24). Farmers
who agree to participate in the general AEP
subprogram must take measures such as
limiting fertilizer use, and construction of
vegetative strips along waterways
(Laukkanen and Nauges 2014, 460). Farms
are compensated by an area-based payment,
which means they are basically paid
uniformly per hectare within the region.
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Support is also given to farmers in arid
climates to let their land lay fallow. This is
to counteract nutrient loss in the soil. When
improving conditions of polluted water, the
condition of soil is also improved because
they are commonly polluted by the same
chemicals (Laukkanen and Nauges 2014,
459).
It is hard for policymakers to create
laws for possible sustainability, let alone to
measure their possible effects (Madau,
Furesi, and Pulina 2014, 489). Even so,
there have been experiments and estimations
done to predict future environmental gains
due to the CAP. For example, one study was
done in the Mediterranean region. With the
predicted EU reform model that requires
farmers to set aside 7 percent of their land to
lay fallow, there is a clear increase in soil
humidity predicted for all fields set aside by
farmers with revegetated shrubs. Farmland
set aside for revegetation would create a
runoff blocking effect by absorbing runoff
with new greenery that would protect fields
located in the lowlands against soil loss by
water. This also reduces sediment yield to
wetlands. In this particular study, this
illustrates that the CAP reforms would help
preserve the Estana lakes, and other
Mediterranean ecosystems like it (LopezVicente et al. 2014, 4294-4295). This
technique has been used in other
Mediterranean regions to address scarcity of
surface water, like in Israel for crop
irrigation (Lopez-Vicente et al. 2014, 4295).
In another study researched by Matthews,
fallow land rotations had positive impacts
for water consumption, nitrogen losses,
biodiversity, GHG emissions, and energy
consumption. This study is another example
which supports the argument that CAP has
the ability to counteract past pollution and
positively impact the environment
(Matthews 2013, 11).
As a result of the CAP, studies have
shown pesticide levels are decreasing in
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most EU countries, except Germany,
Netherlands, and Belgium. Additionally
GHG emissions have declined steadily since
2009 (Carson et al. 2013, 57-58). Even
before the 2013 CAP reform, the area of
pastures increased from 2002-2006 by 9
percent in Sweden after passing the policy
of decoupling, and fallow area initially
increased by 42 percent between 2003 and
2006 (Trubins 2012, 166). After 2003, the
area of temporary grasses and grazing
increased by 23 percent in Sweden (Trubins
2012, 162). In another study described by
Cong, “based on two micro-economic
models (AgriPolis and MODAM), Uthe et
al. found that in the case of grassland,
decoupling led to improvement of the
environment as a result of the crosscompliance obligations” (Cong 2012, 3).
Despite the success of AEP
programs to target pollution, there is still
criticism against the way the policy is
carried out. For example, requirements for
participating in AEPs tend to be general and
payments are given based on
environmentally harmless outcomes and not
measurable results (Laukkanen and Nauges
2014, 459). Actual enforcement of fertilizer
constraints is weak. Only 5 percent of farms
are audited each year and sanctions are mild.
Policies need to be more targeted and
specific in order to be more effective, like
taxing fertilizers or emphasizing payments
for land devoted specifically to water
protection. (Laukkanen and Nauges 2014,
474).
Biofuels
The CAP has also been used in a
way to grow products for biofuels and
energy crops. The EU imports 53 percent of
the energy it consumes, making it smarter
economically to find new renewable energy
sources (Bolognini 2015, 199). Using crops
for both food and other purposes, like fuel,
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is known as multi-functional agriculture,
which became a focus of the EU with
Agenda 2000 (Madau,Furesi, and Pulina
2014, 488). The European goal is to increase
shares in energy mix of renewable energy to
27 percent by 2030. Crops like rapeseed,
sunflower, soy, corn, and miscanthus are
considered “energy crops,” which are cheap
to produce and can be used as biofuel.
Biofuels are cleaner fuels and lead to a
decrease in fossil fuels and GHGs
(Bolognini 2015, 200). In Germany, 95
percent of maize previously used as fodder
is now used for biofuel production.
Germany and France have the largest areas
devoted to biofuel (Carson et al. 2013, 42).
After Hungary’s accession to the EU, their
sunflower oil and rapeseed oil production
doubled, paralleling the increasing
popularity of biofuel, which relies on these
two oils heavily (Potori, Kovacs, and Vasary
2013, 118). Increasing use of biofuels has
the potential to significantly reduce the
levels of greenhouse gases and use of fossil
fuels. However, promotion of bio-energies
can conflict with the rational management of
water resources because the possible
conversion from non-irrigated crops to
certain irrigated energy-supplying crops
could result in more use of water (Madau,
Furesi, and Pulina 2014, 494). Land set
aside used for the cultivation of energy
crops showed environmental impacts similar
to those of the main alternative conventional
agricultural systems, Therefore, although the
use of biofuels lowers GHG emissions in the
environment, the producing of the biofuels
themselves still has a negative
environmental impact if they are not handled
efficiently (Matthews 2013,11). These are
examples of how some of the CAP goals are
in conflict with each other. Dramatic
increases in demand for bio-fuels could also
affect supply and prices for EU food and
non-food goods (Madau, Furesi, and Pulina
2014, 494). Some feel using agriculture for
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energy crops is risky and threatens food
security (Bolognini 2015, 201). Biofuel and
renewable energy targets add further to the
demand for agricultural resources within the
EU, increasing the competition for land with
nature (Matthews 2013, 2). The goal for
Europe is to develop new kinds of
renewable energy without compromising
food security (Bolognini 2015,194).
Organic Food
The CAP has put significantly less
emphasis on organic food2 and nutrition than
it has put on the environment. Still, it is an
improvement from the previous CAP
programs which had no incentives at all for
organic food or food nutrition. In most EU
countries, organic food production is
increasing, but the EU still imports most of
its organic food, especially from Turkey
(Ataseven 2014, 203). Organic farming
made up only 4.7 percent of EU farms in
2011(Carson et al. 2013, 63). In addition,
consumer demand for organic foods is
increasing, although organic markets only
made up 2 percent of EU food expenditure
in 2007 (Carson et al. 2013, 41). Spain,
Italy, Germany, France, and the UK make
up 56.3 percent of organic farming in the
EU, meaning the production of organic food
is not widespread across the EU (Ataseven
2014, 209). Motivation for organic food is
not only because of its health benefits, but
also for other environmental results like
cleaner water, reducing overproduction, and
increasing export opportunities. Organic
food does not use pesticides, which
contributes to food safety concerns as well
as reduces possible soil contamination or
degradation (Ataseven 2014, 206-207).
Organically managed soils contain 30-40
percent more earthworms which are
extremely important for enhancing soil
2

According to the European Environmental Bureau,
organic food is described as “systems growing
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fertility and structure (EEB 2011, 7). In
general, biodiversity is up to 50% higher on
organically managed farms than on
conventional farms (EEB 2011, 13).
Organic producers in EU can be
given financial support through the CAP
reform towards certification and inspection
fees, while also receiving other forms of aid
such as free advice, training, and investment
aid (Ataseven 2014, 206 and 208). Subsidies
may be given to organic farmers not only for
sustainable activity, but also marketing
activities(Ataseven 2014, 207). Organic
farmers are also given other incentives
through other CAP programs such as green
payments through Pillar 1, or the Natura
2000 program funded under Pillar 2
(European Commission 2013, 9). However,
payment levels for organic farming can vary
from crop to crop (Ataseven 2013, 209).
Nutrition
There have been experimental
studies done to decide whether the CAP
should introduce a food and vegetable
reform focused on better nutrition and
childhood obesity. In June 2007, the
Agricultural Commissioner proposed a 103
million euro fruit and vegetable school
program with co-funding from member
states, but these plans were at first rejected
by the Commission, who feared there was
not room in the budget (Sa and Lock 2008,
558). DG AGRI conducted an impact
assessment process from September 2007 to
May 2008 to help inform new policy
creation in Autumn 2008. The object was to
assess the potential impact of a school
program and public health and diet, social
inequality, agricultural markets, and finding
the best value for the EU funds. Before
official policy was made, the Commission
wanted to make sure that fruit and vegetable
healthy plants without the use of synthetic fertilizer
or agro-chemicals.” (EEB 2011, 12).
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programs in schools would work and be
worth the spending. Over 70 percent of
studies conducted displayed a positive
impact on fruit and vegetable intake in
schools. This study was conducted
worldwide, including the EU, USA, and
New Zealand (Sa and Lock 2008, 559-560).
The programs helped to reduce health and
social inequalities, because each child is
offered the same knowledge, and low
income students are offered reduced or free
fruits and vegetables (Sa and Lock 2008,
565).
These experimental studies led to a
program financed by the CAP known as the
School Fruit and Vegetable Scheme (SFVS).
There are 25 participating member states in
the SFVS and the program will be funded
150 million euros as part of the 2020 reform
plan, which is an increase from the previous
90 million euro budget. The program is also
co-financed by the Member States
(European Union Commission 2013b). The
products distributed are fresh produce rather
than processed products, and are fruits and
vegetables of local origin, supporting the
local economy. Frequency of distribution
varies from every day, like Denmark,
Romania, and Ireland to once a week like
Belgium, Italy,and Malta, depending on the
member state (European Union Commission
2014 14 and 17). In the school year 20122013, 61,396 schools were participating in
the SFS, aiding 33 percent of the population
of six to ten year olds and 8.6 million
students total. Each portion per child costs
about 30 cents per unit (European Union
Commission 2014, 4-5). In addition to fruit
and vegetable distribution, methods of
education noted by Member States have
included those directly linked to agriculture,
like farm visits, market visits, school
gardens, tree planting. Educational methods
cited by Member States include
“pedagogical kits for teachers and pupils,
leaflets, seminars, training sessions for
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teachers, publication in schools newspapers,
creation of web sites, interactive games on
health and nutrition, photo competitions,
exhibitions, rewarding gadgets, cartoons,
video clips” (European Union Commission
2014, 19).
This study is an example of how the
CAP can make a positive impact on
nutrition standards. Low intakes of fruits
and vegetables accounts for diseases in 4.3
percent of men and 3.4 percent in women
(Veerman 2006, 31). If the CAP increased
accessibility of fruits and vegetables to
children and lower income individuals, and
each received the recommended daily value
of fruits and vegetables, public health would
be much higher and life expectancy would
improve and increase six months for men
and four months for women (Veerman 2006,
32). The CAP has potential to make a
positive change in equality of opportunity by
implementing student lunch programs and
increasing awareness and accessibility to
fruits and vegetables.
Criticisms of the CAP
There are still many critics of the
CAP today, from the economic,
environmental, and agricultural sectors.
Throughout history, subsidies have become
increasingly political, and are less focused
on supporting struggling farmers (Lacy
2015). Critics of the CAP who are market
liberalists say it is a “costly luxury,” because
it is a form of interventionism that stands in
the way of the free market and competition
(Dragoi, and Balgar 2013a, 35). Subsidies
also have the ability to distort trade and the
World Trade Organization (WTO) must
respect EU subsidies, meaning the CAP
affects the global market (Yamaç and Acar
2009, 433).
The CAP burdens European tax
payers and consumers because of the high
prices it creates. This means it affects the

Fairfield University | Undergraduate Journal of Global Citizenship | Winter 2017

https://digitalcommons.fairfield.edu/jogc/vol2/iss2/1

44

Giacovas et al.: The Undergraduate Journal of Global Citizenship

average European citizen twice, once
through taxes, and again at the market
(Dragoi and Balgar 2015, 59). The cost of
the CAP is paid for by all citizens, but the
benefits are received primarily by the
farmers (Yamaç and Acar 2009, 429). The
2013 CAP reform works in the consumers’
favor, who are the tax-payers who help
finance the CAP. This is because the
reforms free the farmer from production
quotas, so the farmer can produce based on
consumer and market demand (Dragoi and
Balgar 2015, 59). Pressure for reform comes
from the EU budget deficit, as well as
pressure from international trading partners
(Bednarikova and Jilkova 2012, 28). Some
say the CAP is a form of interventionism
that may affect competition in the free
market (Dragoi and Balgar 2015, 57). EU
agricultural policy is also commonly
criticized for being high cost and low
efficiency, but also because of its previous
market price distortion and export support,
though this has decreased through the 2013
CAP reforms (Bednarikova and Jilkova
2012, 26-29).
Farmers, on the other hand, argue
that more reverence should be given to food
security, farm incomes, and stabilizing
agriculture prices (Rutz et al. 2013, 24).
Some farmers argue the greening measures
could drive them out of business through the
layered payment approach, which requires
cross compliance before receiving additional
payments. However, policymakers argue
that these measures only cover about 30
percent of payments, and encourages
competition and long term sustainability,
which is good in the long run for the farmer
(Dragoi and Balgar 2015, 62). For example,
in Hungary, reducing direct payments above
150,000 euros by 5 percent would affect
only 225 of the 176,300 farms which
received direct payments in 2011, showing
that new Pillar 1 qualifications would not
harm or discourage wealthy farmers. In
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addition, the majority of farmers who gave
up farming after the introduction of the
single payment scheme were smallholders
with areas less than 10 hectares. These new
reform policies would have no significant
impact on large farms (Potori, Kovacs, and
Vasary 2013, 119-120).
Environmentalists aim to do away
with the two pillar system, and assert that
more support should be given to organic
farming, with a greater goal of self
sufficiency on the local level. They also
called for direct support for ecosystems,
higher standards for animal welfare, and
greater emphasis on environmental
conservation (Rutz et al. 2013, 24-25).
Results are not being achieved fast enough,
as goals were to halt biodiversity loss by
2010, but now the horizon has shifted to
2020 (Galluzzo 2015, 22). Some
environmentalists also argue that although
the legislation for sustainability is there, the
actions themselves are not enforced. For
example, farmers are rewarded based on
carrying out managing tasks, not necessarily
for measured environmental performance,
and payment levels are not based on the
actual cost to carry out environmental
measures (Cong 2012, 1). It is generally
agreed by farmers and environmentalists
alike that greater interest should be given to
young farmers and also to protecting
forestry (Rutz et al. 2013, 24-25).
Certain member states are also
critical of the CAP. One of biggest barriers
to the CAP is the conflict of national
interest. The CAP becomes more complex
with each member state added because of
the combined diversity of environments and
agricultural systems (Dragoi and Balgar
2013a, 37). The diverse states must all
adhere to a one-size-fits-all policy. The term
“common policy” is fitting, because 90
percent of agricultural production belongs to
the EU, not the individual member states
(Dragoi and Balgar 2013a, 34). The
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countries that put the most money into the
programs (net contributors), are not
necessarily the same as those that receive
the biggest benefits (net recipients). This
means that though some Member States may
put more money into the CAP through
taxes, they do not receive as much funding
as other nations because the taxes are
redistributed based on which nations have
the most farmers and qualify for the most
farm aid. Net contributors tend to be
countries with high GDP but less arable
farmland, like the United Kingdom and
Germany. Net recipients are smaller
countries with climates that favor farming,
like France, Spain, and Italy. It is difficult
to find the right balance between “winners”
and “losers”, and the EU does not want the
gap between the groups to widen (Yamaç
and Acar 2009, 424-425). Nationally France
benefits most, with about 17 percent of CAP
payments, followed by Spain (13 percent),
then Germany (12 percent), Italy (10.6
percent) and the UK (7percent). France is
the biggest agricultural producer, accounting
for some 18 percent of EU farm output.
Germany comes second, with about 13.4
percent (BBC 2013).
Figure 2

Figures 2 exemplifies the disparity
between CAP funding and which member
states provide the most employment in
agriculture. It is clear that those who employ
the most people do not necessarily receive
the most funding. This data is used to
question where the funding is actually
going, if the countries with the most farmers
do not receive the highest CAP payments
(BBC 2013). One possible problem argued
is that the SPS rewards the largest farms
with the largest payments, so the CAP
because a redistribution system, possibly
redistributing from the poor to the rich SPS
also has the tendency to be distributed to
farmers in richer regions, as shown by the
top receivers in Figure 1 (Cong 2012, 1-2) .
In addition, it is difficult to get
Member States to agree on certain policies,
because each country has its own specialty
and its own national interests. For example,
the Netherlands favors freer trade with third
countries with things like grain, and France
and Italy were against Spain’s accession to
avoid Mediterranean competition (Yamaç
and Acar 2009, 426). The process of policymaking in the EU also affects the CAP. This
is because laws are proposed by the
Commission, but then must pass a
unanimous vote by the European Council.
This sometimes leaves the CAP policies too
watered down and up for interpretation for
Member States (Yamaç and Acar 2009, 430433). However, CAP policies with the 2013
reform are flexible so that Member States
can adjust based on their needs. Examples of
this are the optional Small Farmers Scheme
and limited coupled payments to take
account for existing conditions (European
Union Commission 2013b).The flexibility of
policies and additional payments for land
constraints benefit countries that have a very
fragmentized farming population of large
scale farmers and small subsistence farmers,
like Romania (Dragoi and Balgar 2015, 60).

Source: BBC 2013
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Another argument against the CAP,
and subsidies in general, is that farmers
begin to farm only to receive the subsidy,
not to the needs of the market or their own
motivation. From a global perspective,
subsidies only benefit the farmer and their
own country, not other countries or markets
around the world. This becomes bad for the
consumer and bad for small countries in the
world (Lacy 2015). Protectionism and
subsidies by industrialized nations cost
developing countries around 24 billion U.S.
dollars annually in lost agricultural and
agro-industrial income (EEB 2011, 20). The
CAP is seen by some as as part of an unfair
trade system rigged in favor of the richer
countries, perpetuating inequalities in global
food distribution. The average annual
subsidy per farm is about 12,200 euros. But
payments per hectare range from 527 euros
in Greece to 89 euros in Latvia, because of
the transitional arrangements for new
member states. New Member States are
allowed national farm aid to compensate for
lower EU subsidies, but these are not
enough to fill the gap. Small farmers also
put at a disadvantage compared to large
farmers, even with the SFS. Large agribusinesses and big landowners receive more
from the CAP than Europe's small farmers
who rely on traditional methods and local
markets. About 80 percent of farm aid goes
to about a quarter of EU farmers, which are
those with the largest holdings. Some, like
Copa-Cogeca, say farmers need to obtain a
fair income from the market. Farmers state
that other players in the food chain, such as
distributors and commodity speculators,
reap the rewards while their income is
falling. In a sense, the “middle man” like
those who transport the goods and ship them
out, sometimes receive more money than the
farmers themselves (BBC 2013).
It is also possible in the future that
farmers might lie about their income in
order to qualify for more subsidies (Cong
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2012,11). In addition, farmers may be able
to receive subsidies, while not “actively
farming.” This concern of “passive
farming,” is when farmers leave all of their
land fallow or idle and continue to receive
CAP payments (Trubins 2012, 162). CAP
payments make up 40 percent of income on
average for farmers. In some cases, CAP
payments may make up 100 percent of a
farmer’s income, making farming lossproducing. Therefore, in theory, some
farmers would be better off ceasing farming
and just living off CAP payments, so long as
no one checked up on them. This is why
viable food production has to remain a
priority of the CAP (Carson et al. 2013, 32).
The direct payment system guarantees a
minimum income for farmers (Dragoi and
Balgar 2013a, 37). Without the CAP,
farmers would not be able to support
themselves. The agricultural industry is not
ready to remove the CAP, even though it has
been around since the 1960s (Carson et al.
2013, 32). However, this is why the CAP
has undergone reform and passed active
farmer legislation in 2013, so that farmers
must be considered active in order to receive
any kind of CAP payment. (Trubins 2012,
168).
Conclusion
Criticisms of the CAP allude that the
policy is not ideal for all parties involved.
Smaller and poorer nations and individuals
are not being addressed to the same extent as
large and rich nations and farmers, which
have more powerful voices (Lacy 2015).
There are still problems with the SPS,
because it is not addressing the priority of
food security to its full advantage. The
SPS’s contribution to food security is not as
large as imagined because the bulk of the
payments are paid to the most fertile regions
where market prices are enough to guarantee
food production (Cong 2012, 1). It can also
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be difficult to change CAP legislation
because it has been so deeply
institutionalized and because the agricultural
lobby has grown significantly since the
development of the CAP (Carson et al.
2013, 32).
Still, the most recent CAP reform in
2013 has improved standards to attempt to
mitigate these problems. The SFS, although
optional, gives extra support to owners of
small farms who may be overshadowed by
larger, more powerful farms. The new CAP
is an effort to promote sustainability, while
still focusing on food security. The
European Commission was faced with
creating a policy to be able to fit all 28
diverse Member States, so it is impossible to
create the ideal policy that caters to each
nation’s and individual’s needs. The new
CAP aims to be more transparent and
equitable in terms of distribution of direct
payments (European Union Commission
2013a, 8). The CAP has still undergone
radical change throughout the past decade,
transitioning from artificial price support,
then to coupled payments based on
production, and finally to decoupled
payments independent of production rates.
Farmer’s output decisions are now based on
consumer demands and are not distorted by
output subsidies (Cong 2012, 1). The CAP
is still a unique subsidy program that allows
Member States choice and flexibility, while
still enforcing environmental regulations and
providing incentives to promote
biodiversity, agroforestry, and decreases in
pollution.
It still remains important for the EU
to address the issues of climate change and
environmental degradation. Climate change
is believed to affect crop varieties and
productivity, cultivated land areas, increases
in demand for irrigation, increased drought
and water scarcity, and soil degradation. It is
also predicted to increase water salinity,
higher winds, increases in rainfall, greater
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inter-season variability, and higher levels of
carbon dioxide (Madau, Furesi, and Pulina
2014, 496). As stated earlier, it is predicted
that agriculture will be the first and most
affected industry by climate change. This is
a direct threat to food security, which is
major reason why it is supported by the CAP
(Madau, Furesi, and Pulina 2014, 495).
Overall, the CAP is moving forward
to encourage environmental sustainability
and better nutrition. The recent reforms have
created a new kind of subsidy program with
policies that have caused real, measurable
changes as stated throughout this paper. The
future of the CAP after 2020 is
unpredictable, but the European
Commission will have to decide whether to
listen to CAP critics and how to continue to
adapt the CAP to the increasingly globalized
economy. CAP priorities have continued to
change through the years, and may go on
changing in upcoming decades.
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Indigenous
Resistance:
CounterHegemonic
Movements of the
Wixárika and
Ogoni
CASSIDY THOMAS
Abstract
Since the downfall of formal colonialism
after the conclusion of World War II,
economic policies advocated for by the
Global North have been spread around the
globe via the development and globalization
projects, as well as various structural
adjustment programs and neoliberal free
trade agreements. In many cases, Indigenous
and peasant communities have been
drastically affected by the persistence and
spread of economic practices oriented
towards the extraction of natural resources.
This article will critically examine the
experiences of the Wixárika of Mexico and
the Ogoni of Nigeria— two indigenous
cultures that have been terribly affected by
neoliberal economic reform in their
countries. As a result of this economic
reform and subsequent resource extraction at
1

The term Wixárika is what the Wixárika people refer to
themselves as in their native language. Today, the Wixárika
are more commonly referred to as the Huichol, which is the
term that was assigned to them by the Spanish. Given the
spirit of this discussion, much of which relates to the
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the hands of corporations of the Global
North, these cultures’ world-views and ways
of life, which foster an intimate and
irreplaceable connection with the Earth, are
being threatened and endangered. Despite
this crucial similarity that the Wixárika and
Ogoni share, the current state of these
peoples’ resistance movements differs. This
provides us with the opportunity to examine
the similarities and differences of these two
peoples’ experiences, and through doing so
we can gain a crucial insight into the current
state of indigenous resistance movements
around the world, as well as the greater
importance and meaning of these
movements.
Introduction

After the conclusion of World War II, the
world’s major colonial empires began to
disappear from formal existence. However,
these colonial empires were replaced with an
international sphere, defined by hegemonic
power, that promoted a series of economic
policies that only furthered the economic
interests of the world’s most powerful
nations. These policies, diffused through
what is known as the Development Project
(and later the Globalization Project), were
presented under the guise of being a
beneficial economic venture for local
populations. Feeling pressure to develop and
modernize, leaders of many post-colonial
states around the world adopted these
measures. However, these policies have had
disastrous effects on indigenous populations
all around the world, depriving countless
peoples of their traditional ways of life.
While the Ogoni of Nigeria and the
Wixárika1 of Mexico are located on opposite
preservation and protection of indigenous cultures and
world views, it seemed more appropriate to refer to this
indigenous group by their native term.
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ends of the globe, both of these groups
currently find themselves fighting for their
culture and ways of life as the result of
economic practices that have been promoted
by the Global North and embraced by their
state governments. While it is well
understood that these groups have both been
affected by this economic reform in a
negative way, taking a more in-depth look at
their specific movements can provide
valuable insight. By examining similarities
between the Wixárika and Ogoni
experiences, and then acknowledging the
subtle differences, the complexities of the
many challenges facing indigenous peoples
around the world can be more adequately
understood and then located within a
broader counter-hegemonic movement.
Brief Discussion of Indigeneity
To begin, it is perhaps most
important to have a brief discussion on the
concept of ‘indigeneity’ and how it relates to
the two case studies presented in this article.
The term indigeneity and questions
regarding “who qualifies as indigenous”
have become an increasingly complicated
debate for a variety of reasons. As pointed
out by Pelican (2009), the term ‘indigenous’
can undoubtedly mean different things in
different contexts, and it can be more
difficult in certain parts of the world (such
as Africa) to discern who the term is
applicable to. While it is not the purpose of
this paper to wholly engage the debates
surrounding the concept of indigeneity, it is
nevertheless important to explain how the
term ‘indigenous’ is being employed within
the context of this article and clarify how
this usage relates to broader discussions of
indigeneity.
The most logical place to begin this
discussion is a brief survey of various
definitions of the term ‘indigenous’. As
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discussed by Ronald Niezen (2005), the
term ‘indigenous’ being used in relation to
people is a relatively new phenomenon that
began gaining popularity in the 1970’s. The
International Labour Organization (ILO)
was one of the first entities to begin using
the term in relation to human beings, and did
so in a manner that “served as a distinct
starting point for claims of distinct identity
and rights based upon the principles of
original occupation of land and the pursuit
of traditional ways of life (Niezen 2005,
588).” By the late 1970’s and early 80’s, the
concepts of indigeneity and indigenous
rights began to appear within the realm of
the United Nations. By 1986, José Martinez
Cabo, the special rapporteur to the UN SubCommission on the Prevention of
Discrimination and the Protection of
Minorities, completed his study on
discrimination against indigenous
populations and in the process produced this
widely accepted definition:
Indigenous communities, peoples and
nations are those which, having a historical
continuity with pre-invasion and precolonial societies that developed on their
territories, consider themselves distinct from
other sectors of the societies now prevailing
on those territories, or parts of them. They
form at present non-dominant sectors of
society and are determined to preserve,
develop and transmit to future generations
their ancestral territories, and their ethnic
identity, as the basis of their continued
existence as peoples, in accordance with
their own cultural patterns, social
institutions and legal system (Cobo quoted
by Pelican 2009, 55).
Cobo also placed much emphasis on the
concept of self-identification (identifying
oneself as an indigenous person), which has
increasingly been recognized as an
important qualifier (Hodgson 2009). The
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ILO, when replacing their 1950’s definition
in 1989, similarly regarded selfidentification as a ‘fundamental criterion’ of
indigeneity and emphasized peoples’ desires
for self-determination and maintenance of
traditional ways of life in order to retain
their cultural identities (Dove 2006,
Hodgson 2009). In 2007, the African
Commission on Human Rights and Peoples’
Rights of the African Union (ACHR), while
acknowledging that the concept of
indigeneity in Africa differed from the
concept in other regions of the world, also
cited self-identification as highly important
in addition to “a special attachment to and
use of their traditional lands and a state of
marginalization because of cultural
difference from the national dominant model
(ACHR quoted by Pelican 2009, 56).” Then
lastly, scholars have approached the concept
of indigeneity in a variety of ways (see
Figueroa-Helland and Raghu 2015; Hall and
Fenelon 2014; Stewart-Harawira 2011).
Perhaps most importantly, as mentioned by
Stewart-Harawira (2011), large numbers of
scholars have begun to identify the
relationship of indigenous peoples to their
land and environment as one of “the most
fundamental aspect[s] of indigenous identity
(81).”
While the above Cobo definition is a
good starting point and applies to both the
Wixárika and Ogoni in several ways, some
of the qualifiers presented within that
definition can be problematic in some
contexts. To demonstrate this, we need not
look any further than the regions discussed
in this paper. The Wixárika communities
being focused on in this paper satisfy the
Cobo, ILO, and Stewart-Hawarira criteria in
every way. However, where Latin American
individuals who have been forced into the
modern world system, but can also claim
indigenous ancestry, fall within this
discussion has been the source of much
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debate. As pointed out by Harris, Carlson,
and Poata-Smith (2013), in many cases
various colonial processes such as land
dispossession and forced urbanization have
fundamentally altered indigenous peoples’
relationships to their traditional communities
and land base— some people may not even
become aware of their indigenous ancestry
until later in their lives. Within an African
context the discussion becomes even more
complicated, as many peoples have histories
that are difficult to locate within the ‘preinvasion’ dynamic that has been present
within many dominant frameworks of
indigeneity. This is due to the fact that
within Africa, there are long and complex
histories of migration, assimilation,
syncretization, and conquest between ethnic
groups that are all native to the continent
(Pelican 2009)— not to mention the
diffusion of Christianity and Islam across
the northern half of the continent long prior
to European colonization.
Despite the previously mentioned
complications, there are clearly peoples on
the African continent whose experiences are
similar to the experiences of indigenous
people in Latin America. This is referring to
peoples who have historically been
identified and self-identified as
indigenous— largely as a result of their “...
cultural distinctiveness, ... long history of
political subjugation, economic
marginalization, territorial dispossession,
cultural and linguistic discrimination by
colonial and then postcolonial states
(Hodgson 2009, 8).” This is one place that
the Ogoni can be located within broader
discussions of indigeneity, and this is why
they have been included as a case study
within this article. As will be shown in
greater detail later, the Ogoni are a culturally
distinct people who live a lifestyle that
conflicts with the economic development
models of the post-colonial Nigerian State.
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As a result, they have been displaced from
the land that sustained their cultural
practices for thousands of years and when
they have tried to resist, they have been
suppressed— sometimes violently. In
addition to this, they have consistently selfidentified as indigenous peoples and always
presented themselves as such (Ogoni Bill of
Rights; Pyagbara 2006). Please note
however, that while the Wixárika and Ogoni
have been located under the banner of
indigenous resistance for the purposes of
this discussion (for reasons previously
cited), this should not be mistaken as an
endorsement of a particular definition or
rigid framework of indigeneity that is
applicable in every context.
Brief Overview of the Wixárika and
Ogoni people
In order to fully appreciate the
effects of neoliberal economic policies on
indigenous peoples around the globe, one
needs to understand the strong connections
that these peoples have with the land that
they interact with. The Ogoni and Wixárika
are indigenous peoples living in Nigeria and
Mexico, respectively. There are roughly
45,000 Wixárika people who are currently
located in western Mexico, straddling an
area between the present day Mexican states
of Jalisco and Nayarit. Fortunately for them,
they are a fairly secluded society, living in
somewhat rugged mountain terrain. “The
[Wixárika] characteristically maintain
traditional modes of production, religion and
social organization, as well as cultural traits,
with over 90 % of the [Wixárika] speaking
the native tongue, and 11% of these not
speaking Spanish (Boni, Garibray and
McCall 2015, 764).” The Wixárika are
traditionally an agricultural society that
relies on sustenance farming to maintain
their ways of life. Beans, corns, and
different kinds of squash produced through
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slash and burn agricultural methods define
the core of the Wixárika economy. Despite
the fact that they have remained relatively
secluded from the modern world, at least
more so than some other indigenous
cultures, they do occasionally descend from
their mountain towns to sell intricate weaves
and other products that have been common
in their culture for thousands of years. Given
their agrarian way of life, the Wixárika have
a very close connection to the land that they
occupy and their society can be drastically
affected by any changes that occur to this
land. It’s also important to note, however,
that the Wixárika have strong cultural ties to
lands as far as 500 km away from the area in
which they currently reside. “Specific
groups of the [Wixárika] make yearly [400
to 500] km pilgrimages from their
communities in western Mexico to Wirikuta,
a vast region they consider highly sacred
(Boni, Garibray and McCall 2015, 759)...”
The Wirikuta is a region that has a special
religious significance to the Wixárika
people, comparable to the significance of
places such as Jerusalem to Jews and Mecca
to Muslims. As discussed by Darcy
Tetreault:
Every year the [Wixárika] people walk 500
kilometers to get to Wirikuta, where
according to legend the sun was born. Here,
they collect jíkuri (peyote), carry out rituals
of purification, and enter into communion
with their gods, who give them blessings
and guidance. In this way they conserve
their culture, maintain spiritual harmony
with nature, and uphold a thousand-year-old
tradition. Located in the state of San Luis
Potosi, Wirikuta is one of the most
biologically rich and diverse deserts in the
world. It has been shaped and maintained by
hundreds of years of continuous interaction
between the [Wixárika] people and their
environment and constitutes an example of
successful human adaptation and survival
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without resource depletion or environmental
collapse (2015, 57).

destructive effect not only on the land, but
also on the Ogoni culture.

For the purposes of this paper, the Wirikuta
and the cultural practices that surround the
region are perhaps the most important
feature of Wixárika society to understand.
This is because the Wirikuta has been
threatened by the adoption of neoliberal
economic policies and the resulting
proliferation of mining throughout the
country of Mexico.

While the Ogoni, historically
speaking, are similar to the Wixárika people
in the sense that they are both agrarian
societies that have strong connections to the
land around them, the Ogoni currently find
themselves in a much different situation than
the Wixárika. In Mexico, as previously
stated, the sacred land that the Wixárika
people currently find themselves fighting to
preserve is located roughly 500 km from
their current settlement locations.
Fortunately, as of now, the land that
currently sustains the Wixárika people’s
agrarian economy has been preserved for the
most part. The Ogoni of Nigeria have not
had the same experience. Unfortunately, the
land that the Ogoni currently occupy and
nearly every aspect of their culture relies on,
has been continually destroyed by various
industrial practices (Boele, Fabig, and
Wheeler 2001; Odoemene 2011; Uyigue and
Agho 2007). Please note that the previous
statements about how the Wixárika and
Ogoni experiences relate to each other is in
no way meant to imply that the Wixárika
situation is any less significant. It’s very
easy for anyone raised in a secular
environment, especially in the Global North,
to compare the Wixárika and Ogoni
experiences and make the assumption that
the Ogoni situation is far more dire.
However, such a statement would be coming
from an ethnocentric perspective that doesn't
recognize the importance and centrality of
religious practices in some indigenous
cultures. In many ways, the destruction of
sacred land like the Wirikuta can have just
as big of an impact on a culture as the
destruction of agricultural lands.

The Ogoni, on the other hand, are an
indigenous culture in Nigeria that share
some similarities with the Wixárika, both in
societal character and experiences since the
adoption of neoliberal economic reform.
The Ogoni people live in Rivers State in the
Niger Delta, in south-eastern Nigeria, in an
area that is about 100 square kilometers in
size. They number around 500,000 people
who live in six kingdoms. Linguistic studies
suggest they settled in the area currently
known as Ogoni over 2,000 years ago. The
Ogoni were — and still are today — a
largely agricultural and fishing society
(Boele, Fabig, and Wheeler 2001, 76).
The Niger River Delta, where the Ogoni
people are located, is a truly rich and diverse
piece of land. The area, in its natural state,
features large amounts of mangrove
swamps, freshwater wetlands, rainforests,
and land that is perfect for agricultural use.
This biodiverse environment fosters an
incredible array of different plant and animal
life that has sustained the Ogoni for
millennia (Odoemene 2011; Uyigue and
Agho 2007). However, as one may guess,
the Niger River Delta that the Ogoni have
occupied and survived off of is incredibly
fragile, and just the slightest disturbance in
climate pattern or land use can have a very
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In order to fully appreciate the
current state of the resistance movements
concerning the preservation of the Wirikuta
and the Niger River Delta, it is vital that
people understand the economic history of
the two areas. Both Mexico and Nigeria
have long histories, drastically affected by
the colonial tendencies of the Global North
and postcolonial attempts at development
and modernization.2 These histories
continue to have a huge effect on their
respective countries, as well as the
indigenous populations within those
countries.
As discussed by Nkrumah (1965)
and Winant (2015), by the time World War
II concluded, old fashioned colonialism that
had allowed countries of the Global North to
continually extract resources from the
Global South was coming to an end.
However, what was left behind was an
international sphere that featured a handful
of economically and militarily powerful
countries from the Global North; and then
what was labeled as the “Third World”, a
group of countries mainly comprised of
former colonies that had recently gained
independence and were economically
inferior by western standards. At this point
in the discussion, it’s very important to
completely understand the concept of
coloniality and more specifically, coloniality
of knowledge, both of which are a vital
component of critical decolonial discourse.
Both of these ideas directly relate to the
economic evolution of Mexico and Nigeria
and by extension, the Wixárika and Ogoni
people.

2

Please note that while there is some room for debate,
within the context of this paper the term ‘Global North’
generally applies to “wealthy industrialized nations
[including the United States, Canada, Australia, New
Zealand, Japan, and the member states of the European
Union]” while the term ‘Global South’ generally refers to
the “less prosperous counterparts in Asia, Africa, and Latin
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“Coloniality.... refers to long
standing patterns of power that emerged as a
result of colonialism, but that define culture,
labour, intersubjectivity relations, and
knowledge production well beyond the strict
limits of colonial administrations. Thus,
coloniality survives colonialism
(Moldonado-Torres 2007, 243).” Coloniality
of knowledge is a slightly more specific
idea. As stated by Dastile and NdolvuGatsheni:
Coloniality of knowledge is very important
because it speaks directly to the dilemmas of
invasion of imagination and colonization of
the minds of [indigenous peoples], which
constitutes epistemological colonization.
This colonization of consciousness and
modes of knowing is pervasive in discourses
of development, technologies of organizing
people into nations and states, as well as
imaginations of the future (2013, 111).
In countries all over the world, including
both Mexico and Nigeria, colonialism
fundamentally altered the way societies
functioned by destroying traditional cultures
and ways of living in favor of an economic
system that allowed for the easy extraction
of resources. This impact was never going to
simply disappear when formal colonialism
came to end because what was often left
behind were countries led by governments
that had come to embrace the economic
models of the Global North (See Barreto
2013; Chandra 2013; Dastile and NdlovuGatsheni 2013; Figueroa-Helland and
Lindgren 2016; Jones 2013; MoldonadoTorres 2007; Quijano 2000; Quijano 2007;
Seth 2011).3
America... [which share] a history of Northern economic
and political domination (Atapattu and Gonzalez 2015, 1).”
3

Coloniality of Power helps account for the sociopolitical power structures both within formerly
colonized societies and between formerly colonized
societies and the Global North. In many states across
the Global South, when colonial administrators left,
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As both Mexico and Nigeria gained
independence, the leaders that were left
behind were individuals had come to believe
that the only way for their countries to
economically compete was to develop and
modernize as the Global North had. After
the Global North’s final colonial stake-holds
disappeared after World War II, they took
advantage of the colonialities of knowledge
present within the minds of leaders in the
Global South. International institutions like
the IMF and the World Bank were
constructed in a manner that allowed for the
proliferation of economic policies that had
been endorsed by the Global North. It’s
important to note that the IMF and World
Bank are essentially controlled by the
nations of the Global North, and can
therefore advocate policies that unequally
benefit former colonial powers. Voting
power within the IMF and World Bank are
weighted by the size of financial
contributions member states make to the
organizations. In addition to this, the
President of the World Bank is directly
appointed by the president of the United
States, the five biggest shareholders within
the World Bank each appoint their own
directors to the twelve member board while
the remaining five are collectively appointed
by all remaining members, and the
managing director of the IMF is appointed
by the European nations of England, France,
and Germany (See Ahmed 2010; Englebert
2000; Figueroa-Helland and Lindgren 2016;

the leaders left behind were individuals who had
become socio-political elites due to the fact that they
had decided to work with colonial administrators
during the colonial era for personal benefit. In some
instances even, these people were actually just the
descendants of the original colonizers. In addition to
this, these states were economically and militarily
inferior to the Global North (largely the result of the
capital accumulation during the colonial era). These
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The Lancet 2014; McMichael 2012; Scholte
2013).
In reality, it was practically
impossible for every nation across the
Global South to develop as the Global North
had. The amount of resources and capital
needed simply did not exist. Bear in mind,
one the biggest reasons the states of Global
North were able to achieve their level of
industrialization and development was the
accumulation of wealth and resources from
the Global South via colonization.
Nevertheless, the IMF and the World Bank
encouraged nations around the world to
pursue western development and
modernization, in some cases giving them
loans to do so. As discussed by FigueroaHelland and Lindgren (2016), in some
instances during their modernization efforts,
states would begin to engage in what could
be considered ‘sub-imperialist’ practices that
mirrored the actions of past colonizers. To
clarify, the term ‘sub-imperialism’ is
referring to the continued subjugation,
oppression, and exploitation of the most
vulnerable and marginalized communities
within a state’s borders (e.g. indigenous
peoples and their lands) in the name of
economic development.4
The fact that export economies, like
those found in Mexico and Nigeria, were
dependent on the demand of the Global
North made these nations vulnerable to the
volatile global economy and gave them little

lasting power relations are what is often referred to as
Coloniality of Power.
4
Both the Wixarika and Ogoni could be considered
victims of these sub-imperialist practices, since their
state governments have helped facilitate the
exploitation of culturally significant lands in order to
generate revenue. Granted, the term ‘neocolonialism'
is also appropriate since the corporations engaging
their state’s governments are based in the Global
North.
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leverage in trade negotiations.5 This,
coupled with the previously discussed
impossibility of the rapid modernization
they were trying to accomplish, caused
many economies across the Global South to
fail. Once these countries fell into debt, the
IMF and the World Bank, in a somewhat
predatory manner, approached these
countries once again — this time offering
them new loans and/or repayment plan
restructuring. However, these offers had a
huge caveat attached to them. In exchange,
these countries needed to completely
embrace neoliberal economic policies and
open their borders to free trade. This clearly
benefited the more economically powerful
states of the Global North, which were still
hungry for the resources dispersed across the
Global South. The Global North pounced on
the opportunity to resume the extraction of
resources from the Global South at
unprecedented rates under these new free
trade laws (See Englebert 2000; FigueroaHelland and Lindgren 2016; Gonzalez 2015;
Jones 2013; McMichael 2013; Nkrumah
1965).
The Mexican and Nigerian
economies were no exception to the
previously described phenomena. For the
purposes of this paper, neoliberal economic
policies and structural adjustment programs
(SAPs) will primarily be discussed in
relation to their effects on the mining
industry in Mexico, as this is the primary
industry that affects the Wixárika people.
However, it should also be noted that these
same policies have had huge effects on the
manufacturing and agricultural sectors of
their economy as well.
5

Recall that many former colonies had developed
their export economies while they were still under the
administration of the colonial empires of the Global
North. Since their economic infrastructure
constructed around the exportation of natural
resources and the states of Global North still had a
strong demand for these resources, naturally, they
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As many countries did, Mexico
found itself with massive amounts of debt in
the early 80’s, owing nearly 80 billion
dollars to private and public foreign
creditors. As a result, the country turned to
the IMF for assistance, agreeing to cut state
spending and privatize various industries in
exchange for debt relief (Hellman 1997).
Between 1982 and 1988, to further attract
foreign investment in the mining industry:
...the Miguel de la Madrid administration
introduced a number of measures meant to
jumpstart mineral and metal production.
These included the elimination of taxes on
the exportation of metals and minerals, the
reduction of tariffs on the importation of
mining machinery and equipment, and
differential discount rates for production
taxes (Tetreault 2014, 3).
While the administration of Miguel de la
Madrid took action that began to attract the
attention of foreign investors, the actions of
the Salinas administration were far more
significant. Salinas pushed for the complete
privatization of the mining industry and
completely opened it up to foreign
investment.
The Salinas administration made changes to
Article 27 of the Constitution and to the
country’s agrarian and mining laws in order
to put an official end to the postrevolutionary land redistribution process and
to allow for the buying, selling and renting
of ejidal6 land. The 1992 Mining Law
opened the door to the full participation of
100 percent foreign-owned mining
turned back to these economic practices in an effort
to generate revenue and achieve rapid modernization.
This is closely related to the previously discussed
concept of coloniality.
6
The word ejidal means ‘relating to the ejido
system.’ The term ejido is a Spanish term that refers

Fairfield University | Undergraduate Journal of Global Citizenship | Winter 2017

https://digitalcommons.fairfield.edu/jogc/vol2/iss2/1

60

Giacovas et al.: The Undergraduate Journal of Global Citizenship

companies, under the guise of ‘Mexican
Societies’, a status that could and can be
attained by simply establishing a mailing
address in Mexico’s territory (Teautrealt
2014, 3).
Any remaining trade barriers were further
eroded with the creation of NAFTA in 1994.
Today, Mexico is the number one recipient
of foreign direct investment in the mining
industry in Latin America. 208 of the
nation’s 288 mining corporations are
Canadian owned and destructive mining
projects have wreaked havoc throughout the
country, spelling disaster for indigenous
populations (Teatreault 2015). As previously
mentioned, the Wixárika have been lucky to
the extent that the land they currently
occupy has not been destroyed. However,
they are currently embroiled in a fight with a
Canadian mining company that is attempting
to open operations in the Wirikuta, the
Wixárika’s sacred land of worship.
Nigeria’s economic history has
followed a similar trajectory to that of
Mexico’s. When Nigeria gained
independence, they found themselves in a
desperate economic situation. Being gifted
with an abundance of natural resources and
fertile land, and having been an export
economy while under British colonial rule,
Nigeria turned towards the exportation of
resources to generate revenue, develop, and
modernize according to western standards.
Reminiscent of the previously discussed
idea of coloniality of knowledge, in an
authoritarian manner, the state began to
emulate economic practices that were first
implemented under the British.

to an area of communal land that is used for
agriculture.
7
It’s important to emphasize the fact that the actions
of the Nigerian state (government) do not necessarily
represent the interests or desires of the populations
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Oil, and most importantly the revenue it
generated, quickly dominated the Nigerian
economy and thus control over oil resources
was, and still is, a key concern for any
Nigerian government. In order to assure this
control, the Nigerian state7 gradually
strengthened its control over the land. The
British colonial administration had vested
the ownership of all minerals in the Crown.
This policy was intensified by the postcolonial Nigerian government through a
Land Use Decree, which vested all land in
the State and later the Petroleum Act, giving
the Federal State the power to seize any land
needed for oil exploitation. In the late 1970s,
the government further increased its control
over the petroleum industry via two
indigenization decrees, which virtually
nationalized the oil industry and paved the
way for establishing the current joint
ventures (Boele, Fabig, and Wheeler 2001,
76).
Like Mexico, in the early 1980’s
Nigeria found itself in a dire economic
situation, having accrued massive amounts
of debt once their first attempt at western
development failed. In 1986, like Mexico,
the Nigerian government resorted to SAPs in
a desperate attempt to attract foreign
investment and revenue (Ogbonna 2012).
This SAP introduced sweeping economic
reform to the country, revaluing their
currency, eliminating import and export
barriers, and lowering taxes for corporations
conducting business within Nigerian borders
(The World Bank 1994). Once the doors to
Nigeria’s vast amounts of oil wealth were
opened, companies like Shell quickly began
conducting business in the Nigeria. Over
600 million barrels of oil have been sucked
that reside within its borders— particularly
indigenous and peasant populations. This is related to
the previously discussed concept of Coloniality of
Power (explained in footnote 1).
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from the land that the Ogoni occupy (Boele,
Fabig, and Wheeler 2001). This doesn't
include other oil operations around the Niger
River Delta and the greater country of
Nigeria. According to the Nigerian National
Petroleum Corporation, “with a maximum
crude oil production capacity of 2.5 million
barrels per day, Nigeria ranks as Africa's
largest producer of oil and the sixth largest
oil producing country in the world (2016).”
As of 2015, petroleum accounts for up to
90% of Nigeria’s export revenue and
roughly 70% the Nigerian government’s
total revenues (Harcourt 2015). As one
would expect, massive amounts of activity
within the oil industry have had a disastrous
effect on the natural environment and begun
to threaten indigenous people’s ways of life,
including the Ogoni.
Degradation and Resistance
To begin, it is important to
emphasize the fact that while the Wixárika
people have been fortunate enough thus far
to avoid mining exploration on the land
which they currently live, mining has had a
disastrous impact on the natural
environment nearly everywhere the industry
has operated. Throughout Mexico, many
companies have used open-pit mining
techniques.
Open-pit mining completely destroys the
land that contains minerals, leaving behind
gigantic craters and heaps of contaminated
rubble that emit toxins into the environment.
Aside from aesthetic considerations, this
implies the loss of habitat for wildlife and,
more important for our analysis, deprives
local communities of the use of the land for
agricultural, forestry, or other purposes
(Tetreault 2015, 51).
Open-pit mining has repeatedly destroyed
important pieces of land that indigenous
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communities all around Mexico have relied
on for thousands of years, forcing these
communities to change their ways of life
and often relocate to urban centers. Other
mining practices like leaching, which are
used in both open-pit and underground
mining practices, use massive amounts of
water that agrarian indigenous communities
rely on. Leaching simultaneously releases
toxic chemicals into the environment that
degrades land and harms plant and animal
life. Bear in mind that the vast majority of
these mining operations are done without the
consent of the indigenous peoples that they
most drastically affect. To add insult to
injury, the economic benefits of these
operations almost never reach these
communities. In some instances, mining
projects are sold to peasant populations with
the promise of jobs and economic
prosperity. However, describing this as a
mutual agreement is extremely
disingenuous. In many instances these local
populations realize the companies will
continue to pursue their operation regardless
of whether or not they have the support of
the local community. Additionally, the jobs
promised to local populations often turn out
to be either low paying or short term.
The Wixárika people have found
themselves continually fighting to keep the
Wirikuta region from falling victim to
mining practices that have already destroyed
vast amounts of land in Mexico. This land
has been within the sights of a Canadian
mining company called First Majestic Silver
for quite some time now (Boni, Garibray
and McCall 2014; Tetreault 2014; Tetreault
2015). While the Mexican government has
classified the whole area as a reserve, in
2000, the Mexican government divided the
land into special zones that were to be used
a particular way. One of those zone types,
known as a special use zone, was
specifically made to allow mining
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companies to use the land as they wished
without facing legal consequences. In
response to this, the Wixárika people have
allied with various NGO’s and multiple
indigenous rights groups to form the Frente
en Defensa de Wirikuta (FDW) (Boni,
Garibray, and McCall 2014). Led the by the
whole of the Wixárika population, this
group has continually argued with the
Mexican government that this land is vital to
their social and cultural reproduction and
cannot be replaced in any way. They have
demanded the halt of mining operations in
the area and taken the case to court. Federal
courts have recognized the Wixárika claims
to the land but the fight is ongoing (Tetreault
2014; Tetreault 2015). This movement,
throughout all of its stages, has been largely
non-violent and remains so to this day. One
complicating factor is that First Majestic
Silver claims that the local populations who
live right next to the Wirikuta (recall that the
Wixárika live 500 km away) actually
support the mining operations. As
previously mentioned though, the sincerity
of local support can be called into question
fairly easily.
While reforms in Mexican law have
affirmed the importance of cultural rights,
the Wixárika and others have argued that
these reforms do not go far enough (Boni,
Garibray, and McCall 2014). Many media
outlets from all around the world have
begun to follow and support the Wixárika
cause. International support has grown since
the start of their movement and definitely
helped place pressure on the Mexican
government and First Majestic (Tetreault
2015). The case in Wirikuta represents much
more than the protection of land that is
sacred to Wixárika culture. To those
involved with the movement, this fight
represents the convergence of anti-capitalist,
anti-neocolonial, and environmentalist
resistance— as it is capitalist and
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neocolonial practices that have the potential
to steal from people like the Wixárika and
have already stolen so much from other
indigenous cultures around the world.
The Ogoni of Nigeria have had very
different experiences than the Wixárika of
Mexico. As previously mentioned, like the
Wixárika, the Ogoni are an agrarian society
but have also used fishing to supplement
their diets. They rely on the fertile and
diverse land of the Niger River Delta to
sustain their ways of life. Unfortunately,
since Shell and other oil companies have
been allowed into the region by the Nigerian
government, much of what the Ogoni rely
on has been destroyed. According to Bond
(2013), “an estimated 1.5 million tonnes of
oil have spilled since drilling began in the
late 1950’s, the equivalent of an Exxon
Valdez spill each year, costing more than 5
billion dollars in annual environmental
damage (215-216).” Between 1976 and 1990
alone, over 2500 oil spills affected the
region and they were rarely cleaned up
properly. This has had an absolutely
devastating impact on the land and
waterways that the Ogoni have traditionally
relied on for agriculture and fishing; so
much so that most of the land and
waterways affected by oil spoils are
practically useless to the Ogoni people at
this point in time (Etiosa and Agho 2007;
Jike 2004; Odoemene 2011). Only
furthering the problem, petroleum
companies like Shell often construct canals
through the Niger River Delta. This is done
for transport and various other purposes but
has a very problematic effect on the
wetlands environment. As mentioned earlier,
the Niger River Delta features many
freshwater swamps and wetlands that are
very fragile. The construction of canals
throughout the region has allowed saltwater
from the sea to penetrate inland, salinizing
the water in the swamps and wetlands. This
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has a very harmful effect on the freshwater
fish and plants that the Ogoni depend on
(Aluko 2004). Gas flaring is another very
destructive practice that is used widely in
the region, but rarely given the amount of
attention it deserves. The problem with gas
flaring is the amount of chemicals and gases
that it releases into the atmosphere above the
Niger River Delta. These gases then
condense and form acid rain. In Nigeria, this
acid rain has been known to be so potent
that it is sometimes capable of eroding the
aluminum sheets on peoples’ homes.
Additionally, the acid rain in the Niger River
Delta has significantly harmed the
biodiversity of the region, altering
vegetation and poisoning waterways
(Uyigue and Agho 2007; Jike 2004;
Odoemene 2011).
At this point, it is quite obvious that
the petroleum industry has directly affected
the Ogoni way of life. Unlike the Wixárika
people of Mexico, they currently find
themselves in a situation where many of
their traditional modes of livelihood
(agriculture and fishing) are virtually
impossible to follow. Similar to the situation
with the Wixárika and many other
indigenous groups in Mexico, this has been
done without the consent of the Ogoni
people (Aluko 2004). In the 1990’s, given
all of the injustices that have been
committed against the Ogoni, a fairly
powerful resistance movement emerged in
the Niger River Delta.
With the established Nigerian political
system having largely failed the Ogoni, they
believed they had little choice but to revert
to direct social action. The Ogoni movement
decided to engage in a non-violent struggle
drawing on the language of
minority/indigenous peoples’ rights and
social and ecological justice. In October
1990 they launched the Ogoni Bill of Rights.
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In the Bill, the Ogoni people, while
underlining their loyalty to the Nigerian
nation, asserted their right to selfdetermination and articulated their demands
for environmental, social and economic
justice (Boele, Fabig, and Wheeler 2001,
79).
Shortly after this, the signatories of the
Ogoni Bill of Rights formed the Movement
for the Survival of the Ogoni People
(MOSOP). Since the creation of this
resistance group, the struggle has been
brutal. Throughout the 90’s, demands from
MOSOP and large peaceful protests were
met with violence by the Nigerian
government, whose authoritarian leaders
ordered Nigerian troops to attack their own
citizens. Throughout this entire process,
Shell turned a blind eye to the brutal
treatment of the Ogoni people at the hands
of the Nigerian government. Lack of
substantial support from the international
community (contrary to what the Wixárika
in Mexico have experienced) has caused
others in the Niger River Delta to resort to
more desperate measures (Boele, Fabig, and
Wheeler 2001). Other resistance groups,
such as Movement for the Emancipation of
the Niger Delta (MEND) have formed and
taken a much more violent approach (Obi
2009; Odoemene 2011). MEND has
repeatedly used tactics that include sabotage,
property destruction, theft, and guerrilla
warfare (Hanson 2007; Kline 2011). The
stated goal of MEND is to end the
exploitation of the Niger River Delta’s
resources at the hands of foreign investors,
secure reparations, and return total control
of the oil wealth and autonomy to the
indigenous groups inhabiting the region
(BBC News 2006). The level of violence
used by groups like MEND distinctly
separates the situations surrounding the
Niger River Delta and Wirikuta (Obi 2009;
Odoemene 2011).
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Attacks on Ogoni communities and
arrests of MOSOP activists continued
throughout the 90’s until the country
returned to democratic rule. Since then,
violence towards the Ogoni has subsided
somewhat, but dialogue between MOSOP
and Shell has been met with limited success.
While Shell has, on multiple occasions,
announced plans geared towards reducing
environmental degradation and improving
relations with the Ogoni people, the vast
majority of these plans have been created
without the actual input of MOSOP. This,
coupled with the fact that Nigerian land is
still being destroyed, has led to continual
tension between MOSOP and Shell because
MOSOP feels that Shell is dismissive of the
Ogoni cause (Boele, Fabig, and Wheeler
2001). Currently, given the fact that
destruction of their land has already
occurred on a massive scale, their situation
seems far more bleak than that of the
Wixárika in Mexico. Some reparations (15
million dollars) were secured on behalf of
Ken Saro-Wiwa’s family, who brought a
case against Shell to a US court (Bond
2013). Obviously, however, this very limited
monetary reparation cannot undue decades
of damage. To be blunt, it’s unlikely the
Ogoni culture will ever be completely the
same. Too much irreparable damage has
been done to the Niger River Delta, which
the Ogoni people need to sustain their
traditional ways of life. As with the
Wixárika in Mexico, the fight the Ogoni
face in the Niger River Delta is for much
more than just their own well-being. The
fight that the Ogoni have been undertaking
represents a resistance against neocolonial
and capitalist forces that have harmed many
more people than just the Ogoni.

they are saying. Citizens of the Global North
need to learn about such movements, listen
to their discourse, and reflect critically on
their own countries’ roles in creating the
problems that indigenous peoples, and the
planet as a whole, are currently facing. One
of the first things that needs to be challenged
is the culture of consumerism, which drives
the demand for the mass extraction of
minerals, metals, petroleum, and other nonrenewable resources. In addition to this, the
intrinsic value of diversity (both cultural and
environmental) needs to be recognized and
embraced. As previously stated, the
Mexican federal courts have recognized the
precedence of cultural rights within their
country, but far more needs to be done.
Some countries, such as Bolivia, have
enshrined ideas such as Buen Vivir in their
constitution, establishing the inherent value
and rights of the natural environment and
future human generations (See Harcourt
2013; Kothari, Demario, and Acosta 2014;
Safransky and Wolford 2011). Lastly, and
perhaps most importantly, the entire idea of
development needs to be deconstructed,
critically analyzed, and rethought. For too
long, development has only been thought of
in terms of western modernization and it is
this standard that has been applied to
cultures and countries all around the world
(Kothari, Demaria, and Acosta 2014). Once
the idea of development, as defined by the
West, is reconsidered, more radical
alternative lifestyles, modes of governance,
and epistemologies of progress can be
considered. Please note that the previous list
of prescribed actions is by no means
exhaustive. It only represents some of the
more fundamental and broad changes that
need to occur.
Concluding Thoughts

Moving forward, it is the
responsibility of the entire globe to embrace
these indigenous movements and hear what
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Neoliberal economic policies have
had disastrous consequences for indigenous

Fairfield University | Undergraduate Journal of Global Citizenship | Winter 2017

Published by DigitalCommons@Fairfield, 2017

65

Undergraduate Journal of Global Citizenship, Vol. 2, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 1

communities all around the world. In
Mexico and Nigeria, respectively, neoliberal
economic policies advocated for by the
Global North resulted in an unprecedented
level of environmental destruction at the
hands of the mining and petroleum
industries. These industries have continually
alienated indigenous communities like the
Wixárika of Mexico and the Ogoni of
Nigeria, two communities who now find
themselves to be a part of a massive global
resistance against neoliberal economic
policies, environmental degradation,
neocolonialism, and western hegemony. To
the Wixárika, the Ogoni, and other societies
all around the world, land is not just an
invaluable resource, but inherently
connected to their culture and being. As
discussed by Figueroa-Helland and Raghu
(2015),
Although indigenous cultures are richly
diverse, they tend to share the following
principles: Indigenous peoples do not
conceive themselves as separate from or
superior to Mother Earth or the rest of the
life-web. Instead, indigeneity understands
itself as a life-form that is organically
coextensive with, embedded in, and
communally co-responsible for the cycles,
forces, and relational networks that
constitute Mother Earth and the
encompassing cosmos. Indigenous
worldviews often conceive human society as
an organ with specific functions inside a
larger fully living geo-body.
Fenelon (2014) was correct in identifying
what could be considered a rather twisted
and unfortunate irony, which is that the
indigenous peoples that have long been
thought of as ‘primitive’ and
‘underdeveloped’ may very well hold the
key to humanity’s ability to overcome many
contemporary civilizational crises.
Continuing to destroy the environment that
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sustains various indigenous populations will
only further erode their socio-cultural
structures, potentially to the point where
they are completely destroyed. At that point,
humanity as whole will lose a vital piece of
itself and lose the ability to admire and learn
from these cultures that have survived for
hundreds of thousands of years, in harmony
with this Earth (See De Sousa Santos 2014;
Escobar 2015; Fenelon 2014; FigueroaHelland and Raghu 2015; Ikeke 2015; Le
Grange 2012; Pierotti and Wildcat 2000;
Stewart-Harawira 2005). This is why the
movements being spearheaded by the
Wixárika and Ogoni are about much more
than just their societies. These indigenous
resistance movements are about reversing
destructive economic trends and the
development of the human/non-human
dichotomy that will one day doom humanity
(See Ahmed 2010; Ahmed 2011; Bowden
2011; Fenelon 2014; Figueroa-Helland and
Lindgren 2016; George 2010; Houtart
2010).
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Abstract
In the interest of ending the 50 year-old
internal armed conflict, the Colombian
government and FARC-EP advance efforts
to reach a peace agreement. The agenda of
the Havana talks consists of five issues, one
of which is at the heart of achieving peace:
the protection of the rights of the conflict’s
victims. Nevertheless, what is the cost the
victims have to pay to enter the new era of
peace? On December 15, 2015, President
Juan Manuel Santos and Rodrigo Londoño,
leader of the guerrilla force, signed the
“Agreement on Victims of the Conflict.”
With the implementation of transitional
justice, the agreement outlines a set of
special conditions that grant amnesty to the
perpetrators of crimes considered “less
severe.” The agreement’s use of transitional
justice interferes with the full satisfaction of
the victims’ rights. This paper exposes this
failure with an exploration of the conflict’s
history emphasizing human rights
violations. In addition, it will develop into
an analysis of transitional justice, its
processes and limitations. Finally, this paper
will examine the extent to which the
agreement upholds the rights of the victims.
In a case as complex as Colombia’s, a peace
process and an agreement on victims must
acknowledge the harm delivered to the
population to create reparations that
guarantee justice.
Introduction

The Colombian armed conflict is the last
of its nature in Latin America. For more
than half a century, multiple actors have
fueled the conflict. One of them is Fuerzas
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia –
Ejército del Pueblo (FARC-EP,
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—
People's Army). A wide range of military
and terrorist tactics employed by the group
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position them as one of the most violent and
vicious criminal organizations in the world.
Additionally, and most importantly, the
commission of an exorbitant number of
atrocities against the Colombian population
by the guerrilla organization reflects a crisis
of human rights violations.
The political climate in Colombia
during the 1940’s was propitious for the
birth of a conflict. The rivalry between the
Conservative and Liberal parties had as
central axis the dispute of land control. For
these major political parties, the acquisition
of the presidency constituted an effective
medium to implement land reformations
that satisfied their respective needs. Such
was the case of the Liberal administrations
from 1930 to 1946, in which the party
“inaugurated land reform that restricted
ancestral privileges and unleashed furious
political opposition from the
Conservatives.” ( Molano 2000, 23) In rural
areas, the ambiance reflected the political
division seen in Bogota. Peasants who
supported the Liberals fought Conservativebacked landowners and peasants who
intended to protect the class order in the
control of land.
The death of Jorge Eliecer Gaitan, a
Liberal leader who pursued the presidency
of Colombia in 1948 with his ideals on land
reformation, deteriorated the already
fractured social landscape of the country.
From 1948 to 1958, Colombia would
witness a period known as la Violencia. The
Conservative government provided military
support to peasants in rural areas. The
overthrown party, on the other end, armed
peasants in the interest of retaliating
Conservative attacks. These confrontations
between peasants were conducive to the
creation of FARC. The Liberal Party, with
assistance from Communist Party activists,
formed a 10,000-man army. (Molano 2000,
24) Pedro Antonio Marin, a peasant fighter
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at the time, would become the commanderin -chief of FARC.
Although class struggle spearheaded
the destructive course of action of the group
against the government during the 1960’s
and early 1970’s, FARC later transitioned to
attacking and threatening civilians as a tactic
to gain territorial control and undermine the
government’s legitimacy. This tendency
continued until the early stages of the peace
dialogues between President Juan Manuel
Santos and the current commander, Rodrigo
Londoño Echeverri, in 2012. As a result, the
decision to formally initiate a peace process
in Havana, Cuba was deemed as a victory
for peace and international security. For
once in Colombia, a possibility to halt
decades of war and violence seemed a
reality.
The Havana peace process
overshadows the failures of past peace
processes with the purpose of ending the
internal conflict with other militant groups
in Colombia such as Ejercito de Liberación
Nacional (ELN, National Liberation Army).
In the same way, this unprecedented event
has battled the criticisms of the opposition,
championed by former President Alvaro
Uribe Velez, for the deplorable management
of human rights violations throughout the
creation of the different agreements on
which the peace talks focus.
“The Agreement on Victims of the
Conflict” was signed on December 15, 2015.
This outcome of the peace process created
the highest expectation given of Colombia’s
infamous history of human rights violations.
Additionally, since the initiation of the
peace dialogues in 2012, both negotiating
parties have stressed their commitment to
acknowledge the painful past of the victims
and to compensate for the damage
committed. Nonetheless, the agreement
constitutes a mechanism to absolve the
members of FARC-EP of any criminal
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responsibility, thus creating impunity for
mass atrocities.
Literature Review
Transitional Justice
The past 50 years of conflict in
Colombia belong to a history of gross
human rights violations. The attempt of the
government and FARC-EP to transition to
an era of sustainable peace has to take into
account such a disturbing past. Therefore,
the implementation of transitional justice
into the peace process is fundamental to
confront the damage visited upon the
victims of the conflict.
The literature on transitional justice
offers multiple definitions. It “can be
defined as the conception of justice
associated with periods of political change,
characterized by legal responses to confront
the wrongdoings of repressive predecessor
regimes.” (Teitel 2003, 49) This
interpretation, however, excludes the nonjudicial mechanisms that transitional justice
incorporates in its functions to secure peace.
Additionally, it ignores the responsibility
that other non-state actors bear under
periods of violent turbulence. In the report
“The rule of law and transitional justice in
conflict and post-conflict societies,” former
Secretary-General Kofi Annan provides an
all-encompassing definition. It is “the full
range of processes and mechanisms
associated with a society’s attempts to come
to terms with a legacy of large-scale past
abuses, in order to ensure accountability,
serve justice and achieve reconciliation.”
(Annan 2004, 4) To hold “society” liable for
crimes committed against the population
integrates the assumption that actors of
different natures can participate in the
execution of inhumane acts, such as
guerrillas or criminal groups. He furthers the
definition to the extent of considering both
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judicial and non-judicial mechanisms
essential for a society to reconcile with a
troubling past.
The salient feature of transitional
justice, regardless of its various narratives, is
its intention to facilitate the progression of a
society from a past filled with violations of
human rights to a future provisioned with
justice, peace and security. In order for
transitional justice to achieve this objective,
it depends on the functionality of four
distinct processes: a justice process, a
reparation process, a truth process and an
institutional reform process to guarantee no
repetition. Each one interconnects with the
other, thus fortifying their respective focus.
Moreover, the results of these processes
become the undeniable rights of the victims.
In other words, the victims have the right to
truth, justice, reparation and no repetition.
Justice Process
The perpetrators of past crimes
should be investigated, prosecuted and
punished for their actions. States have the
duty to initiate a judicial process against
those suspected of violating human rights
(Gomez Isa 2014, 47). Under international
law, crimes against humanity, genocide, war
crimes and aggression, due to their gravity,
always qualify for prosecution and
punishment. “The right to justice demands
that States maximize measures to prevent
impunity for serious and systematic
violations of human rights.” (Gomez Isa
2014, 47) Bringing perpetrators to justice,
similarly, constitutes a reparation
mechanism for victims and a preventive
procedure against future atrocities.
The establishment of sanctions,
nonetheless, can present a challenge to
ensuring justice. If these have the potential
to threaten the progress towards peace and
reconciliation, then authorities have to resort
to incentives and special sanctions.
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Governments have the prerogative of
accommodating the enactment of
punishment, if and only if certain crimes can
be considered of minor gravity. Amnesty,
pardon and reduction of sentence are
alternatives to the traditional forms of
punishment.
For this purpose, the creation of
tribunals or units with special jurisdiction is
vital. These institutions judge crimes
depending on their degree of severity. The
punishment or the special conditions,
consequently, must be proportional to the
final verdict. Most importantly, these
limitations to justice must encompass full
respect of the authority of human rights. But
how can a government assure the citizens
and the victims of abuses that the judgement
of crimes excludes arbitrariness? How can
principles of impartiality and objectiveness
be secured in such a delicate process?
Failure to recognize, within the judging
process, the harm inflicted on victims and
their rights promotes the creation of unjust
sanctions. “An open door to impunity, to
oblivion and to the absence of a full and
effective reparation for the victims” (Gomez
Isa 2014, 48) could result if no precaution is
taken when judging a crime.
Truth Process
What happened? When did it happen? Who
participated?
Answering these questions is central
to the right of the victims and society to
know the truth about the events that took
place. In this context, the element of
investigation from the Justice process carries
an influential role as it will provide the
information necessary for the victims to
exercise their right to truth. At the same
time, this benefits the victims in another
way. “The knowledge that truth provides has
to be accompanied by the recognition of the
victims.” (Gomez Isa 2014, 54) Exposing
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the truth reveals the damage delivered to
victims, which validates their experiences in
the past and the urgency to compensate
these in the present and future. In like
manner, finding the truth serves as a
spiritual and psychological reparation for the
victims.
The government has the duty to
implement the mechanisms to recuperate
and reconstruct the truth. The installation of
truth and reconciliation commissions (TRC),
therefore, becomes a requirement for this
process. The investigation of past atrocities
is as essential as elaborating
recommendations for conceivable
reparations for the victims. In different
historical cases, TRCs possessed diverse
functions. South Africa “had the power to
investigate crimes committed during
apartheid, including the use of subpoena and
seizure powers, to have public hearings, and
to recommend the granting of an amnesty
for perpetrators in exchange for full
disclosure. This commission was also
allowed to award interim reparations and to
make recommendations in this respect.”
(Sandoval Villalba 2011, 8) In Argentina, on
the contrary, the National Commission on
the Disappeared had only the mandate to
investigate disappearances between 1976
and 1983.
Reparation Process
Transitional justice vindicates the
right of the victim to receive reparation for
the harm caused. Both state and individual
actors, such as FARC, in the case of
Colombia, have the obligation of repairing
the victims for the harm inflicted, if found
accountable for violations of human rights
under international law. “Any state that
breaches its international obligations (by
action or omission) has the obligation to
produce reparation.” (Sandoval Villalba
2011, 6) The 2002 Rome Statute of the
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International Criminal Court, moreover,
holds responsible those individuals who
commit crimes against humanity, war
crimes, genocide and aggression.
Reparation appears in economic,
symbolic and material forms. Nonetheless,
Gomez Isa argues that independently of the
reparation, there are psychological
consequences that cannot be addressed with
any type of approach. “First of all, we have
to underline that reparation is not a panacea
that will solve all problems related with the
past…” (Gomez Isa 2014, 56) Victims of
past atrocities have to live with the legacy of
pain, anguish and damage for the days to
come. Reparations, as a result, should be
constructed as long-term processes and not
moments of instant gratification.
Institutional Reform – No Repetition
“Reforming state institutions
involved in, or that failed to prevent, the
commission of heinous crimes is an essential
element of the transitional justice
processes.” (Sandoval Villalba 2011, 9) By
doing so, a state is able to prevent the
occurrence of the same atrocities that
destroyed the society. This emphasizes the
belief in no repetition. At the same time, it
underpins the efforts of the state to
transform the institutions that permitted the
cultivation of violence and its prevalence. In
this process, the justice and security sectors
should be the primary focus of reform. “The
police, military personnel, intelligence
services, customs, certain segments of the
justice sector, and non-state actors with
security functions” (Sandoval Villalba 2011,
9) are entities that fall under the
aforementioned approach. From a human
rights standpoint, implementing changes in
these sectors is crucial if the aim is to bring
to justice those responsible for violations
and abuses
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International Law
Human rights are a matter of
immense significance for the international
community. World War II, for example,
drew the line between inaction and
cooperation amongst nation-states in
circumstances of degradation of human
dignity and violation of the liberties of men
and women. The United Nations, as a result,
has pledged to promote and preserve
international peace through the advocacy
and protection of human rights since its
founding in 1945. The adoption of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights by
the UN in 1948 constitutes a fundamental
step towards the prevalence of human rights
in all corners of the globe. Moreover, this
milestone propelled the development of a
vast number of treaties and conventions that
concern specific rights. Amongst these are
the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights developed from the UDHR.
(Valdivieso Collazos 2012, 624)
“The concern for the respect for the
human species encourages the development
of international legislation for the defense of
human rights.” (Valdivieso Collazos 2012,
624) This type of legislation, in its majority,
carries a penal condition. “The international
regime on human rights devotes a whole
normativity in different spheres (regional
and global) that constitute mechanisms of
inspection, protection and punishment to
violations of these rights.” (Valdivieso
Collazos 2012, 624) Such is the case of the
Rome Statute and the Geneva Conventions.
Colombia is a state-party to both
treaties. It signed the Rome Statute on
December 10 of 1998 and ratified it on
August 5, 2002. Regarding the Geneva
Conventions, Colombia is member to all
four conventions and Protocols I and II. For
the purpose of this paper, only the Fourth
Geneva Convention relative to the
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Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War and Protocol II relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International
Armed Conflicts will be employed to
analyze the situation of the victims in the
Colombian armed conflict. The country
ratified the Convention on November 8,
1961 and the Protocol on August 14 of
1995.
The Rome Statute established the
International Criminal Court (ICC) on July
17, 1998. The treaty defines the crime of
genocide, crimes against humanity, war
crimes and the crime of aggression as “the
most serious crimes of concern to the
international community as a whole.” (Rome
Statute 1998, 3) The exploration of the
Colombian conflict reveals that all actors
involved in the conflict have committed
crimes against humanity and war crimes.
Article 7 lists the acts that constitute crimes
against humanity. Some examples include
murder, extermination, deportation,
deprivation of physical liberty, enforced
disappearance of persons and rape.
Furthermore, Article 8 defines war crimes as
“grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions
of 12 August 1949.” (Rome Statute 1998, 5)
Some acts pertinent to the Colombian armed
conflict are willful killing, causing great
suffering to the body or health and enlisting
children. “States that ratify the statute bind
themselves to investigate, judge and
sentence with adequate punishment those
who committed the crimes of genocide,
aggression, war and crimes against
humanity.” (Valdivieso Collazos 2012, 625)
States that do not obey this mandate must
extradite those who perpetrated previous
crimes in order to be judged by the ICC.
The four Geneva Conventions of
1949 prevail in the realm of International
Humanitarian Law (IHL). (Valdivieso
Collazos 2012, 625) These “pretend to
humanize wars imposing prohibitions of
penal character to the individual.”
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(Valdivieso Collazos 2012, 626) Article 4 of
the Fourth Geneva Convention defines who
is protected at times of war. “Persons
protected by the Convention are those who,
at a given moment and in any manner
whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a
conflict or occupation, in the hands of a
Party to the conflict.” (Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War 1949, 170) In the
same way, Protocol II Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International
Armed Conflict includes internal wars
within the sphere of rules of law of armed
conflicts. Article 4.1 emphasizes the humane
treatment of persons who do not participate
directly in the conflict. Moreover, the article
prohibits certain acts such as taking
hostages, acts of terrorism and the
recruitment of children.
Blood and Violation of Human Rights
The internal armed conflict in
Colombia between FARC-EP and the
government dates back to the 1960s, more
specifically, to 1964. (Hataway 2015, 163)
Nonetheless, the period known as La
Violencia, which lasted from 1948-1957,
preceded and propelled the awakening of the
conflict and the formation of FARC-EP. La
Violencia began in 1948 with the
assassination of Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, a
Liberal candidate who aspired to win the
presidential post. This episode exacerbated
the economic and political disparities rooted
in the social fabric of the country. Tensions
between the two major political parties –the
Liberals and the Conservatives— escalated
to a bloody confrontation that extended to
rural areas. The impact of bipartisan
divisions over land control facilitated the
permeation of the violence. After Gaitán’s
death, the Conservatives installed their
power in the government with Laureano
Gomez as head of state in 1950. “Gómez’s
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victory and continued Conservative control
contributed to the formation of Liberal
‘guerrilla squads’ in rural areas which were
organized to retaliate against Conservative
farms and villages.” (Offstein 2003, 101) La
Violencia, which left a death toll of 200,000
people, (Offstein 2003, 101) ended with the
creation of the National Front in 1958.
With this coalition, Liberals and
Conservatives established a power-sharing
government in which they would alternate
the presidency every four years. Moreover,
the National Front aimed to mitigate the
violence between the members and
supporters of the Conservative and Liberal
parties. Both political wings acknowledged
that rural discontent generated this violence.
Nonetheless, “the government’s struggle to
address legitimate concerns of rural (and
urban) poor while maintaining a strict twoparty Liberal/Conservative political
framework allowed groups with alternative
political ideologies to synthesize into
guerrilla-style movements.” (Offstein 2003,
103) Not only were these products of
partisan rivalry, but they also appeared as a
result of local disagreements over land and
control of coffee crops. Their political
agenda included the promotion of rural land
reforms and better wages. (Offstein 2003,
102) One of these movements, the Southern
Guerrilla Bloc (SGB), developed into
Colombia’s strongest group –las Fuerzas
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia –
Ejército del Pueblo. Its affiliation to the
Colombian Communist Party reflected its
left-wing, Marxist ideals. (Hataway 2015,
166) FARC’s original social revolution
shifted to criminal and terrorist activities in
order to gain economic, political and
territorial control. This resulted in
destructive consequences in civilian life.
“Two other guerrilla movements whose
roots can be traced to the period of the
[Violencia] and early years of the National
Front agreement are the Ejército de
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Liberación Nacional (National Liberation
Army or ELN) and Ejército Popular de
Liberación (Popular Liberation Army or
EPL).” (Offstein 2003, 104) FARC-EP,
ELN and EPL became involved in the
production, protection and distribution of
illicit drugs. (Hataway 2015, 167) At the
same time, right-wing paramilitary forces,
which later united under one group,
Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC),
emerged with the support of some sectors of
the Colombian armed forces, politicians and
landlords to counterattack the insurgency of
the aforementioned guerrilla groups. This is
the multilayered and heterogeneous nature
that characterizes the Colombian armed
conflict.
As Colombian writer and journalist
Alfredo Molano remarks, FARC
consolidated its power between 1970 and
1982 when the number of fighters increased
to 3,000. At the same time, the support of
peasants matched this previous
transformation in rural zones. Nonetheless,
landowners repressed peasant movements
and expulsed small tenants from the lands
they cultivated (Molano 2000, 26) obliging
the displaced to settle in areas dominated by
the guerilla.
One of the early attempts to achieve
peace through diplomatic means occurred
during the presidency of Belisario Betancur
(1982 - 1986). With the recent installation of
a Peace Commission, Betancur offered to
“legalize the FARC’s political activity and
to convert their military force into a political
party.” (Molano 2000, 27) The offer led to
the creation of the Patriotic Union (UP) in
exchange of a verifiable ceasefire and a
termination of kidnappings. The presidency
of Virgilio Barco, contrary to its
predecessor, did not have any peaceful
nuances. In 1987, the army attacked the the
Fifth Front of FARC in the department of
Uraba. (Molano 2000, 27) At the same
time, paramilitary forces supported by the
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army, killed indiscriminately activist of the
Patriotic Union. Three presidential
candidates of the left were assassinated
during Barco’s last days in office; Jaime
Pardo Leal and Bernardo Jaramillo of the
UP and Luis Carlos Galan of the Liberal
Party. According to Molano, the right wing
argued at the time that paramilitaries,
considered self-defense groups, “should be
recognized as the third actor in the conflict.”
(Molano 2000, 30) In areas where no
government presence existed, paramilitary
forces acted as representation of the
government’s army.
More than 50 years of confrontation
have invaded the lives of Colombians with
pain, brutality and bloodshed. The multiple
dimensions of the war have created a
heterogeneous universe of victims. The
Law of Justice and Peace (Law 975),
enacted in 2005 by the Colombian congress,
defines the victim as: the person who has
suffered individually or collectively direct
harm such as temporary or permanent
injuries that cause any type of physical,
psychological and/or sensory disability
(visual and/or auditory), emotional
suffering, financial loss and detriment of
their fundamental rights. These harms must
have resulted from crimes committed by
members of organized armed groups at the
margins of the law. (Procuraduría 2007, 15)
Although the law excludes those victimized
by official state agents, (Garcia-Godos and
Lid 2010, 501) it is crucial to distinguish
that all participatory actors in the conflict,
including the state (police and armed
forces), have responsibility in the execution
of crimes that violate human rights. In
Colombia, crimes that range from murder
and kidnappings to bombardments of public
spaces construct the victimhood of the
individual.
The violence during the 1990s
augmented the number of victims. (Hataway
2015, 168) Figure 3 demonstrates that in the
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beginnings of the decade, both homicides
and kidnappings reached unprecedented
numbers when compared to previous years.
By the time, approximately 25,000
homicides and 2,500 kidnappings had been
carried out. Table 10 reiterates the previous
numbers of homicides and kidnappings with
statistics from 1964 until 1996. For example,
undoubtedly, the number of homicides
changed dramatically starting in the year
1985 with 12,922 cases. Five years after, the
number of homicides equaled to 24,304.
According to the Group of Historical
Memory (GMH) of the National Center for
Historical Memory in Colombia, the conflict
has caused the death of approximately
220.000 people between 1958 and 2012.
(Grupo de Memoria Histórica 2013, 31) “Of
these deaths, 81.5% corresponds to civilian
deaths and 18.5% to combatant ones.”
(Grupo de Memoria Histórica 2013, 32) For
instance, in 1999, the paramilitaries
assassinated Jaime Garzón, a well-respected
journalist, humorist and political satirist.
The GMH declares that the armed conflict
leaves a disturbing balance of victims:
25,007 disappearances, 1,754 victims of
sexual violence, 6,421 boys, girls and
adolescent victims of forced recruitment,
4,744,046 displaced people, 27,023
kidnappings between 1970 and 2010, and
lastly, 10,189 victims of antipersonnel mines
between 1982 and 2012. (Grupo de
Memoria Histórica 2013, 33).
FARC-EP is responsible for 238
massacres and 489 kidnappings between
1980 and 1989. Diagram 10 proves the
prominence of kidnappings in the belligerent
behavior of FRAC-EP (teal line). In 1998,
the guerrilla group carried approximately
1,800 kidnapping, which exceeds the
amounts of the rest of the actors. Between
1996 and 2002, the use of kidnappings
reached its highest level. FARC-EP became
the leading perpetrator of this crime with
8,578 in its record. (Grupo de Memoria
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Histórica 2013, 67) A renowned case is that
of former senator and presidential candidate
Ingrid Betancourt when she was kidnapped
by FARC-EP on February 23, 2002. Andrés
Felipe Pérez, the terminally ill son of
Corporal Norberto Pérez, died in 2001 in the
hopes of seeing his father liberated. FARCEP never granted Andrés’ wish, who had
pleaded multiple times for the freedom of
his father.
Concerning forced recruitment,
FARC-EP is the main recruiter of children
and adolescents with 3,060 cases. The
guerrilla group obliges minors to participate,
directly or indirectly, in the execution of
hostilities or in military actions. (Grupo de
Memoria Histórica 2013, 84) Rape
constitutes one of the strategies of the group
to recruit children. The painful testimony of
an adolescent girl reveals the suffering that
no child should experience. To prevent the
recruitment of her brothers and preserve the
life of her father, the victim had to accept
her own rape by a FARC-EP commander.
(Grupo de Memoria Histórica 2013, 83) The
recruitment of children and adolescents
constitutes a crime against humanity (Rome
Statute, Article 8.2). On the other hand,
Article 8.1 of the Statute considers rape as a
war crime.
Santo’s Quest for Peace: Havana Talks
Since its beginnings, the presidency
of Juan Manuel Santos has geared towards
one sole goal: achieving peace with the
conclusion of the armed conflict. As a result,
his efforts to initiate an exploratory phase
with FARC-EP with the purpose of
engaging in a peace process were
paramount. From February 23 until August
26 of 2012, the Colombian Government and
FARC-EP met in Havana, with the host
country and Norway serving as guarantors.
With this role, Cuba and Norway “make
sure that the terms of the agreement will be
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fulfilled.” (Armengol 2013, 7) On the other
hand, the government of the Bolivarian
Republic of Venezuela fulfills the role of
logistics facilitator and companion. As a
companion, Venezuela “was instrumental in
bringing about the talks.” (Hataway 2015,
181) The initial rapprochement between
FARC-EP and the government resulted in
the General Agreement for the Termination
of the conflict and the Construction of a
Stable and Durable Peace. The government
and FARC-EP agreed, amongst other things,
the initiation of “direct and uninterrupted
talks about the points of the Agenda here
established.” (Acuerdo General, 1) These
points are:
1. Comprehensive agrarian
development policy,
2. Political participation,
3. End of the conflict,
4. Solution to the problem of illicit
drugs and
5. Victims

The only point that has not materialized into
an agreement is Point 3 - End of the
Conflict. It is expected that the Government
and FARC-EP will reach an agreement in
March 2016. However, the Agreement on
the Victims of the Conflict, signed on
December 15, 2015, will be the focus of this
paper as it deals with the rights of the
victims of the conflict and the mediums of
reparation for the pain inflicted upon them
throughout the years of the armed conflict.
“To compensate the victims is at the center
of the agreement National Government –
FARC-EP.” (Acuerdo General, 3) In
furtherance of this objective, both parties
will deal with sub-points on the human
rights of victims and truth.
In order to assess the situation of victims of
the conflict, a special system was designed
to investigate crimes, impose sanctions and
establish reparation programs for the
victims. The Comprehensive System of
Truth, Justice, Reparation and No Repetition
(SIVJRNR for its acronym in Spanish)

Fairfield University | Undergraduate Journal of Global Citizenship | Winter 2017

Published by DigitalCommons@Fairfield, 2017

79

Undergraduate Journal of Global Citizenship, Vol. 2, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 1

possesses the prerogative to carry out these
functions. Within this system, an installation
of bodies, such as the Commission for the
Clarification of Truth, Coexistence and no
Repetition; the Special Unit for the Search
of People Reported Missing in the Context
and by Reason of the Conflict; the Special
Jurisdiction for Peace, will focus on specific
tasks. For example, the Special Jurisdiction
for Peace will be composed of chambers that
“investigate, clarify, prosecute and punish
grave violations of human rights and grave
infringements of International Humanitarian
Law.” (Acuerdo sobre las Victimas del
Conflicto, 7) As it will be demonstrated,
there are multiple irregularities within this
jurisdiction that compromise the declared
commitment of the Colombian government
and FARC-EP to human rights. Similarly,
this jurisdiction exposes violations of IHL
on behalf of the government.
To ensure justice to the victims, the
proceedings will be classified according to
the provision of truth and responsibility by
the perpetrator in question, or the lack
thereof. The following bodies will integrate
the previous processes:
A) Chamber of Recognition of Truth,
Responsibility and of Determination of Facts
and Conduct.
One of its main functions is to decide
which cases fall under its competency.
The Chamber will examine the events
and behaviors that emerged throughout
the duration of the conflict. In order to
accomplish this, it will work other
authorities, such as the Attorney
General. Additionally, it will receive the
reports of victims and human rights
organizations.
B) Peace Tribunal
a. Section of first instance in case of
recognition of truth and responsibility,
which will enact sentences.
b. Section of first instance in case of
absence of recognition of truth and
responsibility. This one will host trials
and formulate prison sentences.
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c. Section of sentence revision will
receive cases that have been sanctioned
by other justice bodies or by the office
of the General Attorney. The sanctions
must not constitute amnesty or pardon.
d. Appeals section
C) Chamber of Amnesty or Pardon
will depend on the work of the Chamber
of Recognition of Truth, Responsibility
and of Determination of Facts and
Conducts. In such manner, it will be
determined which cases qualify for
amnesty or pardon.
D) Chamber for the Definition of Judicial
Situations
will define the judicial situation of
people who shall not be subject of
amnesty or pardon and of those who will
not be required to recognize
responsibility if they have received
amnesty or pardon.
E) Unit of investigation and accusation
will be in charge of satisfying the
victims’ right to justice in the absence of
individual or collective recognition of
responsibility.

Room for impunity: The Agreement on
the Victims of the Conflict
The victims of the conflict deserve
their rights to justice, truth, reparation and
no repetition to be upheld. From the genesis
of the peace process, the Colombian
Government and FARC-EP assert their
compromise to the victims concerning the
protection of their rights. In the General
Agreement for the Termination of the
conflict and the Construction of a Stable and
Durable Peace, they declare that “the
respect of human rights in all confines of the
national territory is a goal of the State that
should be promoted.” The centrality that
both parties attributed to the issue of victims
generated the Agreement on the Victims of
the Conflict on December 15, 2015.
The foundations of the agreement
derive from the Declaration of Principles
for the Discussion of Point 5 of the Agenda:
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‘Victims’ of June 7, 2014.[2] The principles
establish the framework that the parties
respected in the creation of the agreement on
victims. They corroborate the rights of the
victims and the inherent protection these
rights should receive: recognition of the
victims, recognition of responsibility,
fulfillment of the rights of victims,
participation of victims, clarification of the
truth, reparation of victims, guarantees of
safety and security, guarantee of no
repetition, principle of reconciliation and
focus on human rights.
In order to respect the
aforementioned principles, the Agreement
on Victims of the Conflict creates la
Jurisdiccion Especial para la Paz (Special
Jurisdiction for Peace). “To access the
special treatment provided in the Justice
component of the SIVJRNR, it is necessary
to contribute with full truth, reparation for
the victims and ensure no repetition.”
(Acuerdo sobre las Victimas Del Conflicto,
23) Point 60 of the agreement delineates the
sanctions that the special treatment provides.
These sanctions must have the greatest
restorative and reparative function of the
harm caused. Moreover, they must
correspond to the degree of recognition of
truth and responsibility provided.
Concerning “serious crimes,” those
who contribute with truth and recognize
their responsibility before the Chamber of
Recognition will obtain sanctions with a
“minimum duration of the fulfillment of the
reparative and restorative function of the
sanction of five years and a maximum of
eight.” (Acuerdo sobre las Victimas Del
Conflicto, 39) Additionally, the person or
group in question will have effective
restrictions of liberty, the right to residency
and the right to movement. Nevertheless,
these restrictions will neither translate into
time in jail or prison, nor any equivalent
form of detention.
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The punishment for the members of
FARC-EP responsible for crimes against
humanity and war crimes hinders the justice
process of transitional justice. The literature
of transitional justice claims that
perpetrators of past crimes deserve to be
penalized. To prevent impunity,
governments must impose sanctions for
serious and systematic violations of human
rights. (Gomez Isa 2014, 47) FARC-EP’s
commission of war crimes and crimes
against humanity fulfill the previous
description. Under the jurisdiction of the
Rome Statue, these types of crimes merit
penalties. Article 77.1 of the treaty states
that a person convicted of a crime defined in
Article 5 must receive punishment in the
form of “a) imprisonment for a specified
number of years, which may not exceed a
maximum of 30 years; or (b) A term of life
imprisonment when justified by the extreme
gravity of the crime and the individual
circumstances of the convicted person.”
(International Criminal Court 1998, 54)
Evidently, the sanctions of the Special
Jurisdiction for Peace fail to respect the
victims’ right to justice. In the same manner,
the sanctions for serious crimes threaten the
compliance of the Colombian government to
the Rome Statute.
Point 60 states that “the sanctions
will have as essential finality to satisfy the
rights of the victims and consolidate peace.
[The sanctions] must have the greatest
restorative and repairing function to the
damage caused.” (Acuerdo sobre las
Victimas, 39) The government and FARCEP consider the lack of jail and security
measures as worthy to satisfy the rights of
the victims, specifically, the right to justice.
Furthermore, the sanctions with restorative
and reparative function do not reflect what
the Rome Statue establishes as punishment
for severe crimes. Projects in rural and urban
zones and areas of the national territory
where landmines and war explosives remain
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will both respect the right to justice and
reparation of the victims. These are some of
the sanctions:
1. Participation in/execution of
programs that protect the environment,
2. Participation in/execution of
programs that replace cultivations of
illicit use,
3. Participation in/execution of
programs of construction and
amelioration of road infrastructure,
4. Participation in/execution of
programs of eradication of landmines

The text develops the description of
sanctions by asserting that the establishment
of these will depend on “calibrating” the
crime. Consequently, the sanction will
coincide with the severity of the crime. For
example, “those who did not have a decisive
participation in the most severe and
representative crimes, even when involved
in them” (Acuerdo sobre las Victimas, 40)
will receive sanctions lower to five years.
“In this case, the minimum of sanction will
be of two years and the maximum of 5
years.” (Acuerdo sobre las Victimas, 40)
This point does not specify if the
duration of the sanction refers to time in jail
or a program with restorative purposes. It is
necessary to ask, if these are the
corresponding sanction for the most severe
crimes, what does the agreement deem as an
appropriate sanctions for crimes of less
gravity? Moreover, does the Agreement
provide accountability to perpetrators, even
if they did not have a “decisive
participation”? After all, the government and
FARC-EP professed their commitment to
the principle of recognizing responsibility as
a guarantee to uphold the right to justice.
These sanctions and projects carry
implications for the Colombian government
and FARC-EP. Although they possess a
restorative and conciliatory nature that will
assist victims, they “do not reflect the
accepted standards of appropriate
punishment for grave violations.” (Human
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Rights Watch 2015, 1) Consequently, the
government violates its obligation to uphold
international treaties such as the Rome
Statute, the Fourth Geneva Conventions and
Protocol II. These sanctions disregard the
suffering of the victims and do not respect
their right to justice. The implications for
FARC-EP would equal the evaluation of
their crimes and the establishment of
punishment under the jurisdiction of the
ICC. Because the Colombian government
fails to enact appropriate sentences that
reflect the gravity of crimes, especially of
those listed in the Rome Statute, the ICC
would have to intervene and try the
members of FARC-EP. The greatest
consequence of all these unsuitable
sanctions is the subsequent failure of the
peace process and its conclusion, if it ever
happens. If the government and FARC-EP
“avoid meaningful punishment, then the
peace agreement itself would be illegitimate,
unfair, and unlikely to help achieve the goal
of a lasting peace.” (Hataway 2015, 188)
The promises made by the
Colombian Government and FARC-EP to
the victims of the conflict become
insignificant when, on paper, what is being
agreed reflects no consideration of the
violation of human rights. The Agreement
on the Victims of the Conflict exposes the
multiple injustices that will hinder the
provisions of justice, truth, reparation and no
repetition. Moreover, this particular
agreement demonstrates the infringement of
international law concerning crimes against
humanity and war crimes. The Colombian
government does not comply with the
various international treaties to which it is a
member
Conclusion: Will Colombia have peace?
The extensive literature on
transitional justice provides an opportunity
to better understand the dynamics of a peace
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process. Its multiple definitions, concepts
and functions demonstrate that its utilization
has been vast in post-conflict cases. In the
same way, the literature explains how the
different processes within transitional justice
e.g. justice, truth, reparation and no
repetition interfere with the functionality of
each other.
The justice process dictates that the
state has the duty of investigating, judging
and punishing those responsible for
violations of human rights. Severe crimes
such as the ones defined by the Rome
Statute must always account for punishment.
Additionally, the truth process declares that
victims have the right of receiving the truth
of what happened and how it happened
throughout the conflict. Knowing the reality
is equivalent to a form of reparation, which
also constitutes one of the rights of the
victims. The fortification of the historical
memory also accounts as reparation for their
deteriorated emotional and psychological
states. Thirdly, dignifying the victims
through the alleviation of their suffering
with symbolic, material or financial means
constitutes the focus of the reparation
process. Last but not least, the government
must reform the institutions that permitted
the commission of crimes or that by
omission did not prevent them. The main
component in this process is the guarantee
of no repetition.
The multidimensionality of the
Colombian conflict, its tremendous length
and complexity serve as the appropriate field
for the creation of complications when
planning and implementing transitional
justice. Without doubt, all the actors that
have participated in the conflict are
responsible for Colombia’s deplorable
situation of human rights. Guerrilla groups,
paramilitaries and state actors must pay for
the high toll of victims. Because FARC-EP
is the groups with which the government is
currently negotiating, the peace process

83

must ensure that the punishment for their
members correlates to the crimes they have
committed. Evidently, the guerrilla group in
one of the main perpetrators of atrocities
such as homicides, kidnappings, forced
displacement, amongst others.
The Agreement on the Victims of the
Conflict must fortify the justice component
if the objective is for the peace process to
succeed. The Colombian government and
FARC-EP must adhere to what transitional
justice states. What they propose on the
agreement falls short in providing justice to
the victims. In the same way, due to the
interconnection of justice with the other
processes, the victims do not recognize if the
government and FARC respect their rights
to truth, reparation and no repetition.
Annex - October 2, 2016 Referendum
Colombia’s Rejection of the Peace
Referendum
The peace process accounts as one of
the most controversial events in
contemporary Colombian history. Deeprooted views heavily represented the sectors
that opposed and favored the process. And
although media polls and political analysts
assured a monumental victory of the “Yes,”
the bipolarization already incarnated in the
country changed the course of the
referendum into an unexpected “No.”
The research, documentation and
completion of this paper occurred before the
October 2016 Referendum. It is essential to
address this event in the context of this
paper and its main argument. How does the
Referendum results modify the basis of this
paper?
The views of the author concerning
the Peace Process and the Accord on
Victims represented the shared views of a
majority in Colombia and abroad. This
invisible but existent group opposed the
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poor consideration of the victims’ rights in
the formulation of judicial mechanisms to
punish those responsible for crimes
committed during the conflict. It is this same
group that questioned the reparation
methods with which FARC members
intended to “compensate” for the harm
inflicted in so many lives. And finally, this
sleeping force certainly denounced the
lightness demonstrated by the government to
include the voices of the victims throughout
the process. Therefore, it comes to no
surprise the strict results in which the “No”
rejected the negotiations by 100,000 more
votes of those for the “Yes.” Therefore,
rather than modify the argument of this
paper, the Peace Referendum results
reiterate and endorse the various concerns
here emphasized. At the same time, the
victory of the “No” constitutes a demanding
call for a just reformation of the accords in
the interest of fulfilling the needs of the
victims, especially, their rights.
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Conundrums in
Commercial
Cosmetics:
Interrogating the
Effectiveness of MarketBased Strategies for
Poverty Alleviation and
Women’s Empowerment
in Argan Oil and Shea
Butter Economies
SRUTHI P. RAO
Abstract
A growing trend of the last 20 years within
the international development community is
the budding focus on “women’s
empowerment.” States, non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), and supranational
organizations – such as the United Nations
and the World Bank, have directed
development initiatives toward women,
most notably emphasizing incomegenerating and market-based projects as
vehicles of economic and social
empowerment. This paper argues that a
concentration on women’s entrepreneurship
as a major development mechanism is
potentially flawed, particularly when the
enterprises generate products that are
dependent on the ebbs and flows of the
global market and fluctuating tastes of
consumers in the Global North. This
investigation will examine the sustainability
of market-based women’s empowerment
mechanisms and poverty alleviation

89

initiatives, focusing on social enterprises
generating “niche products.” It will compare
two globally popular cosmetic products as
case studies: argan oil, produced primarily
in Morocco, and shea butter, produced in
West Africa – specifically Ghana and
Burkina Faso.
In exploring the implications of
social enterprises for women’s economic
empowerment, it is necessary to first
contextualize shea and argan gendered
production processes and examine the
transition from a locally essential raw
material to a luxury cosmetic product
demanded by wealthy consumers all over
the world. We must then describe the
“neoliberal development paradigm,” a
concept encouraging development initiatives
rooted in ideals of individualism and
entrepreneurial spirit. Situating shea butter
and argan oil production and consumption
within this paradigm will catalyze three
things. First, this analysis looks at
quantitative economic data, focusing on
local household returns to income and
wealth in the wake of the argan and shea
booms to quantitatively corroborate (or
disprove) the notions of success dominating
discourse on market-based development
projects. Second, it constructs a theoretical
framework that critiques the paradigm from
feminist and sociological perspectives,
elucidating the power dynamics and
inequality between producers and consumers
of argan and shea. Finally, this paper
compares those empirical findings and
qualitative critiques to anecdotes collected
on the ground from Marjana Cooperative
members. These independent analyses taken
together will allow exploration of an
important debate dominating development
discourse: whether short-term material
benefits are provided by market-based
initiatives, and if so, whether these benefits
outweigh long-term structural weaknesses of
such initiatives.
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Introduction

The semi-arid, rolling Mediterranean hills
lumbered past us, spotted with spindly
trees and the occasional djellaba-clad
onlooker. My group of fellow American
students had driven from the northern
coastal capital of Rabat, Morocco to the
southern port cities of Essaouira and Agadir.
We were now nearing the end of our
excursion as we pulled into a large dirt path
off the freeway. A hand-painted sign, in
Arabic, French, and English greeted us:
Cooperative Marjana d’Extraction d’huile
d’Argan. Marjana Cooperative for
the Extraction of Argan Oil.
Essaouira and the surrounding region
are particularly famous for argan oil
production. The sub-Mediterranean climate
hosts the perfect environment for argan trees
– and is one of the few areas in the world
where they grow. Marjana Cooperative,
operated almost completely by Moroccan
women, dedicates itself to argan nut
harvesting and oil manufacturing. We were
ushered from building to building and
shown each step of the production process.
Women in colorful djellabas chatted
amiably as they shelled nuts and
occasionally posed for a photo by a curious
foreign onlooker. Questions for the
cooperative members had to be translated
from English to French to Darija – making
conversation a tad jilted.1 What I most
wanted to know was how the women felt
about participating in a cooperative. Were

1

Darija is the colloquial name for the Moroccan dialect of
Arabic, which differs significantly from formal Arabic and
has no written counterpart.
2
A Djellaba is a traditional unisex Moroccan dress,
consisting of a long tunic and hood.
3
The definition for Global North and Global South used in
this paper is that of the United Nations Development
Program, categorizing countries through the Human
Development Index (HDI). Global South countries
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their lives improved? Did they feel
empowered? Shy
at first with my limited vocabulary, the most
I could ask was this:
“Do you like making argan oil?”
“Vous aimez faire d’huile argan?”
“Tuhib suhn zayt al’arghan?”
A woman in a pink djellaba with white floral
patterns stared at me, her brown eyes wide
and kind.2 She cocked her head to one side,
thinking over what I had asked. She pursed
her lips and then bobbed her head from side
to side; not quite shaking it “no,” but not
quite nodding “yes” either. That was her
answer.
A growing trend of the last 20 years
within the international development
community is the budding focus on
“women’s empowerment.” States, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and
supranational organizations – such as the
United Nations and the World Bank, have
directed development initiatives toward
women, most notably emphasizing incomegenerating and market-based projects as
vehicles of economic and social
empowerment. This paper argues that a
concentration on women’s entrepreneurship
as a major development mechanism is
potentially flawed, particularly when the
enterprises generate products that are
dependent on the ebbs and flows of the
global market and fluctuating tastes of
consumers in the Global North.3 This
investigation will examine the sustainability
of market-based women’s empowerment
mechanisms and poverty alleviation
initiatives, focusing on social enterprises
generating “niche products.”4 It will
generally have HDIs less than 0.8. Global North countries
constitute the United States, Canada, Western Europe, and
some countries in East Asia.
4
Niche products are part of a special subset of a larger
market. The “niche” nature of the product is defined both
by its specific method of production and marketed level of
quality. Argan and shea are a niche sector of the cosmetics
market.
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compare two globally popular cosmetic
products as case studies: argan oil, produced
primarily in Morocco, and shea butter,
produced in West Africa –
specifically Ghana and Burkina Faso.
Moroccan dress, consisting of a long tunic
and hood. The definition for Global North
and Global South used in this paper is that
of the United Nations Development
Program, categorizing countries through the
Human Development Index (HDI). Global
South countries generally have HDIs less
than 0.8. Global North countries constitute
the United States, Canada, Western Europe,
and some countries in East Asia. Niche
products are part of a special subset of a
larger market. The “niche” nature of the
product is defined both by its specific
method of production and marketed level of
quality. Argan and shea are a niche sector of
the cosmetics market.
In exploring the implications of
social enterprises for women’s economic
empowerment, it is necessary to first
contextualize shea and argan gendered
production processes and examine the
transition from a locally essential raw
material to a luxury cosmetic product
demanded by wealthy consumers all over
the world. We must then describe the
“neoliberal development paradigm,” a
concept encouraging development initiatives
rooted in ideals of individualism and
entrepreneurial spirit. Situating shea butter
and argan oil production and consumption
within this paradigm will catalyze three
things. First, this analysis looks at
quantitative economic data, focusing on
local household returns to income and
wealth in the wake of the argan and shea
booms to quantitatively corroborate (or
disprove) the notions of success dominating

Argan oil and shea butter constitute
niche products within the cosmetics market,
with their production restricted to both
specific geographic regions and
manufacturing methods. Both argan and
shea are sold as exotic, luxury cosmetics
products internationally. Brenda Chalfin
describes how in the late 1990s, shea butter
moved from a local raw material to a niche
market within the beauty industry as a
luxury cosmetic for a demographic of
female consumers – primarily in the Global
North.5 Dominique Guillaume and Zoubida
Charrouf highlight how argan oil has
steadily become “a major actor in the
dermocosmetic field.”6 They, along with le
Polain de Waroux, trace the argan boom
back to the late 1990s when international
cosmetic firms “took an interest in the
resource as a skin care product.”7 In 1999,
European firms such as Yves-Roche and

5

6

Chalfin, Brenda. Shea Butter Republic: State Power,
Global Markets and the Making of and Indigenous
Commodity. New York: Routledge, 2004.
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discourse on market-based development
projects. Second, it constructs a theoretical
framework that critiques the paradigm from
feminist and sociological perspectives,
elucidating the power dynamics and
inequality between producers and consumers
of argan and shea. Finally, this paper
compares those empirical findings and
qualitative critiques to anecdotes collected
on the ground from Marjana Cooperative
members. These independent analyses taken
together will allow exploration of an
important debate dominating development
discourse: whether short-term material
benefits are provided by market-based
initiatives, and if so, whether these benefits
outweigh long-term structural weaknesses of
such initiatives.
Contextualization: Why Shea and Argan?

Guillaume, Dominqiue and Zoubida Charrouf, “Argan
Oil.” Alternative Medicine Review, 16, no. 3 (September
2011) 275-279, Academic Search Complete.
7
le Polain de Waroux, Yann and Eric F. Lambin, “Niche
Commodities and Rural Poverty Alleviation.” Annals of the
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Colgate-Palmolive had already begun to
investigate the cosmetic properties of argan
oil.
To provide some contemporary
examples, the French cosmetics brand
L’Occitane sells a 5.2-ounce tin of shea
butter for $42.00.8 The American cosmetics
brand Josie Maran sells a 4-ounce bottle of
argan oil for $96.00.9 Datamonitor, a Swiss
market research firm, cited only two
personal care products in the United States
listing argan oil as an ingredient in 2007. A
2011 follow-up found 111 products,
documenting its exponential growth in argan
popularity through the turn of the
millennium.10 These cosmetics brands are
only two of hundreds that have capitalized
on the luxury appeal of shea butter and
argan oil – others include Origins (Estee
Lauder), The Body Shop (L’Oreal), and
OGX (Vogue International). This boom is
reflective of the growing globalization of the
cosmetics industry: multinational firms are
recruiting raw materials as cosmetics
ingredients from previously untapped
geographic regions and cultures. The
globalization of the cosmetics industry is
economically idiosyncratic. Many
multinational firms seek new resources that
are cheaper substitutes or move production
where labor is less expensive. In luxury
cosmetics, the demand for novel ingredients
has driven industry
globalization, with firms investing in
uncommon materials that may actually be
more expensive – such as argan and shea
nuts. According to its own report,
L’Occitane pays 20 to 30% more for shea

Association of American Geographers, 103, no. 3 (May
2012): 589-607
8
See Appendix A: Figure 1
9
See Appendix A: Figure 2, 3
10
Holmes, Elizabeth. “New Entries in the Beauty
Industry’s Oil Boom.” Wall Street Journal, July 31, 2013.
Accessed November 2, 2015.
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butter from West Africa than Western
producers.11
Gendered Production
Shea butter and argan oil are
produced using traditional methods,
methods that are also historically gendered:
in both markets, women have primarily
manufactured the oil and butter. Argan oil is
processed from nuts collected from argan
trees: the nut must first be collected, dried,
and then the flesh removed. The nut is then
cracked for the kernels, ground and pressed
for oil. Similarly, shea butter is fat extracted
from the fruit of the karite tree. Women
collect the nuts, crush them to extract the fat,
and beat it into butter.
Both processes are highly labor
intensive, but are still traditionally worked
by women. As Chalfin states “shea is an
inextricable feature of the feminine
domain.”12 Women have produced and used
shea butter for generations – and have
intimate knowledge of the tree itself that is
passed down through successive generations
of females. In the case of argan oil, it is the
women who have historically managed the
entire life of the nut, from tree to oil –
particularly in indigenous Amazigh
communities.
It is important to note that in both
markets, the women often do not own the
sources of the nuts. Argan orchards are
either held by male owners or on
government land, while shea trees are also
owned by the male head of the family or
grow wild in the West African landscape.
Despite the lack of ownership of the original
11

Kamara, Yari. “L’Occitane au Burkina Faso: More than
Just Business with Shea Butter Producers.” Growing
Inclusive Markets, United Nations Development
Programme, 2012.
12
Chalfin, Brenda. Shea Butter Republic: State Power,
Global Markets and the Making of and Indigenous
Commodity.
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resource, “women are [still] the keepers of
tradition...they are the ones who have the
ancestral know-how for production.”13
Both argan and shea embody
characteristics of a “heritage product.” As
objects, the oil and the butter alone hold
cultural and historical significance to the
heritage of the communities producing and
consuming them. But the significance
extends to more intangible aspects, such as
the actual role that their production and
consumption processes play in the lives and
communities of indigenous women. As the
preparation of shea butter is passed down
matrilineally from mother to daughter, the
transfer of knowledge strengthens
generational ties. The knowledge itself is
“imbued with meanings that draw on the
sociological, cosmological and ritual
realm...cementing social ties between
women.”14 A bit to the north, women not
only possess the knowledge to make
argan oil, but also the extensive and varied
uses for it as a staple of the Amazigh diet
and natural healing elixir for everything
from stretch marks and dry skin to diabetes.
Women in the Sous and Anti-Atlas regions
of Morocco have developed “an argan treeoriented way of life,” since the time of the
Phoenicians, using the tree and its fruits to
“support the family circle.”15 For example,
at Marjana, the women sang traditional
songs about marriage, love, and childbirth in
Tashelhit as they shelled the nuts.16 This is
culturally significant, as Katherine Hoffman
notes that the argan tree serves as a symbol
in the construction of this Ashelhi identity.17

The interaction between the women and the
tree cultivates meaning for both the gender
and ethnic identity of Ashelhi women.18 The
fruit of the trees is not just a commodity;
indeed the whole tree and its role in Ashelhi
feminine life signifies the dissimilarity of
Ashelhi women from their Arab cohort.
Thus, argan oil and shea butter can indeed
offer economic gain, but also have essential
anthropological functions.

13

16

Chalfin, Brenda. Shea Butter Republic: State Power,
Global Markets and the Making of and Indigenous
Commodity.
14
Elias, Marlene and Judith Carney, “African Shea Butter:
A Feminized Subsidy From Nature.” Africa: The Journal of
the International African Institute, 77, no. 1 (2007): 37-62,
Project Muse.
15
Guillaume, Dominqiue and Zoubida Charrouf, “Argan
oil, the 35-years-of-research product.” European Journal of
Lipid Science, 116, (2014): 1316-1321.
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The Neoliberal Development Paradigm: A
Gendered Perspective
Positive Intentions
To its critics neoliberalism “signifies
the seemingly limitless advance of a global
marketplace, a fully integrated apparatus
serving the interests of a global corporate
elite via new strategies of capital
accumulation.”19 In a purely economic
context, this is not necessarily an inaccurate
description – at least in its nods to a fully
integrated global marketplace. The
neoliberal era of capitalism began with the
Washington Consensus and
the economic policies put forward for
developing countries by the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and
other international institutions. These
policies primarily focused on rescuing
developing countries of Latin America in
economic crisis, purporting the
amalgamated world market as a powerful
tool to realign economically failing

Tashelhit is the southern variety of the native Amazigh
language, Tamazight.
17
Ashelhi refers to the Amazigh ethnic group of the AntiAtlas, Sous region of southern Morocco.
18
Hoffman, Katherine E., “Moving and Dwelling: Building
the Moroccan Ashelhi Homeland,” Journal of the American
Ethnological Society, 26, no. 2 (2006), 144-167.
19
Freeman, Carla. Entrepreneurial Selves: Neoliberal
Respectability and the Making of a Caribbean Middle
Class. Durham: Duke University Press, 2014.
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countries.20 Liberalization of trade, financial
deregulation, devaluation of currency, and
the elimination of agricultural subsidies are
some fundamental policies of the
Washington Consensus that have received
much criticism following their
implementation.21
But the more useful definition of
neoliberalism for this investigation is an
ideological one. Speaking more broadly,
within neoliberal thought, the world market
is envisioned as both engine driving growth
and a compass directing it.22 So
neoliberalism, in this sense, operates as an
ideological framework – one that casts
production as a “mode of domination” based
on “insecurity and precariousness,” but also
offers great potential for gain.23 Humans
operate within the boundary of a system of
markets, of supply and demand chains, of
profit and loss transactions where their
individual ability to produce and trade is
their best asset. This realization is essential
to understanding social enterprises and
similar development schemes. The
emergence of these strategies as poverty
alleviators reflects the trend in development
to both mold human action and
foster these abilities in order to fight global
inequality using the market structure itself.
Thus, when manifested in
international development discourse,
neoliberal thought centers on principles of
self-sufficiency and the ability to function in
the market as a rational economic

individual. Development approaches
“presuppose that participation in
markets provides substantial benefits and
that making the market more inclusive for
the poor will ‘enhance their empowerment
and human development’.”24 To “develop”
both as an individual and a country is to
forge capabilities required to interact in the
global market system. Schemes encouraging
individuals to cultivate their entrepreneurial
potential and transact competently are the
ideal mechanism to encourage development.
Microfinance operations and social
enterprises are founded on these principles
and presuppositions.
Entrepreneurialism does not
necessarily belong to any particular ideology
or historical tradition– rather as a concept, it
exists in many cultural contexts with no
“generic shape.”25 Amartya Sen
characterizes the “freedom to transact” as a
fundamental human freedom.26 There is not
a single culture that “owns”
entrepreneurship or entrepreneurial ideals.
However there are ideologies that posit
certain ways in which entrepreneurship can
be most successful and productive. For
example, in a contemporary context,
economists make a distinction can be made
between “necessity entrepreneurship” and
“opportunity entrepreneurs.”27 Economic
literature notes that necessity entrepreneurs
are industrious individuals, primarily in
developing countries, who form small
enterprises purely for survival.28 But their

20

Poverty Alleviation.” Social Science Review, 84, no. 1
(March 2010): 29-55.
25
Freeman, Carla. Entrepreneurial Selves: Neoliberal
Respectability and the Making of a Caribbean Middle
Class.
26
Sen, Amartya, Development as Freedom. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1999.
27
Amoros, Jose Ernesto and Oscar Cristi. 2011. Poverty
and Entrepreneurship in Developing Countries. In The
Dynamics of Entrepreneurship: Evidence from Global
Entrepreneurship Monitor Data, 209-227. Oxford Press.
28
the Wennekers, Level of Economic Sanders,
Development. Van Stel, A, Thurik, Small Business A.R.
and Economics Reynolds, P. 24(3): 2005. 293-309.

Serra, Narcis and Joseph E. Stiglitz. The Washington
Consensus Reconsidered: Towards a New Global
Governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
21
Hibben, Mark. “Coalitions of change: explaining IMF
low-income country reform in the post- Washington
Consensus,” Journal of International Relations and
Development, 18, no. 2 (2015): 202-226.
22
Freeman, Carla. Entrepreneurial Selves: Neoliberal
Respectability and the Making of a Caribbean Middle
Class.
23
Bourdieu, Pierre, “The Essence of Neoliberalism,” Le
Monde Diplomatique, December 1998.
24
Cooney, Kate and Trina R. William Shanks, “New
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enterprises are only limited forms of market
participation whether as a street-seller
hawking goods to passersby or a small tea
stall owner in the informal sector.29 Poor
necessity entrepreneurs are inflexible
to market shocks. Some economists argue
that these issues lead to “accelerated market
failures,” meaning the long-term
sustainability of the enterprise is practically
nonexistent.30 Opportunity entrepreneurs
however, possess significantly more
resources, like start-up capital to finance
their business and financial services such as
banking and credit to more efficiently
harness the power of the market.
Consequently, the gap between
necessity and opportunity entrepreneurs is a
fundamental obstacle to economic growth.
Development theorists assume that “barriers
hindering the poor from full market
participation are access to credit, low
investment in human capital, and
geography.”31 To offer necessity
entrepreneurs the same resources as
opportunity entrepreneurs, such as loans,
financial literacy training, and more
structured methods of channeling
entrepreneurial potential, is to provide
invaluable support for economic
development.32 I argue that this
“officialization” of entrepreneurial ventures
is where the neoliberal paradigm makes its
entrance. Necessity entrepreneurs, with
isolated consumer-bases and inefficient
production, are not proficiently functioning
in the market. They do not utilize banking
institutions or new strategies for capital
accumulation. And they are certainly not

Bridging this gap, then, are all kinds
of formal market-based development
initiatives, from microfinance organizations
offering loans to the poor to start small
businesses, to social enterprise cooperatives
that build financial skills and channel
collective entrepreneurial potential. The
Grameen Bank is one of the first microcredit
organizations in the world, founded by
Bangladeshi economics professor,
Muhammad Yunus. The bank’s fundamental
premise is that credit is a basic human right.
In Yunus’ own words, “credit creates
entitlement to resources and is the basis for
the economic emancipation of the poor in
general and poor women in particular.”33
This philosophy ascribes credit, an essential
instrument of banking, power to liberate the
poor, fitting well within the neoliberal
paradigm: access to credit enables resource
accumulation, driving self-sufficient
employment and ultimately market
participation. The Grameen Bank has seen
enormous success, with a 95% repayment
rate – and inspired thousands of
microlending institutions all over the
world.34
Though rooted in similar ideology,
social enterprises often take shape at
neighborhood and community levels rather
than individual ones. In its most basic

29

31

29 The informal sector of the economy is unregulated by
the government, therefore not subject to taxes or
government oversight. Developing economies are often
characterized by large informal sectors.
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Cooney, Kate and Trina R. William Shanks, “New
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fully participating in the market,
participation that could liberate
them from consistent poverty.
Bridging the Gap: Microfinance and Social
Enterprise

Cooney, Kate and Trina R. William Shanks, “New
Approaches to Old Problems: Market Based Strategies for
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32
“Necessity Entrepreneurs: Microenterprise education and
economic development”
33
Yunus, Muhammed. Banker to the Poor. New York:
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definition, a social enterprise is an
organization that applies commercial
strategies to maximize wellbeing, of humans
and the environment.35 Rather than increase
profits for enterprise shareholders, generated
revenue should be reinvested into the
community participating in the economic
activity. Social enterprises take a variety of
different forms that are often dissimilar by
region and shaped by political and economic
contexts.36 But whether a gender-based craft
cooperative or an agricultural workshop, the
underlying philosophy is that “paid
employment is the primary activity moving
the poor out of entrenched poverty.”37 In the
developing world, social enterprises often
focus on formalizing informal labor in order
generate a new stream of income.
Craftwork, weaving, embroidery, and nontimber agricultural processing are primary
targets, or in other words, niche products
with unique methods of production and
heritage.
Many of the arguments for such
strategies focus on the potential for
entrepreneurship among poor women as a
means of income-generation and poverty
alleviation. Within the rural development
narrative, advocates of social enterprise,
cooperatives, and microfinance schemes
stress their ability to offer women the
chance to choose their own actions. First,
these schemes are associated with gender
empowerment by providing typically
disadvantaged women access to an incomegenerating opportunity. In social enterprises,
the emphasis on niche products tapers the
market in a specific method for the
feminized poor. Second, entrepreneurial

development initiatives can function as a
tool of feminist radicalization by
formalizing a subset of labor that may
traditionally not be considered legitimate by
concentrating on traditionally manufactured
products. Women participating in
cooperatives become formal members of the
labor market through their work. Third, they
facilitate social interaction between women
by establishing a space reserved for women
outside the home. Fourth, advocates of such
schemes claim that they cultivate sustainable
empowerment by encouraging financial
literacy and management, as well as
independence and associated skills within
their participants. Another claim of
advocates for women-targeted initiatives is
that “when women benefit, outcomes for
children – along with prospects for future
poverty alleviation – improve.”38 Such
commercialized, gender-specific,
cooperative activity could increase returns to
female labor, improve women’s positions
within household bargaining, and heighten
their social status.
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Connecting the Paradigm to Argan and
Shea
Keeping the parameters of this
paradigm in mind, shea butter and argan oil
are ideal products for this entrepreneurial
project. As raw materials, argan and shea
have had an active role in the lives of
women in their respective regions and were
actually central to women’s lives before the
globalization boom. By nature, the
extraction and refining processes of both
products are highly cooperative, involving
Cooney, Kate and Trina R. William Shanks, “New
Approaches to Old Problems: Market Based Strategies for
Poverty Alleviation.” Social Science Review, 84, no. 1
(March 2010): 29-55.
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the pooling of resources among women of
all ages to oversee the production – and
were joint ventures even before the
introduction of cooperatives. In shea
production, such workgroups operated as the
perfect model to pass down knowledge and
skills from older to younger women,
characteristics of the heritage product
discussed above. Chalfin recounts how in
northern and western Ghana, the making of
shea butter is a skill taught to young
daughters and brides, by mothers and
mothers-in-law as a means of investment in
family loyalty.39 “Extrahousehold
cooperation” is also prevalent, when women
from the same village or come together
biweekly or monthly to arrange butter
production for local consumption.
The traditionally gendered
production of shea and argan engenders
cooperatives as an ideal mechanism for
targeted development strategies based in
agricultural niche product generation. Social
enterprises in particular have been the
strategy of choice, with elder members
contributing their expertise, while younger
women contribute labor power. In the years
following the argan boom, women’s
cooperatives and social enterprises have
become the chief mechanism of facilitating
argan oil production in Morocco, with
organizations established both by the
European Union, the Royal Moroccan
Agency for Social Development, and private
corporations. In 1999, there were

only a “handful” of cooperatives employing
a few hundred women in Morocco.40 In
2007, the cooperatives exploded to over 100
across the country employing more than
4000 women, now constituting 14% of total
cooperative activity.41 The cooperative
system dominates not only argan, but shea
production as well – in Burkina Faso
especially. In Burkina Faso alone there are
an estimated 1,300 groups involved in shea
production.42
The Tighanimine Fair Trade Argan
Oil Cooperative, located outside of Agadir
southwest Morocco, is one of the most
internationally renowned cooperatives. It
has won many international awards for its
work in sustainable development, with
features in international women’s magazines
and Fair Trade marketing material.4344 The
cooperative employs about sixty women,
founded in early 2007 as the brainchild of a
Tighanimine native, Nadia Fatmi. Fatmi
pursued university studies, and decided to
return to her hometown to work with the
women. In her own words, argan oil
production is the “only income generating
activity” in the arid region surrounding
Tighanimine. Fatmi decided to
capitalize on the women’s know-how,
providing literacy classes to the women to
jump- start the business.45 Her steps to help
formalize the women’s argan production fall
exactly in line with the enterprise
officialization promoted by the neoliberal
paradigm. Fatmi contends that in the new
cooperative model, the women are paid for
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every step in the production process, from
collecting the nut, to processing the fruit,
and finally for the total quantity of nuts she
produces.
Ojoba Fair Trade Collective is a shea
butter cooperative, interestingly based in
Portland, Oregon, though the actual
production takes place in northeastern
Ghana. Two Americans founded the
cooperative in 2003.46 It primarily supplies
the natural cosmetics industry, attracting
multinational firms such as Lush Cosmetics
who specialize in organic and chemical-free
products.47 The tagline of the cooperative,
“empowering women through ethical trade,”
is a bold statement, as are the cooperative’s
claims to have helped achieve many of the
United Nations Millennium Development
Goals.4849 “The wages made by the 400
women of Ojoba Women’s Shea
Cooperative have let the community
purchase additional food...eliminating
hunger; and make additional income,” the
website proudly states, “the cooperative has
400 empowered and outspoken women that
have not only lifted themselves out of abject
poverty but become a vibrant community.”50
The website also hosts profiles of
participants in the cooperative, attesting to
the benefits that their participation have
awarded their lives, from allowing them to
send another child to school, to starting a
livestock business with the extra income.
These anecdotal testimonials from
Morocco and Ghana are highly encouraging
primary sources that augment the sense of
impact associated with social enterprises and
cooperatives. At the local level, these
women are engaged in activity outside the

home that belongs purely to them and are
apparently able to collect income from their
labor. But they are also limited in the
insights they allow. Perhaps the public
picture that their websites, magazine
features, and awards paint a truly reflective
illustration of how these cooperatives
function in practice – but are they the norm?
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Parsing out the Economics
We must first evaluate the economic
effectiveness of these cooperatives, and in
doing so, answer whether Tighanimine and
Ojoba are representative of the thousands of
other argan and shea cooperatives in the
region. A number of economists have
ventured into the field, conducting empirical
tests to determine the impact of shea and
argan cooperatives on the livelihoods of
participants. The goal of these tests is to
determine the effect of participation in such
initiatives compared to the situation of
nonparticipation. This comparison builds
understanding of why people choose to be
cooperative members or microfinance
clients, and concretely shows whether these
institutions are the best economic option
available many poor women.
It is important to first determine the
units of measurement for these tests.
Continuing to operate within the neoliberal
paradigm, success for these initiatives
should be reflected in generated income and
household spending – measures connected
directly to paid wage work and directly
correlated with breaking out of the poverty
trap. These are the most common measures
used to track the influence of incomeAmong the United Nations Millennium Development
Goals listed: 1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, 2.
Achieve universal primary education, 3. Promote gender
equality and empower women.
50
Ojoba Women’s Shea Butter Cooperative, “Ojoba
Collective.”
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generating activities, along with
accumulated household wealth and savings.
In general, when it comes to income
and spending, economists have concluded
that microfinance institutions and social
enterprises have presented only mixed
results at best. Abhijeet Banerjee with the
Poverty Action Lab at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology conducted a series
of studies examining the income impact of
microfinance in Hyderabad, India. His team
found that of microenterprise clients, only
those households that already owned some
sort of business increased their spending,
while other households mostly used the loan
to pay existing debts. In surveys conducted
with the clients, the concluded:
“Microenterprise may not be the miracle that
is sometimes claimed on its behalf.”51 There
is relatively less data-driven evidence on the
effect of social enterprise participation on
clients – Kate Cooney and Trina Shanks
stress the need for more investigation.52 But
they and Wolfgang Bielefeld highlight the
sustainability issues associated with an
enterprise that does not diversify their
product line and is not able to internalize
technological innovations.53 They contend
that social enterprises, especially those with
supply chains flowing to the global market,
run the risk of becoming increasingly
expensive to operate. These enterprises may
have to internalize quality standards and
even invest in mechanization to more
efficiently meet growing global demand.
Such costs become increasingly burdensome
and the participants may face dwindling
incomes.

Returns to the Shea and Argan Economies
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It logically follows that we should
determine which camp of these results argan
and shea cooperatives fall within. The
fundamental queries are:
1. Whether argan oil and shea
cooperatives are the best option for poor
women to make a living.
2. Whether women’s participation in
argan and shea cooperatives have
substantially increased their individual
incomes and household
spending, thereby alleviating poverty.
3. And if so, whether the cooperative
model a sustainable vehicle for
income generation and women’s
empowerment.

Why, economically speaking, do
women participate in argan and shea
cooperatives? First, many advocates argue
that these social enterprises offer the best
avenue for income-generation, and are a
respite from a lack of alternative economic
options for women. When women are barred
from other sectors of the economy, such as
male-dominated agriculture, cooperatives
are a rare, economically positive
opportunity. Second, while argan oil and
shea butter are manufactured within the
home for domestic consumption, and sold
for profit when there is sufficient local
demand, the quantity of these small cottage
industry transactions is marginal when
compared to the market opened up by global
supply chains. Cooperatives dealing with
multinational cosmetics firms connect these
women with international commodity chains
to which they would otherwise not have
access.
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Empirical findings on both shea
butter and argan oil cooperatives contest this
“best option” conclusion, however. In a
study based on regulated cooperatives
throughout Burkina Faso, Marlene Elias and
Magalie Saussey found that it takes about
ten hours on average to produce one
kilogram of shea butter. This extensive time
commitment is owed to the highly labor
intensive process but also to the high quality
standards required of international cosmetic
exports. Including these production costs a
cooperative member earns only $0.20 for
every hour of labor. This wage is actually
even lower than the standard minimum wage
for female agricultural work in Burkina
Faso: $0.24. Elias and Saussey suggest, “the
potential these incomes hold for ‘lifting’
women out of poverty, as fair trade
narratives would suggest, remains
questionable.”54
A series of parallel studies on
selected Moroccan households in arganproducing regions after the argan boom
showed similar results. Travis Lybbert,
Yann le Polain de Waroux, and Eric Lambin
conducted separate empirical studies on
households in argan- producing regions to
determine the relationship between income,
wealth, and the participation in argan oil
cooperatives. For both sets of researchers,
the exponential growth in argan oil demand
coupled with the introduction of the
cooperative system in the late 1990s
functions as the market shock, or treatment
effect for the test.
le Polain de Waroux tested villages
outside of the coastal city of Agadir. In these

cooperatives, on average, it takes about three
days of work to produce one liter of argan
oil, for which the female producer received
about 50 Dh, half of the average local daily
wage of 100 Dh for female agricultural
wageworkers.55 Lybbert’s empirical test
took place in two villages near Essaouira,
southwest Morocco. Household
consumption increased, but in economically
very small terms – and only for households
that were already well positioned to take
advantage of demand for argan, whether by
proximity to trees or involvement in a
cooperative. Average weekly spending
amounted to 170 Moroccan dirhams (Dh),
and the argan boom contributed an increase
of only about 300 Dh annually.56 On
average, this is only a 5 Dh increase in
weekly spending, economically miniscule (5
Dh converts to about 50 cents and can buy,
at most, a candy bar). Hence, all the studies
find that “argan oil commercialization has
played a minor role” in income
accumulation and household consumption.
So additionally, not only have
returns to argan and shea-based incomes
been minimal, in some ways, the
cooperative social enterprise has actually
diminished potential returns to income,
sending participants home with even less
than they would earn ordinarily and
countering the “best option” narrative.
Describing the “neoliberal politics of argan
extraction,” Bernard Turner notes these lost
wages and suggests, “the cooperative model
also appeared to be more oriented toward
the market and less concerned with the
livelihood conditions of the actual
cooperative members.”57 He maintains that
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argan oil cooperatives are not quite “selforganized, counter-hegemonic” initiatives,
but rather are enabling the
“disenfranchisement of the local population
with a standard product that responds to
industrial demand and consumer
expectations.”58
Indeed in an ethnographic study on
Burkinabe shea cooperatives, Delaney Grieg
stresses that the cooperative system
possesses both constraints and negative side
effects.59 Participating in global supply
chains has made international quality
standards more relevant to social enterprises.
Selling to European and American firms
requires an institutionalization of particular
regulations, such as cleaning and processing
technique that culminate in driving up the
production costs. To be certified “Fair
Trade” for example, requires compliance
with a series of criteria. Elias and Judith
Carney also note that with skyrocketing
demand, shea cooperatives have seen the
need to integrate equipment, such as
mechanized mills, to assist in meeting
increasingly large quantities of
butter desired by international clients.60
These investments are expensive and require
the cooperatives to take on debts.
It seems that the prices for argan and
shea products have internalized these
increased production costs, and are still
quite high, with luxury brands selling 7
ounces of argan oil for more upwards of
$100.00 and shea for more than $50.00. But
these international prices have not trickled
down to the producers. Let us do a quick
calculation. Say a Burkinabe woman is a
member of a shea cooperative partnering
with L’Occitane en Provence. She works at

Elias’ calculated wage, earning $0.20 every
hour. Taking L’Occitane’s price of $42.00
for 5.2 ounces of shea butter, we have
$42.00 for about .15 kilograms. If it takes
ten hours to produce 1 kilogram, it takes
about an hour and a half to produce the shea
butter for this product. Hence, the
cooperative member earns about $0.30 on
the product, only about 0.7% of the total
price. In fact, though L’Occitane makes
about $1.23 million annually in revenue
from shea butter sales, 99.3% of the revenue
does not come to a cooperative member in
any way.61 A similar calculation for an argan
cooperative producer tells an analogous
story. 90% of Josie Maran products contain
some amount of argan oil, and the company
recently pulled in almost $100 million in
retail sales, which, compared to the
infinitesimal 300Dh seems to
show what Turner affirms: “the described
configuration does not significantly
empower those local people...to economic
self-determination and self-reliance. Instead,
market integration appears to negatively
affect their full rights.”6263
Now the women at Marjana
Cooperative offered a multitude of reasons
for joining the enterprise, but categorically
avoided making direct statements regarding
their income. One woman said she joined
because her sister and neighbor were
members and said it was a good idea.
Another said she wanted to stay at Marjana
until she could afford to send her daughter to
school, and that day had still not come after
three years of work – only an oblique
statement on her economic situation. And
yet another said she joined
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simply because she had nothing else to do.64
Their responses do not completely affirm the
empirical findings of negligible economic
advantages, but neither do they contradict
them. What they do warrant is a broader
conversation about the more long-term
structural complications of these
development strategies, one that may help
explain the Marjana ladies’ somewhat
ambiguous opinions on their own
involvement in argan cooperatives.

Feminist critiques of neoliberal
economic policymaking maintain that such
policies are rooted in assumptions of a
rational, utility-maximizing individual, and
thus are deeply gendered. In her work on
gender, development, and globalization,
feminist economist Lourdes Beneria
questions the assumed gender-neutrality of

the globalized economy and neoliberal
economic policies, arguing “that neoliberal
globalization constructs a market society
and is a thoroughly gendered process
because it makes women’s home-based care
work invisible.”65 These models and
policies, she asserts, are “implicitly
masculinized” both in their association of
women’s freedom and empowerment with
paid labor and their lack of
acknowledgement that women may
interact much differently with markets than
men.66
Unpaid labor, which characterizes a
sizeable segment of women’s work – and
argan and shea production in local markets
prior to globalization – is both ignored and
delegitimized by these associations. Such a
characterization restricts the vehicle of
empowerment to a particular sphere of
participation: the formal market that offers
wage labor. Argan and shea processing are
only useful activities when fully integrated
into a formal, capital market. Why is this
problematic? If women feel empowered
through earning formal wages, do
characterizations of unpaid labor matter?
Earlier sections of this paper cited the rural
development narrative that actually views
this process as radicalization, turning
domestic work into formal labor. Indeed, in
an ethnographic study of women’s
entrepreneurship initiatives in Turkey,
Ozlem Altan-Olcay states, “on the
one hand, programs targeting women’s
entrepreneurship encourage women to think
of themselves as individualized, rational
agents with entrepreneurial capacities to
earn a living.” The answer to this question
leads us to another issue raised by Beneria:
that women and men are shaped differently
by market participation because of other
embedded power dynamics at play.
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Interrogating the Neoliberal Paradigm
As established, social enterprises and
women’s cooperatives are deeply embedded
within the neoliberal development
framework, resting on presuppositions about
the market’s power to work against poverty
and assumptions about barriers to this
market participation. This section highlights
the potential for disempowerment
manifested in these strategies, utilizing
feminist, sociological, and anthropological
critiques of the neoliberal paradigm. These
criticisms first contest the idea that market
participation can actually free women from
patriarchy and further suggest that
participation in the global market imposes
yet another structure of power, the
exploitative capitalist system, on
vulnerable women in the developing world.
Feminist Critiques
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Feminist economists argue that in the
context of the neoliberal paradigm, female
capabilities are still restricted to and defined
by patriarchal interpretations of
emancipation. These reproaches reject the
idea that once women are given the chance
to operate in the male space of the market,
only then do they become rational,
empowered individuals. They find this
principle to be paradoxical and
disempowering in its delegitimization of
unpaid feminine labor that sustained many
communities and societies for generations.
In the setting of argan oil and shea butter
specifically, the paradigm runs
the risk of slowly denigrating the spiritual,
cosmological, and social value the two
products have held long before they
provided any income by affixing the source
empowerment to wages.
These feminist economists further
assert that capital market participation alone
does not free women from patriarchy – and
freedom from patriarchy does not liberate
women from potential capitalist
exploitation. For example, economists and
anthropologists examining the household
effects of higher returns to female income
conclude that while a woman may make
more money, her ability to actually use it in
her household is another question entirely.
Documentation shows that for many women
an income-generating opportunity does not
immediately translate to control over fiscal
decisions. In surveys conducted with
Indonesian women medicinal entrepreneurs,
Maria Constanza Torri found that 40% of
the businesswomen she spoke to emphasized
the conflicts that arose at home over the use

of her income.67 Banerjee of the MIT
Poverty Action Lab presents similar findings
from surveys of female business-owners
throughout slum communities in South
Indian cities.68 In my own interviews of
female businesswomen in the Rabat medina,
50% of the women I spoke with expressed
frustrations of a lack of financial control.69
Second, though they may be
generating income outside the home,
“women are expected to utilize their
entrepreneurship for the benefit of their
families, coded as part of their caregiving
responsibility.”70 Sure enough, Nadia Fatmi
from Tighanimine Cooperative says herself
“women are the only ones who can really
benefit their family. They are the future.”71
The Grameen Bank chooses to target its
loans towards women because they are more
likely to use their extra income to invest in
the community around them than spend it on
themselves. The burden of “development”
then, whether for the individual household
or community as a whole, rests solely on the
women’s shoulders, subjugating her as an
object of the development cause. Her
income-generating capacities are still
inextricably linked to her patriarchally
defined responsibilities. These discussions
poke holes in the household bargaining
theory and suggest that alone, paid labor is
simply not enough to positively interact with
other structures of dominance keeping
women disempowered. And while incomegenerating opportunities may offer women a
chance to cultivate economic capabilities,
they also subject these women to a new set
of power structures extending even beyond

67

69

Torri, Maria Constanza, “The JAMU System in
Indonesia: Linking Small-Scale Enterprises, Traditional
Knowledge and Social Empowerment Among Women in
Indonesia.” Journal of International Women’s Studies, 13,
no. 1 (2012): 32-45.
68
Banerjee, Abhijeet, and Esther Duflo. Poor Economics:
A Radical Rethinking of the Way we Fight Global Poverty.
New York: Public Affairs (2011).
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Rao, Sruthi. “Ingénues of Enterprising: An Investigative
Profile of Female Entrepreneurs in the Rabat Medina.”
School for International Training, 2014.
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Altan-Olcay, Ozlem, “Entrepreneurial Subjectivities and
Gendered Complexities: Neoliberal Citizenship in Turkey.”
Feminist Economics, 20, no. 4 (2013): 235-259.
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71 Fair Trade Connection, “Tighanimine l’huile du
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the distinct systems of patriarchy and
poverty.
Fair, Pure, Organic: The Finicky Consumer
of the Global North
From a more macro perspective and
most salient in the context of this paper’s
analysis is this: when the vehicles of
entrepreneurship, the enterprises themselves,
are built on products that are appealing to
the ever-changing tastes of a far-flung
consumer, the problems embedded in this
neoliberal paradigm of development become
even more acute. These foundational
problems are what Beneria calls the
“broader power inequalities” unaddressed by
market-based institutions.72 To probe this
inequality, I return to the dialogue on the
argan and shea booms, and examine the
relationship between the consumer side of
the boom, and the producer, supply-side of
the boom.
The growth in popularity for shea
and argan products in the Global North,
constituted a globalized market shock that
began in the mid-1990s and continued into
the early 2000s. This boom is made unique
by the accompanying marketing narrative of
socially conscious consumerism, couched
within the framework of the fair trade social
movement. Socially conscious consumption,
sometimes called ethical consumerism, or
moral shopping, has been defined in a
variety of ways in sociological literature,
from a consumer “taking into account the
public consequences of their private
consumption,” to “one who uses their
purchasing power to bring about social
change,” and finally “taking responsibility
for one’s day-to-day impact upon the
world,” via buying.7374
72

Beneria, Lourdes, “Globalization, Gender, and the Davos
Man.”
73
Clark, Duncan and Richie Unterberger. The Rough
Guide to Shopping with a Conscience. London: Penguin
74
Webster, Rough Frederick Guides E. (2007).

104

In the context of cosmetic argan and
shea, this narrative of conscious
consumerism is oft employed as a bulwark
marketing strategy, where the wellbeing of
poor women in Africa producing the goods
is intimately linked with the purchase of the
product. The primary consumer
demographic of argan and shea are wealthier
women from the Global North with a vested
interest in purchasing cosmetic products for
their exotic and wondrous properties and
effects. Shea and argan-based cosmetics are
marketed on the global stage as “win-win”
products: on one hand they offer a novel and
exotic solution to beauty problems. On the
other hand, they are an opportunity for
disadvantaged women in the Global South to
become independent. L’Occitane and Josie
Maran, cosmetics brands referenced prior,
boast distinct campaigns utilizing rhetoric
that characterizes their products as “Luxury
with Conscience” and “Women’s Gold.”75
This rhetoric, accompanied with
images of traditionally-garbed West African
and Moroccan women working against an
African countryside backdrop appeal greatly
not only to a Global North consumer’s
ethos, but also to their desire for
“authenticity,” “purity,” and “naturalness.”
Such images firmly locate the female
Moroccan or Burkinabe producer as the
“other,” a cavern of mystical beauty
regimens and an artifact of fantasy.
Purchasing the goods allows the consumer
to dip into the romanticized exotic. bell
hooks observes this phenomenon as “eating
the Other,” maintaining that the
consumption of such exotic goods “allows
privileged consumers to assert their power

“Determining the Characteristics of the Socially Conscious
Consumer.” Journal of Consumer Research, 2, no. 3
(1975): 188-196
75
See Appendix A: Figures 4-7
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over the ‘ethnic’ cultures they consume.”76
Indeed, even indigenous producers appeal to
this language. Al-Amal Oils, a Moroccan
firm founded by a Moroccan-American
businesswoman, proudly showcases its
partnership with “Berber women’s
cooperatives” in an effort to share “ancient”
and “secret” Moroccan beauty rituals that
have “not yet been discovered by the
Western world.” The company also states its
commitment to provide “sustainable support
for Moroccan women entrepreneurs.”77
There are two fundamental issues
with this employed lexicon. First, the
rhetoric creates an implicit dependency of
the producer on the consumer’s desire for
exotic, pure goods. It reinforces the dynamic
between the socio-economically privileged
consumer, made even more powerful by
their demand, and the producer, from a
vulnerable population with a livelihood that
rests on this continuous demand. Second,
this implicit dependency is further
dangerous in that if the tastes of the
consumer change, the producer
no longer has a consumer base.
Chalfin compares the explosion of
shea popularity to the similar cocoa butter
boom that exploded just twenty-five years
prior. The 1960s and 70s saw a marked rise
in demand for cocoa butter by European
chocolate producers and wealthy chocolate
consumers: production in leading cocoa
producers Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana rose
significantly, and prices increased. As
chocolate makers eagerly scooped up
portions of the cocoa market, cocoa butter
slowly became a ubiquitous product – and
its previous notions of naturalness and

uniqueness began to fade – a phenomenon
Chalfin calls the “massification” of cocoa.78
Chocolate producers were no longer willing
to pay the high price for unwanted cocoa
butter. Thus, in the early 1990s, demand for
cocoa butter steadily declined as chocolate
confectioners in the United States and
Europe found cheaper and more interesting
substitutes to use (shea butter being one of
them), and cocoa farmers could not adapt
without state assistance. The weakening of
the cocoa sector had broad consequences for
the sustainability of cocoa growers’
livelihoods, and prompted vehement
opposition from the cocoa-growing
community, who “...can point to the chaos,
losses, quality deterioration and loss of
market value across the region caused by
collapse.”79
In parallel, ironically, the popularity
of shea and argan is actually bound to
perceptions of their purity– as alternatives
to the mass-produced beauty products of the
capitalist cosmetics market. These notions of
authenticity and exoticism held by the
privileged consumer can wear away, just as
they did with cocoa butter (the cocoa market
exhibited volatility in a span of about 20
years). As demand grows, and production to
match it, as multinational cosmetics and
beauty firms scramble to get a hand in the
argan and shea markets, the presence of
argan and shea products may reach a critical
mass, seen everywhere from neighborhood
drugstores to high-end beauty counters.
Once demand peaks, consumer disinterest in
argan and shea could follow, and the very
structures of supply and demand chains

76

79

bell hooks, “Eating the Other: Desire and Resistance.”
Black Looks: Race and Representation. New York: South
End Press (1992).
77
Al Amal Oils. “About Amal Oils.” Last modified 2015.
Accessed November 2, 2015. http://www.amaloils.com/
78
Chalfin, Brenda. Shea Butter Republic: State Power,
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propping up these social enterprises may fall
apart.
So here is a touted development
strategy that has indeed embraced
Bourdieu’s “domination by insecurity,” with
the livelihoods of vulnerable, poor women
precariously perched on the fluid vanities of
a cosmetics consumer in Global North. The
gains provided by this surrender to the
perilous global market are empirically
minimal – and insufficient to blind us to the
long-term underlying frailties of these
enterprises. Ultimately, these women’s
livelihoods are sustained on the
“otherization” of both the
producer and the product, a configuration
that fundamentally contradicts conceptions
of empowerment. Through the lens of these
criticisms, these enterprises are not
necessarily cultivating independence, but
rather shifting the dependency of these
women onto another, perhaps even more
powerful set of actors.
Marjana and the Paradigm
I want to return to the floral-djellaba
clad cooperative member from the first
anecdote of this paper, the first woman I
spoke to at Marjana. In a way, her equivocal
answer to my inquiry set the tone for the rest
of my discussions with the Marjana women.
Their lived experiences neither fully confirm
nor fully challenge the neoliberal
development paradigm, or its critiques. On
one hand, many women expressed general
amity towards their experiences at Marjana,
telling me how they enjoyed the chance to
spend time with other women in space that
was not intrinsically domestic. They could
gossip, share and vent their lives to one
another within the cooperative walls – even
share their lives with me. On the other hand,
none of the women emphasized any concrete
economic benefit they received from
participating in Marjana. These attitudes
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seem to undermine the mainstream narrative
hailing the definitive positive economic
effects of social enterprises.
And most remarkably, the
cooperative women did not engage with the
sales side of the enterprise altogether. After
our tour of Marjana, the cooperative
managers (interestingly men) led us to the
product showroom to browse and shop.
Tourists filled the showroom, assisted by
saleswomen recommending the best
products for anti-aging and dry skin. There
was no real trace of any of the women I had
interviewed on the oil bottle labels, soaps, or
lotions – only small print touting the “madeby-women, organic, 100% natural” motto. It
was as if a curtain had descended between
us as I returned to my role as a privileged
argan consumer and they to nameless,
faceless producers hidden away. This was an
unsettling conclusion to the trip. I wondered
how many tour groups passed through
Marjana, indulging in the spectacle of these
women harvesting nuts for a second before
purchasing famous Moroccan argan oil, in
some ways just as I had done.
These moments following the
interviews made me recognize my own role
in perpetuating the dependency of these
women on my consumer choices, and put
their answers to my questions in a wider
perspective. Now that I can take my own
positionality in tandem with the analysis of
the potential problems niche product social
enterprises, I see how this episode at
Marjana gives credence to the issues of
power dynamics underpinning these
development strategies. And in truth, no
matter what the marketing material told me,
I had no hand in empowering these women.
They were – they are – mothers, sisters,
wives, and most importantly women who in
many ways did not suddenly
derive empowerment from just the
cooperative, but had already cultivated it
through making choices for themselves and
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their families. Electing to participate in
Marjana in the first place, leaving the
cooperative after years of little palpable
gain, joining in order
to send a daughter to school. These are all
decisions these women took upon
themselves that extend beyond any
economic model – and yet went overlooked
by the Marjana Cooperative narrative, a
narrative that strangely fixated on me more
than them.

developing world are structured in the
future.

Conclusion
Locating the activities of shea butter
and argan oil cooperatives within the
neoliberal development paradigm brought
up questions of its merits in practice – not
only for argan and shea economies, but
woman-centered economic activities and
development initiatives all over the world.
The paradigm is centered on a series of
assumptions, first, about the power of capital
markets to positively impact livelihoods, and
second, about the obstacles preventing the
poor from market participation. But the
paradigm also suffers from critical
shortcomings from feminist and sociological
perspectives. These shortcomings become
more prominent when seen through the lens
of argan and shea-based social enterprises.
Pairing these discussions with my
ethnographic field research from an argan
cooperative in Morocco, as well as empirical
studies on the economic effectiveness of
social enterprise in alleviating poverty
complicated the debate on the
short-term benefits and long-term fragilities
of women-focused, market-based
development strategies. My hope is that this
dialogue can eventually situate itself in
development discourse that incorporates
transnational feminist and feminist
economic perspectives to inform the way in
which initiatives targeting women of the
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